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ABSTRACT
The South China Sea dispute challenges the future development of
maritime legal order and international law. China’s behavior in the South China
Sea challenges widely accepted rules governing maritime jurisdiction worldwide
as it tries to expand the limits of its jurisdiction. In China’s view, the Arbitral
Tribunal in Philippines v. China also challenged the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS
by taking a highly political issue related to sovereignty. This thesis argues that
mere rhetorical rejection of China’s actions in the South China Sea will not
determine the resolution of the dispute. China’s behavior will be dependent on
striking the right balance between domestic and international priorities. These
priorities include a combination of political stability, economic satisfaction, thirdparty involvement, and balance of power. This thesis examines the development
of international law and its limitations in light of China’s domestic and foreign
policies, justification for its behavior, and the reaction of other states.
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INTRODUCTION
Lights! Amidst the sticky summer heat of Times Square in New York City,
people bustle beneath illuminated billboards advertising Broadway productions, the latest
Apple gadget, and the McDonald’s McRib. The year is 2016. There is too much
entertainment news going on. No one expects to see an international dispute in this part
of town. However, between July 23 and August 3, Xinhua, the Chinese State news
agency, produced a three-minute video clip that was shown 120 times a day on a giant
screen hovering 2 Times Square at the corner of 46th St. and 7th Ave.1 The video starts
with pictures of fishing boats and islands followed by captions describing how China
discovered the South China Sea islands in the 2nd century BCE. Next, it tells how other
countries never contested how China exercised sovereignty over the islands since they
were discovered. The video continues to denounce how the “Arbitral Tribunal vainly
attempted to deny China’s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights, and interests in the
South China Sea.” Further, it argues that “China did not participate in the illegal South
China Sea arbitration, nor accepts the Award so as to defend the solemnity of
international law.” John Ross, former policy director of Economic and Business Policy
for the Mayor’s Office of London, Catherine West, UK Shadow Minister for Foreign

1

Nancy Kong. “South China Sea video playing in Times Square.” China Daily, (2016).
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-07/27/content_26235718.htm Accessed January 20, 2021; Gu
Liping. “South China Sea video displayed at NY Times Square.” Xinhua, (2016)
http://www.ecns.cn/2016/07-28/220094.shtml Accessed January 20, 2021.
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Affairs in 2016, and Masood Khalid, Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, are shown
in the video voicing support for China’s calls to bilaterally settle the dispute between
China and Southeast Asian countries.
The South China Sea is bounded by Taiwan and the Hainan Province to the north,
Vietnam to the west, the Philippines to the east, and Borneo to the South. It is estimated
that about 60% of the world’s maritime shipping passes through the South China Sea and
the seabed contains one of the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves.2 Two island
groups are primarily contested: the Spratly Islands located about 175 nautical miles west
of the Philippine-island of Palawan and the Paracel Islands located 120 nautical miles
east of Vietnam’s Quảng Ngãi Province.
The way China made known its position on the arbitration, from July 23 to
August 6 at Times Square, speaks volumes as to how China wanted to influence
international public opinion and thereby influence governments to conclude that its
claims are legitimate. Not only was Times Square an unusual venue to disseminate
propaganda on a global issue, but it was also concerning that the Chinese state was
spreading a narrative that distorted the facts in the middle of one of the world’s busiest
pedestrian areas.
Two weeks before the Times Square show, on July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in the Hague unanimously ruled that China’s historical and jurisdictional
claims in the South China Sea were incompatible with the U.N. Convention on the Law

2

CSIS. “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transitssouth-china-sea/ Accessed June 8, 2021; CSIS. “South China Sea Energy Exploration and Development.”
https://amti.csis.org/south-china-sea-energy-exploration-and-development/ Accessed June 8, 2021
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of the Sea (UNCLOS) in Philippines v. China. The Philippines had filed a complaint
against China in 2013 arguing that (1) the seabed and the maritime features of the South
China Sea were to be governed under the UNCLOS, (2) that China’s “historical rights”
and “nine-dash line” theories were invalid, and (3) that China violated the Philippines
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the UNCLOS provisions on artificial islands.3 The
Tribunal ruled that (1) China did not have historic title over the islands in the South
China Sea, (2) China was obligated to protect marine environment, and (3) there was a
difference between entitlement and maritime delimitation disputes that would give the
Tribunal jurisdiction to hear the case.
There is no doubt the South China Sea dispute presents the international
community with a challenge to the future development of maritime legal order. While
there is literature discussing China’s refusal to observe international maritime order, I am
not aware of papers discussing the South China Sea dispute as a challenge to what had
been widely accepted as the rules governing maritime jurisdiction worldwide. In addition,
there has been little discussion of the compatibility of China’s assertions with the idea of
the legal equality of sovereign states, a concept central to the legal order expressed in the
United Nations Charter. In this paper, I argue that mere rhetorical rejection of China’s
actions in the South China Sea will not determine the resolution of the dispute. China’s
behavior will be dependent on striking the right balance between domestic and
international priorities. These priorities include a combination of political stability,
economic satisfaction, third-party involvement, and balance of power. I intend this thesis

3

South China Sea Arbitration (Award), 112(B)(2), 122(B)(12)(a), and 192
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to examine the development of public international law and its limitations in light of
China’s approach to international law, justification for its behavior, and the reaction of
other states.
I will first discuss the history of China’s evolving claims in the South China Sea.
An analysis of the Tribunal’s decision on admissibility and the award in Philippines v.
China will follow. This section will discuss the scope of UNCLOS and how the South
China Sea dispute challenges the limitations of international legal order and the freedom
of the seas concept. The following section will consider what possible motivations China
may have for taking a more assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea. Lastly, I will
forecast the future of the South China Sea by analyzing current trends and recommend
actions for the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries, specifically a concerted campaign to
articulate and unanimously support a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that
attempts to draw China into negotiations with the affected states. This discussion would
also include implications for U.S. foreign policy.

4

CHAPTER ONE: China’s Evolving Claims and the History of the South China Sea
Dispute

China’s main argument for the legitimacy of its claims over the South China Sea
islands is based on historical legacies as seen in the quixotic Times Square video clip and
the “nine-dash line” Chinese map presented to the U.N. Secretary General on May 7,
2009.4 This sense of entitlement to the islands is what drives Chinese foreign policy and
as long as UNCLOS provisions and U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (US
FONOPS) are enforced, Chinese foreign policy and the international community are
bound for a collision course. In order to get a clearer understanding of what China’s
historical claims are, I will use Chinese primary sources and show how China’s evolving
claims have gone from obscured distortion to blatant propaganda.
It is important to note that historical claims are not fully codified in UNCLOS but
rather based on customary international law.5 For example, the International Law
Commission in 1962 studied historical rights in relation to the maritime realm. It
“examined the elements of title to historic waters, the issues of burden of proof, the legal

4

The Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, No. CML/17/2009 (7 May 2009) (Annex 191) was
accompanied by maps depicting the “nine-dashed line.”
5

UNCLOS, arts. 5, 10, 298
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status of waters regarded as historic waters, and the settlement of disputes.”6 The study
concluded that historical claims can only be exercised if:
1.
2.
3.

authority must be actively exercised over the area by the state claiming it as
historic waters;
such exercise of authority must be continuous; and
other states must acquiesce.7

The following discussion will show that China does not meet these criteria.
Although sources may be biased, numerous scholars have relied on Chinese or
American news media for evaluating Chinese claims.8 One of the first academic articles
in English defending China’s claims in the South China Sea was written by Tao Cheng, a
professor of political science at Trenton State University. He said, “It [South China Sea]
has been an important part of the sea route from Europe to the Orient since the sixteenth
century, a haven for fishermen from the Hainan Island, and the gateway for Chinese
merchants from south China to Southeast Asia since earlier times.”9 However, none of
the writers were maritime historians but lawyers, political scientists, and geographers,
and their reliance on their sources must be verified.10 China did not play a dominant role
in the South China Sea trade, and it shared the seas with Malays, Indians, Arabs, and

6

Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 14th
session Apr. 24–June 29, 1962, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962)
7

Ibid. p.125 and 13, 80

8

Hayton, p.9; Cheng relied on Chinese commercial magazines from the 1933-34, 1956, and 1974 including
the Shanghai-based Foreign Affairs Review and the state-owned National News Weekly and Renmin
Ribao. Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho Park also used similar sources in their paper. Hayton notes that the
sources referenced by these authors were written when the South China Sea was highly politicized. France
annexed the Spratly Islands and angered China in 1933. Tomas Cloma, a Filipino businessman claimed the
Spralys for the Philippines in 1956. In 1974, the Battle of the Paracels provoked a new wave of claims.
9

Cheng 1975, p.266

10

Hayton. p.9
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Europeans.11 Early 20th century sources reveal that China did not even have the naval
capacity to govern the Chinese coast. In January 1908, The Times of London reported
uncontrolled piracy along the West River in Guangzhou.12 Similarly, in 1909, several
foreigners decided to begin illegal mining operations on Hainan Island without alerting
Chinese authorities until much later.13 What can be agreed upon is that China lacked the
capabilities and did not assert sovereignty on the South China Sea islands consistently for
centuries.

Mistranslations and the Modern Origins of China’s Claim to the South China Sea
Johannes Kurz’s article, “The South China Sea and How It Turned into
‘Historically’ Chinese Territory in 1975,” discusses the ancient Chinese texts that the
modern Chinese government is now using to justify its claims. Kurz finds that sentences
have been twisted, translations distorted, and words inserted. In 1975, “Shi Dizu,” a
pseudonym for the members of the Historical Geography Group in the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, published in Renmin Ribao, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece, a
reassertion that islands in the South China Sea historically belonged to China. 14 The
article included classical texts that purportedly support their claims.
From the Song dynasty’s Taiping Yulan, it says:
11

Bonnet, p.13; Granados, p.444

12

Chinese Foreign Relations, p. 5

13

China and Her Islands, p.8

14

Fish, Eric. “China’s Angriest Newspaper Doesn’t Speak for China.” Foreign Policy. (2017)
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/28/chinas-angriest-newspaper-doesnt-speak-for-china/ Accessed January
20, 2021.; See Gitter and Fang for more information on the CCP’s relationship with the People’s Daily and
how it functions as the CCP’s mouthpiece.
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Chen Mao from Runan once was a mounted escort/aide-de-camp
attendant (biejia) in Jiaozhi [a position] that corresponds to that of
regional acting prefect of old and he had not crossed the rising ocean.
When prefect Zhou Chang took to the sea and a wind arose that
threatened to overturn the vessel, Mao with his sword drawn, reproached
the water god and the wind immediately subsided.15
However, there is no indication in this quote that China acquired sovereignty over
territory. At best, it only indicates travel through the sea. According to Jianming Shen,
law professor at St. John's University School of Law, a quote from the Han dynasty’s
Yiwu Zhi, “Zhanghai qitou, shui qian er duo cishi” translates to “There are islets, sand
cays, reefs and banks in the South China Sea, and the water there is shallow and filled
with magnetic rocks.”16 He claims that this quote is evidence that China has title over the
South China Sea. However, the original sentence does not have anything to do with the
South China Sea or Chinese jurisdiction over a territory as shown in the original text
below. The text referred to is inside the red box. According to Wentian Fu, a professor of
Chinese History at McGill University, the translation is more like, "According to
Nanzhou yiwuzhi, Gouzhi is 800 li away from Yuyou. There is a mouth of river which
runs from southwest to northeast. Gigantic rocky reefs show up in Zhanghai, which is
shallow and abundant in magnetic rocks."17

15

Taiping yulan 60.1b (p.287)

16

Shen, p.19

17

Probably an error with the original text here since 與遊 should be 典遜
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Figure 1. Yiwu Zhi (Record of Foreign Matters) Han dynasty

The Chinese Foreign Ministry repeated Shen’s translations on November 17, 2000, to
assert its historical claims over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands.18 Shen further translates the
following sentence of the Song dynasty’s Taiping yulan: “wai jiao ren cheng da chuan,
jie yi tie die die zhi. Zhi ci guan, yi cishi, bu de guo” to:
There are islets, sand cays, reefs and banks in the South China Sea, and the water
there is shallow and filled with magnetic rocks. Officers on patrol missions took
18

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Historical Evidence To Support China’s
Sovereignty over Nansha Islands.” FMPRC. (Nov. 17, 2000)
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3754_666060/t19231.shtml Accessed January 20, 2021.
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big boats all covered with iron; when they approached the area, they could not
proceed further because of the magnetic rocks.19
Again, Shen’s translation is inaccurate. The original sentence does not have anything to
do with officers, patrol missions, and areas. According to Johannes Kurz, Shen
misinterpreted rocks into “islets, sand cays, reefs and banks”; “rising sea” into the South
China Sea; and foreigners into “officers on patrol missions.”20 Shen mistranslated a
foreign boat into a Chinese vessel to provide evidence that Chinese officials inspected a
maritime area controlled by China without reference that the area was actually shared by
several Southeast Asian mariners including China. The original text is copied below for
reference. The arrow marks where the passage begins.

Figure 2. Taiping Yulan (Imperial Reader) Song dynasty

19

Shen, p.19

20

Kurz (2019), p. 139

10

According to Wentian Fu, the translation more likely goes,
According to Nanzhou yiwuzhi (Records of Exotic Matters in the Southern
Region), rising sea and rocky stones, is of shallow water and magnetic rocks. The
big boats of some foreigners were covered by iron clads. So when they sailed
here, they cannot pass because of the magnetic rocks.
Thus, the mistranslations show that Jianming Shen and Tao Cheng tried to spread a
narrative that distorted the facts. These mistranslations were the basis of statements from
the Chinese Foreign Ministry since 2000.
One aspect of China’s historical rights claim is that it was the first country to
develop the Spratly Islands, one of the most important island clusters in the South China
Sea and partly claimed by the Philippines. According to the British Navy’s 1868 Guide to
the South China Sea:
fishermen from Hainan Island went to Zhenhe Isles and Reefs and lived on sea
cucumber and shells they got there. The footmarks of fishermen could be found in
every isle of the Nansha Islands and some of the fishermen would even live there
for a long period of time. Every year, there were small boats departing from
Hainan Island for the Nansha Islands to exchange rice and other daily necessities
for sea cucumber and shells from the fishermen there.
However, evidence contradicting this claim is strong. One of the most telling pieces of
evidence contradicting China’s claims is a statement by Lai Enjue, a military general
during the Qing dynasty. In 1841, he reported to the Qing government that Hong Kong
was in the “outer seas.”21 Similarly, in the 1850s, the provincial admiral of Guangdong
reported that “the barbarian seas of Black Water (Heishui) facing Hong Kong” was part

21

Memorial by Yishan, Qi Shen, Qigong, and Liang Baochang, DG 21/11/xinwei (2 January 1842),
YWSM DG 40/26.
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of the “outer seas to the southwest.”22 By labeling Hong Kong’s surrounding waters as
“outer seas,” the Qing acknowledged that those waters went beyond their jurisdiction.
Further, labelling them as “barbarian seas” seems to be projecting otherness and distances
the Qing from people living in Hong Kong waters. Although the 1868 British navy
guidebook quote may imply that Chinese fishermen went to the Spratlys for trade, it
certainly does not give China sovereignty over the Spratlys.
The Foreign Ministry also notes how fishermen’s “Road Maps” or “genglubu,”
nautical guidebooks are historical sources proving China claim to the South China Sea. In
2016, the Chinese government reported that Su Chengfen, an elderly Chinese fisherman
living in Hainan, possessed a 600-year old genglubu that shows how to get to the Spralys,
Xisha (Paracels), and Huangyan (Scarborough Shoal).23 According to state-run media,
the ancient guidebook provided “ironclad proof of Chinese ownership” and sovereignty
over the islands.24 However, when John Sudworth from the BBC tried to ask Su Chengfen
to see the route book, Sudworth was told that he threw it away because it was already
damaged, a proposition that challenges credulity in light of the obvious evidentiary value
for the Chinese position such a guidebook would have.25 The mysterious disappearance

22

Report by the Admiral of the Guangdong Provincial Water Force, undated (c. 1850s), FO 931/1047.

23

Marnie O’Neill. “China says 600-year-old fisherman’s book ‘iron-clad’ proof of sovereignty over
disputed South China Sea islands.” News.com.au. https://www.news.com.au/technology/science/chinasays-600yearold-fishermans-book-ironclad-proof-of-sovereignty-over-disputed-south-china-seaislands/news-story/b489f29673e27dc5f9e8f1074ede8a9a Accessed January 20, 2021; Li Xiaokun and Liu
Xiaoli. “Ancient book ‘provides ironclad proof of Chinese ownership.’” China Daily. (May 24, 2016)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05/24/content_25433846.htm Accessed January 20, 2021.
24

Ibid.

25

John Sudworth. “South China Sea: Does a book prove China’s claim?” BBC. (June 19, 2016)
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-36562116 Accessed January 20, 2021.
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of the genglubu might point out that it had no supporting evidence of China’s claims.
After all, this source would have significantly improved China’s argument in the South
China Sea.
In the same statement, the Foreign Ministry also claimed that China was the first
country to exercise jurisdiction over the Spratlys. The Qing dynasty did not recognize
Hong Kong’s waters as its territorial sea and therefore could not assert jurisdiction farther
out. However, the Ministry’s article claims that the Memorial Tablet of the Tomb to
General Qian Shicai of the Hainan Garrison Command of the Ming Dynasty reads:
“Guangdong is adjacent to the grand South China Sea, and the territories beyond the Sea
all internally belong to the Ming State.” According to the Ministry, “General Qian led
more than ten thousand soldiers and 50 huge ships to patrol tens of thousands of li on the
South China Sea.”

Reaction vs. Entitlement from the End of Qing dynasty to the End of the Civil War
China tried to make its historical claims persuasive. Some Chinese scholars and
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs constructed a national narrative that China’s claims
could be traced back to ancient texts. However, mistranslations, garbled sentences, and
confusing Chinese claims have raised more questions than answers and shaped the
geopolitical situation in the South China Sea today. Moreover, China’s claims in the 20th
century were shaped by the decline of economic satisfaction and nationalist legitimacy
and not preexisting claims. Thus, China’s historical argument is unpersuasive and
appears more reactional rather than a strong entitlement to the islands. The following
13

discussion shows that China did not exercise continuous presence in the South China Sea.
This implies that China’s claims are not well founded.
China first asserted sovereignty on Pratas Island, about 410 km southwest of
Taiwan, in 1909. However, China reacted with reluctance after U.S. Secretary of War
William Taft told the Qing government on his visit to China in December 1907 that
Nishizawa Yoshizi, a Japanese entrepreneur, settled in Pratas and started a guano
collecting business.26 Taft may have been worried about the implications of a Japanese
settlement near the Philippines, a newly acquired U.S. colony.27 Nevertheless, China took
two years to gather a fleet and force out Nishizawa to complete the 1909 Pratas
settlement, suggesting that China did not continuously exercise sovereignty over Pratas. 28
The next time China asserted sovereignty on the South China Sea was in 1933.
However, examining the period between 1909 and 1933 may reveal their motivations to
make their claims publicly known within China.29 In 1911, the Qing government finally
collapsed after dealing with the Chinese Famine of 1907. People had mixed feelings with
foreign armies stationed in China and they were discontent with the way the Qing failed
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to uphold Chinese sovereignty in the wake of foreigners whom the people distrusted.30
The Wuchang Uprising led to the creation of a new central government, the Republic of
China (ROC), in Nanjing with Sun Yat-sen as its head. Qing loyalists staged revolts and
China fell into disarray. In 1913, Guangdong officials refused to pay for lighthouses in
the Paracels despite demands from ships running aground or wrecking on the reefs.31 In
1921, Sun Yat-sen licensed the Paracels Archipelago Industries Ltd. to mine guano on the
islands. This started a controversy that the company was a front for Japanese interests and
people demanded the license revoked.32 According to Ulises Granados, British
intelligence reported, that “the southern government also negotiated a so-called ‘Hainan
Loan’ with a Japanese national so as to cede all development rights of the island in
exchange for an alleged sum of 20 million yen”33 Arguably, what led Sun to agree to
foreign development were the economic, political, and social challenges his Nationalist
government was facing as well as China’s incapability to sustain travel between mainland
China and the Paracels. The implications of the North China Famine of 1920 starved
millions and warlords battled with politicians for control over resources.34 The Chinese
Communist Party, founded in 1921, presented a challenge to Sun’s fledgling
government’s efforts to gain legitimacy. The South China Sea islands gained Chinese
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attention again in February 1928 when Guangdong officials convened a conference
appointing Professor Shen Pengfei of the Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, to
investigate the situation of the Paracels.35 Bill Hayton hypothesizes that the timing for
Chinese renewed interest in the Paracels may have been because China viewed Japan as a
military threat now and asserting sovereignty over the Paracels was a means to legitimize
the nationalist government after the Communist-led Guangzhou Uprising.36 Sun’s
government wanted to show legitimacy in the face of a rising Communist government
and Japan. The ability to show control over territory was important for Sun’s government
as the Communists and Japan were challenging Sun’s government. This is evidence that
China’s assertion of sovereignty was reactionary and not well founded. It should also be
added that starting in December 1927, China was going through “excessive dryness” and
locusts had brought “natural calamity” to seventy counties in north China.37 Faced with
the threat of disunity, the newly installed Chiang Kai-shek launched his own Department
for Relief Affairs in 1928 and partnered with the China International Famine Relief
Commission to provide relief services in famine-stricken provinces.38 Shen’s Reports on
the Investigation of the Paracel Islands published in 1928 focused on the need to develop
the islands, extract its resources, and establish Chinese sovereignty. It starts with a
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declaration “The Paracel archipelago is our nation’s southernmost territory.”39 In 1928,
Guangdong authorities commissioned Chen Tianxi to write A Compilation of Materials
Concerning the Xisha and Dongsha Islands Case as evidence supporting their historical
claim to the islands. Arguably, scarcity of resources in the homeland forced the
government to find resources offshore. For the Chiang government, claiming the Paracels
as historically Chinese unified public opinion towards the goal of restoring entitlement as
well as establish a new source for food and resources. Chiang’s government established
the Inspection Regulations of Land and Water Maps and mandated the Land and Water
Maps Review Committee in January 1930 to legitimize its new claims. However, due to
political instability, it would take three years to hold its first meeting on June 7, 1933, in
time for another crisis.40
In the face of Chinese claims, on July 14, 1933, France annexed the Spratly
Islands and included them in French Indochina.41 However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
protested stating: “The coral islands between the Philippines and Annam are inhabited
only by Chinese fishermen, and are internationally recognized as Chinese territories.”42
China based its protests on the 1887 Sino-French treaty.43 The treaty says, “The north-
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south line passing through the eastern point of island of Tcha’s-Kou or Ouan-Chan (Tra
Co) which form the boundary, are also allocated to China.” Thus, the treaty established a
French claim to areas in the South China Sea lying west of a line 105° 43' and Chinese
sovereignty on anything east of the line. While the Spratlys do lie east of the line, the
purpose of the text was to allocate coastal islands in the Gulf of Tonkin and did not
mention archipelagos or islands and reaffirmed Paragraph 2, Art. 3 of the 1885 Treaty of
Tientsin. Further, it took China until 1988 to physically occupy any of the islands.
Putting the misinterpretation of the 1887 Sino-French treaty in context, the fact
was China did not know where the Paracel or Spratly islands were to begin with. When
there were news of French and Japanese infringement of Chinese territory, China
responded with confusion over the location of the Spratlys and the Paracels.44 FrancoisXavier Bonnet found U.S. records attesting that Chinese authorities in Nanjing requested
their consul in Manila to ask the American colonial authorities for a map showing where
the Spratly Islands were located.45 In a meeting of China’s Military Council on
September 1, 1933, it was recorded that “All our professional geographers say that Triton
Island [in the Paracels] is the southernmost island of our territory” and China
acknowledged that it had no claim over the Spratlys.46 However, the Southwest Political
Council was convinced that France annexed Chinese territory.47 Bill Hayton argues that
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this confusion “provoked consternation and nationalist anger among the Chinese
public.”48 Three years later, Bai Meichu, a geography professor at the Beijing Normal
University, drew the first U-shaped line in the South China Sea in his 1936 New Atlas of
China’s Construction.49

Figure 3. Bai Meichu's 1936 New Atlas of China's Construction
48
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A closer look also reveals non-existent islands. Recreating the U-shaped line on a modern
map shows that the China’s southernmost claim that should represent James Shoal is in
the wrong place when compared to a modern map.

Figure 4. Closeup of Bai Meichu's 1936 New Atlas of China's Construction (U-shaped line
on the satellite image was drawn by the author)

The French fled the South China Sea in 1939 when Japan took over during World War II.
Japan used the Spratly’s strategic location to launch invasions and block Allied
shipping.50 After the war, Japan retreated from the islands. In 1946, in accordance with
the 1943 Cairo Declaration, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government coordinated a
diplomatic and military plan to take over the Paracels by the end of 1946. This does not
50
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validate China’s historical rights to the islands, but Chiang’s government found this
opportunity to unify the country in light of the islands economic and nationalistic
potentials.51 The first issue was timing. In a joint meeting between the Foreign Ministry,
Defense Ministry, Minister of the Interior, and the Naval Command, it was mentioned
that stationing and inspection could be carried out simultaneously, because “if the troops
arrive after the scouting is done, it will take too long and may draw the attention of other
countries, or we may even lag behind them.”52 The second issue was how to occupy the
islands. This included officials from the Foreign and Defense Ministries, Naval
Command, and the Guangdong province to land on the Paracels followed by troops,
building weather stations, and housing.53 The third aspect to consider was the permanent
construction plans for the islands, including establishing governance institutions,
ensuring logistics, and developing the islands.54 The fourth issue was how to respond to
diplomatic pressure. The meeting concluded that “with regard to the sovereignty issue, it
is better to create established fact,” and thus the government of the ROC “would not raise
the issue of sovereignty for the time being.” “All source materials concerning
sovereignty” would be “compiled by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense,
and the Naval Command and transmitted to the Foreign Ministry for future use.” The
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Ministry of Education would be responsible for the revision of geography textbooks.55
The fact that the government was concerned about how to assert sovereignty over the
islands is evidence that they did not always control the islands and taking over the islands
now may politically backfire if other nations protested China’s claims. On one of these
trips, Zheng Ziyue, a geographer professor at the Beijing Normal University and a
committee member of the Ministry of the Interior, joined the Nationalist fleet to survey
the islands.56 He was instrumental to producing the Location Sketch Map of the South
China Sea Islands in 1946, the first official publication of a map showing a U-shaped
dashed line.57 Going back to the archives, Chris Chung points out that the minutes agreed
upon on September 26, 1946, accompanying the Location Sketch Map, by the Nationalist
government included the scope of what China would claim in the South China Sea.58
Resolved matters:
The case of how to delimit the scope of what is to be received [from Japan] for
the purpose of reclaiming [lit., "receiving"] each of the islands in the South China
Sea.
Resolution: As according to the scope shown in the Ministry of the Interior's copy
of the Location Sketch Map of the South China Sea Islands, After the Executive
Yuan has checked and approved [the scope], it will order the Guangdong
provincial government to comply [and carry it out]. (MOFA, file series
019.3/0012, file 097)
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Chung argues that in the original text, the dual use of the verb “to receive” 接收 reflected
China’s view that the islands were originally theirs. It was “reclaiming” them from Japan,
which had recently surrendered.59 He also points out that mention of waters around the
islands is absent.60 This implies that not all of the area within the U-shaped line was
being claimed by China but only its islands. This contradicts China’s claims today that
everything within the nine-dash line is China’s territorial sea. It is also interesting to note
that the Location Map printed in 1947 contains the inaccurate non-existent islands at the
southern edge of Bai Meichu’s 1936 map. A comparison below (Figure 6) shows their
similarities.
Another noteworthy feature in the comparison is the change from Bai Meichu’s
continuous line to the 1947 broken line. Although it is unclear what brought about this
change, it may be argued that the dashed line was not meant to be a maritime boundary
line but only a scope of territory without claiming the waters surrounding the islands.61
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Figure 5. 1947 Location Sketch Map of the South China Sea Islands
24

Figure 6. 1947 Location Map vs. Bai Meichu's 1936 Map (arrows drawn by the author)

Therefore, the years between the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and China’s takeover of the
Spratlys in 1947 were critical for China’s assertion of sovereignty over the islands and
the genesis of its evolving claims in the South China Sea. Chiang’s Nationalist
government was also embroiled in a civil war with Communist forces from 1945 to 1949
and lost the Chinese mainland by the end of 1949. Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, and the Communist party took over the
government.
25

Mao Zedong’s Policy on the South China Sea
Shortly after, in 1949, China dropped its claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, changing
the eleven dashes to nine. Some scholars point out that Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong
approved the deletion of the two dashes when China transferred its sovereignty on Bạch
Long Vĩ Island over to Vietnam to support its resistance against the French and anticommunist forces.62 Under Mao, China only claimed over the islands and did not intend
the South China Sea to be part of its territorial sea as stated in the 1958 Declaration on
China’s Territorial Sea.
The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China shall be twelve
nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the People’s Republic of
China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan
and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands and all other islands belonging to
China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high
seas.
Although there is no mention of the nine-dash line, China acknowledged that it has
jurisdiction on “all other islands belonging to China which were separated from the
mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.” However, it also noted that high seas
existed. Thus, it would not be possible for China to extend its claim over the entire South
China Sea as its historic waters.
To be clear, China has not defined how it classifies the nine-dash line. It does
seem to claim the 12 nautical mile territorial sea starting from the Paracels and Spratlys
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baseline, not from individual islands. However, the baselines cannot be awarded this right
because many of these features are artificial islands and cannot sustain life.63
The year 1956 saw a renewed interest in the South China Sea. China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) reestablished its garrison on Yongxing Island in the Paracels
while the remnant Nationalist government in Taipei (ROC) stationed troops on Taiping
Island in the Spratlys.64 Shao Xunzheng, a researcher in the No. 3 History Research
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, wrote in Renmin ribao that there were
texts that supported China’s historical claims over the Paracels.65 Given that Renmin
ribao (People’s Daily) is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and publications are carefully curated by the Party, the CCP was
charting a course that would determine the narrative of its assertion of sovereignty in the
South China Sea moving forward.

Challenging China’s Claims
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However, China’s claims have been challenged. South Vietnam reestablished the
abandoned French camp on Shanhu Island in the Paracels, however its focus on defeating
North Vietnam proved to be expensive and it scaled back its forces in Shanhu Island to a
weather observation garrison. There are no records that China objected to South
Vietnamese presence in the Paracels despite North Vietnam’s recognition of the Paracels
and Spratlys as China’s territory.66 Filipino lawyer and businessman Tomás Cloma
financed an expedition to the Spratlys and claimed it as Freedomland for the Philippines
in 1956.67 In his “Notice to the Whole World”, Cloma based his claims on terra nullius
since Japan renounced ownership of the Spratlys in the San Francisco Peace Conference
in 1951. The ROC sent naval vessels to the Spratlys to contest Cloma’s claims and
demanded that Cloma recognize the Spratlys as Chinese territory.68 Cloma lost his claims
to the Spratlys, but Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos declared a majority of the
Spratlys as Philippine territory in 1978.69
The South China Sea remained tense but peaceful between 1956 and 1973.
During this time, North and South Vietnam were embroiled in disputes. This conflict
would later be a proxy war between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union. On the
domestic front, China went through a chaotic Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976.
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According to Mao Zedong, the Revolution’s goal was to crack down on remnants of
capitalism in Chinese society. The Philippines established diplomatic ties with China in
1975. It claimed some islands near the Spratlys as Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), 280
nautical miles northwest of mainland Philippines after the Taiwanese navy attacked a
Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba in 1971.70

Solidifying its Claims to the Islands
The next drama to unfold in the South China Sea was the Battle of the Paracel
Islands in 1974 between China and South Vietnam. This time, it was about energy
security rather than food security. In mid-1973, South Vietnam granted energy
exploration rights to Western companies to conduct geological surveys near the Crescent
Group in the Paracels. In the summer of 1973, South Vietnam formally declared Saigon’s
administrative control over the Paracels. It would later send warships to protect its claim.
Brunei also partnered with Shell to start offshore drilling in 1972.71 In October 1973, two
Chinese fishing trawlers landed on Duncan Island and planted Chinese flags to claim
sovereignty, followed by the construction of a seafood processing plant on Robert
Island.72 China also began drilling oil wells on Woody Island in December 1973.73 Due to
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the Cultural Revolution, China’s naval fleet was falling apart and China scrambled to
assemble its forces and respond to South Vietnam’s moves.74 South Vietnam’s assertion
of sovereignty on Chinese claimed territory might have threatened China. It could also be
argued that China already calculated that it could now use force to take away South
Vietnam’s claims since a North Vietnamese victory seemed likely by the end of 1973.75
On January 19, 1974, South Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces clashed in the Paracels.
The Chinese chose smaller and faster ships to outmaneuver the large and slower-firing
Vietnamese fleet.76 China won the Battle of the Paracels, took over the Vietnameseoccupied islands, and braced for a counterattack that never came. This was the first time
China used its military to forcefully remove a claimant in the South China Sea. What was
different now was that China had superior material capability to assert sovereignty over
the Paracels compared to South Vietnam. The appearance of missile-armed frigates
tipped the regional naval balance of power in China’s favor.77 China calculated that the
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U.S. would not aid South Vietnam since it just withdrew from the region following heavy
losses during the Vietnam War. This left South Vietnam to fend for itself. 78 Further, the
U.S. was trying to warm up relations with China following the Sino-American
rapprochement in 1972. It could be argued that China knew the U.S. would think twice
before confronting Chinese forces and risk jeopardizing each other’s partnership in
counterbalancing the Soviet Union. China found the Battle of the Paracels as an
opportunity to assert sovereignty over the islands, show technological superiority and
modernization, effectively use smaller vessels to outmaneuver the larger Vietnamese fleet
and, most importantly, the opportunity to write history. China’s success was well
calculated and critical for its stake in the South China Sea.
China restarted its information campaign, and an article was published in Renmin
ribao by “Shi Dizu,” a pseudonym used by the members of the Historical Geography
Group in the Geography Institute in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 79 This article,
published on November 24, 1975, asserted that China had historical claims in the South
China Sea.80 For the first time, an English translation was also published on December
12. It could be argued that China felt more confident now than before to make its claims
public and international since previous publications were only in Chinese and presented
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to local and regional audiences. China used history as a tactic to target Southeast Asian
countries laying claims to the South China Sea since they suspected that Southeast Asian
countries did not have any historical records to challenge China.81 Further, regulations
such as UNCLOS were still being developed. Kurz argues that China was prompted to
publish its claims as a first line of defense against a potential U.S. intervention in favor of
South Vietnam.82 The fact that China republished the article in English may also point to
China’s intent to notify the U.S. and the Western English-speaking states about its
position in the South China Sea.
Fourteen years after the Battle of the Paracels, a now-unified Vietnam clashed
with China in the Spratlys. On March 14, 1988, the Johnson South Reef Skirmish
resulted in a Chinese victory and occupation of the reef. The previous year, the 14th
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) authorized China to
build an observation post in the Spratlys. This was accompanied by Chinese vessels
conducting surveys and naval patrols in the area.83 China chose Fiery Cross Reef because
it was large enough and isolated from other islands claimed by other countries.84
However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet naval forces made extensive use of
Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay, which may have threatened China’s assertion of jurisdiction
over the Spratlys. China chose Fiery Cross Reef to balance the Soviet navy. China
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became more assertive in the area, wanting to establish a permanent hold over the
Spratlys under the diplomatic guise of a UNESCO mandate.85 On January 31, 1988, two
armed Vietnamese cargo ships with construction materials approached Fiery Cross Reef
to assert their claim in the Spratlys when warships from China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) intercepted the Vietnamese cargo ships.86 The conflict escalated on
March 14 when a PLAN guided missile escort ship intercepted and sank the armed
Vietnamese ships. Within half an hour, all Vietnamese ships were sunk along with the 74
Vietnamese crew members who perished.87 China’s superior technology determined the
outcome of the skirmish. After this incident, China became more aggressive in the South
China Sea. By the end of 1988, China occupied six reefs and atolls in the Spratlys and
increased military presence on Hainan to defend against the Soviet threat and counter
Vietnam’s search for oil.88 By this time, China was solidifying its claims using its
military might and advances in naval technology.
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In 1988, Philippine President Corazon Aquino visited Beijing to discuss trade
issues with China’s paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. While Aquino raised the issue of
the Kalayaans and the Philippine claims in the Spratlys, there is no evidence that China
protested Philippine claims.89 Deng and Aquino agreed to put aside the sovereignty
question and jointly explore and exploit maritime resources. In May 1994, the Philippine
Department of Energy approved Vaalco, a U.S. oil company, to conduct “desk-top” oil
explorations with its Philippine subsidiary Alcorn near Reed Bank, 400 nautical miles
west of Palawan.90 Beijing protested Manila’s actions and characterized it as a violation
of Chinese sovereignty and an infraction of the joint exploration agreement in 1988. This
incident was the beginning of deteriorating Sino-Philippine relations. In January 1995,
Chinese patrols detained a Philippine fishing vessel on Mischief Reef and a month later,
China claimed Mischief Reef, a maritime feature within the Philippines EEZ, and began
constructing “a shelter by Chinese fishermen, not for any military purpose” as well as
extract energy resources.91 The Philippines and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) protested China’s actions. Philippine President Fidel Ramos
condemned the Chinese structures as “inconsistent with international law and the spirit
and content of the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea to which
both [countries] are parties.”92 For the Philippines, diplomatic strategy was the only
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realistic answer to China’s aggression since it did not have the material capabilities to
militarily counter China.93 Further, the U.S. removed all of its military bases and turned
over Subic Naval Base to the Philippine government. Ramos faced political instability on
the domestic front and decreasing involvement from the U.S., the Philippines most
important ally. Ramos could not simply acquiesce to China. After rounds of diplomatic
negotiations, China and the Philippines signed a Code of Conduct in August 1995.
However, that did not diffuse the dispute. Minor skirmishes between Chinese and
Philippine warships were reported between January and May 1996 on Mischief Reef as
China strengthened its defense systems in the Spratlys.94 China continued to assert
sovereignty and the Philippine navy increased reconnaissance activities by taking pictures
of Chinese vessels unloading constructions materials on Mischief Reef. At the 1998 AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, newly elected Philippine President
Joseph Estrada raised the issue with Chinese President Jiang Zenmin and the two agreed
to refer the matter to a panel of experts on finding ways to jointly use facilities.95 Estrada
also met with U.S. Vice-President Al Gore at the APEC summit and told Gore that he
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was pushing the Philippine Senate to ratify the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) and modernize the Philippine military.96

The U.S. Gets Involved: The Emergence of a Third-party Threat
The emergence of a third-party threat was to balance China and tip the balance of
power in favor of Southeast Asian countries. U.S. involvement changed the power
dynamics in the region and forced China to negotiate a Code of Conduct. On May 27,
1999, the U.S-Philippines VFA was ratified, allowing U.S. troops to be temporarily
stationed in the Philippines. The U.S. renewed its commitment to the Philippines. U.S.
Ambassador to the Philippines Thomas Hubbard declared that the U.S. would defend the
Philippines if it was attacked in the South China Sea pursuant to the 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty.97 Joint Balikatan military exercises were quickly resumed in May 1999,
including a series of exercises near Palawan in the South China Sea between February
and March 2000. The U.S. expected that China would accelerate its militarization of the
South China Sea after Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui declared the “two state theory”
in July 1999. In a broader context, 1999 was a year of political instability for China when
the CCP launched a campaign to “eradicate” Falun Gong, a spiritual practice of
Buddhism and Taoist traditions, on July 20. The CCP saw Falun Gong as a counter to the
CCP’s teaching of state atheism. Further, while the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Yugoslavia in May could have been accidental, Jiang Zemin’s decision to quietly wait
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for the Politburo Standing Committee to reach a consensus on settling the incident with
the U.S. instead of taking more drastic diplomatic measures shows that China valued its
relationship with the U.S. Jiang cautiously moved ahead when he had the support of the
Politburo to ensure that there would be no public backlash that could threaten the
integrity of the government. The U.S. showed support for Taiwan’s “two state theory” by
sending in two U.S. aircraft carriers, the Kitty Hawk and Constellation, to the South
China Sea. In August 2001, the U.S. sent two more aircraft carriers, the Carl Vinson and
Constellation, with 13 escort vessels to conduct military exercises with Taiwan on a
simulated Beijing attack on Taiwan.98 Since Russia was about to vacate Cam Ranh Bay
in Vietnam, Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) visited
Hanoi to propose American naval access to the bay, but Vietnam declined the American
proposal out of fear of Chinese retaliation. 99
U.S. involvement in the South China Sea changed the power dynamics in the
region. China realized that further coercing Southeast Asian countries would push them
to get militarily closer to the U.S. and open their port facilities to American military and
commerce. In view of third-party threats, balancing distribution of power, and crumbling
political stability, China renewed interest in a South China Sea Code of Conduct.100
China presented its Code of Conduct draft in March 2000 at the ASEAN-Chinese SOM
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in Cha-Am, Thailand, but China’s insistence on resolving the disputes on a bilateral basis
failed to persuade ASEAN to sign on.101 However, China still wanted to negotiate a code.
After several negotiations, China finally accepted that a multilateral code would be its
only choice, but it rejected the Philippines demand banning new structures on islands and
reefs and replaced it with Article 5 agreeing to “refraining from action of inhabiting on
the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features”. To make sure
ASEAN had its hands tied, China also demanded the words “on the basis of consensus”
be included as Article 10.102 China and ASEAN finally signed the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the 8th ASEAN summit at Phnom Penh in
November 2002.
However, the U.S. threat was only temporary as China gained confidence with its
new military capabilities. The next major Chinese assertion of jurisdiction in the South
China Sea was on March 17, 2009, when it “shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in
dangerously close proximity to USNS Impeccable, in an apparent coordinated effort to
harass the U.S. ocean surveillance ship while it was conducting routine operations in
international waters.”103 According to a Pentagon spokesman, the incident was “one of
the most aggressive actions we've seen in some time.”104 Perhaps China saw the U.S.
101
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acquiescing to China’s demands in the South China Sea in return for stronger economic
interdependence. After all, the U.S. was in the middle of a financial crisis and China
surpassed Germany to become the world’s third largest economy.105 Indeed, when U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited China in February 2009, she made it clear that
cooperation with China to tackle the financial crisis took precedence over U.S. concerns
about human rights in China.106 A week after the Impeccable incident, China dispatched
the Yuzheng 311, its largest fishing patrol, to the Paracels and challenged Vietnam’s
claims to the islands.107 Despite China’s growing economy, Chinese leadership felt
threatened when Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission on May 6, 2009 to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to clarify their claims to the
“southern part of the South China Sea.”108 For China, losing dominance in the South
China Sea meant cutting off a lifeline that could threaten the Chinese economy. China
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objected to Vietnam and Malaysia’s joint submission. It claimed that it violated Chinese
historical sovereignty over the South China Sea.109

Balancing Power and Diplomacy in the Face of a Rising China
China strengthened its assertiveness of sovereignty in the region after it surpassed
the U.S. as the largest consumer of energy worldwide in 2010.110 Besides meeting
domestic demands, China saw more value in securing East and South China Seas trade
routes for oil tanker shipments as the country became the second-largest consumer and
net importer of oil.111 Realizing China’s rapid steps towards securing the region for itself,
U.S. Secretary of State Clinton affirmed the U.S. position of “open access to Asia’s
maritime commons” at the July 22 U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Clinton’s
statement was seen as an expansion of American involvement and support for Vietnam’s
claim that China violated international norms by imposing a fishing moratorium on
Vietnamese fishing.112 Despite expanded U.S. involvement in the region, Chinese
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assertiveness against the Philippines and Vietnam increased significantly between
January and June 2011, including a near-fatal encounter on February 25 when Dongguan
560, a Jianghu-V Class missile frigate, fired on Philippine makeshift fishing vessels at
Jackson Atoll 140 nautical west of Palawan.113 To meet domestic demands for energy,
China launched a mega oil and gas-drilling platform in March 2011 to be used by the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in the South China Sea. This was
China’s first deep-sea drilling project.114
Philippine President Benigno Aquino responded by increasing funds to modernize
the Philippine military. He also emphasized lobbying ASEAN colleagues to form
consensus in pushing for a Code of Conduct and increasing defense cooperation with the
U.S. to continue diplomatic pressure on China. However, potential UN involvement and
increased U.S. presence may have prompted China to push for implementing the Code of
Conduct. During his state visit to Brunei, President Aquino said “We are completing the
data on about six to seven instances since February. We will present it to [China] and
then bring these to the appropriate body, which normally is the United Nations.”115 On
May 14, President Aquino and his Cabinet flew to the USS Carl Vinson in the South
China Sea as it made its way to the Philippines on a “routine port call and goodwill visit.”
113
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The Carl Vinson was accompanied by other U.S. navy ships including the Bunker Hill,
Shiloh, and Gridley.116 A week later, Chinese Defense Minister General Lian Guanglie
met with Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin to find ways to cooperate on
territorial disputes in the Spratlys. In their joint statement, they said:
“both ministers expressed hope that the implementing guidelines of the 2002
Declaration of Conduct would soon be finalized and agreed upon, that responsible
behavior of all parties in the South China Sea issue would help keep the area
stable while all parties work for the peaceful resolution … Both ministers
recognized that unilateral actions which could cause alarm should be avoided.”117
Immediately after the meeting, Sun Yi, Deputy Chief of Political Section at the Chinese
Embassy in Manila, issued a statement saying that China looked forward to an
“accelerated dialogue” with the Philippines but insisted that the dispute was still a
bilateral issue.118
In Vietnam’s case, domestic pressure forced Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to
make a strong statement defending national sovereignty on June 9, 2011 saying, “We
continue to affirm strongly and to manifest the strongest determination of all the Party, of
all the people and of all the army in protecting Vietnamese sovereignty in maritime zones
of the country.”119 Prime Minister Dung also reaffirmed that Vietnam’s sovereignty over
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the Paracel and Spratlys was ”incontestable.” Although China announced that it would
conduct naval exercises in the Western Pacific, Vietnam forged ahead by publicly
announcing a live-fire exercise.120 The 9-hour exercise occurred on June 13 and the
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry characterized it as “a routine annual training activity of the
Vietnam navy.”121 The exercise included anti-ship missiles fired from Sukhoi jet
aircraft.122 At the same time, Vietnamese students used Facebook and social media to
arrange anti-China demonstrations over twelve weeks in Ho Chi Minh City.123 Holding
signs saying, “Down with China” and “Stop Chinese invasion of Vietnam's islands,”
protestors marched to the Chinese embassy.124 After numerous calls from the people, the
Vietnamese government sent Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son to Beijing to meet
his Chinese counterpart, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, to discuss the South China Sea.
On June 25, Vietnam and China released a joint statement saying,
The two sides agreed to speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign an
“Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between
Vietnam and China,” and boost the implementation of the Declaration on Conduct
of Parties in the East Sea [sic] (DOC) and follow-up activities so that substantial
progress will soon be achieved.125
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Although China realized that it was going to be outmaneuvered diplomatically as
a result of U.S. military threats and recent calls for Vietnam and Philippines to counter
China’s claims, China pursued a two-track strategy of coercion and diplomacy. In late
2010, China agreed to revive the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group to Implement the
Declaration on Conduct of Parties to limit further damage of its reputation.126
Negotiations lasted from December 2010 to April 2011. However, now that China had
more power to leverage, it insisted that sovereignty disputes could only be solved
bilaterally. Unlike in 2002, China now demanded the clause mentioning how ASEAN
members would first gather consensus before meeting with China be removed from the
document.127 ASEAN negotiators acquiesced to China’s demands and on July 20, 2011,
ASEAN and China reached an agreement and signed The Guidelines for the
Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct.

China Breaks its Promise
Not long after the agreement, the Philippine Navy spotted Chinese fishing vessels
in Scarborough Shoal, within the Philippine EEZ, on April 8, 2012.128 The situation
escalated when the Philippines sent the BRP Gregorio del Pillar, the Philippine Navy’s
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flagship, and attempted to arrest the Chinese fishing boats.129 The standoff lasted for a
month until China sent government vessels to force the Philippines to leave
Scarborough.130 The U.S. mediated to diffuse tensions on the condition that both parties
withdraw from Scarborough.131 However, after both parties withdrew, Chinese ships
returned soon and have remained on Scarborough since then. China blocked Filipino
fishermen from accessing the vicinity of the shoal. Clearly, this was a breach of the Code
of Conduct.132 China also banned the importation of Philippine bananas and other fruits
that affected $75 million in the market with 200,000 jobs.133 In January 2013, the
Philippines filed a formal claim against China asking the Permanent Court of Arbitration
to invalidate China’s claims to the South China Sea. This was followed the following
year when the Philippines filed supporting evidence to the UN in March 2014.134 Details
of the case and tribunal’s ruling will be discussed in the next chapter.
The Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig standoff between China and Vietnam on May
4, 2014 was another breach of the Code of Conduct. China did not contest the Paracels
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since 2009, but in 2014, China moved its oil rig to the south of the Paracels and declared
an exclusive zone around it. Vietnam protested China’s actions immediately and sent 29
ships to disrupt the rig’s construction.135 On May 7, the standoff escalated when Chinese
military vessels used high powered water cannons and rammed several Vietnamese
warships. Violent anti-Chinese protests erupted throughout May.136 For many
Vietnamese industrial workers who protested, anti-Chinese sentiments extended beyond
the incident. They believed Chinese businesses were exploiting them.137 Further, the
workers were frustrated with the Vietnamese government for its perceived willingness to
sacrifice territorial sovereignty in exchange for better economic ties with China.138
From the end of 2014 through 2015, China accelerated its reclamation projects in
the South China Sea.139 Chinese Foreign Minister spokeswoman Hua Chunying justified
China’s actions by saying, “We are building shelters, aids for navigation, search and
rescue as well as marine meteorological forecasting services, fishery services and other
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administrative services” for China and its neighbors.140 Responding to China’s
reclamation projects, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter instructed the Department of
Defense to look into military options, including flying Navy surveillance aircraft over the
disputed islands and sending U.S. naval warships within 12 nautical miles of the Spratlys
to challenge China’s claims in May 2015.141 The purpose was to deter Chinese presence
in the region and demonstrate globally that the U.S. did not recognize China’s excessive
claims. By October 2015, the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense
agreed to implement U.S. FONOPs in the South China Sea.142 U.S. President Barack
Obama publicly voiced concern about China’s claims during the 2015 APEC summit
meeting in Manila: “We agree on the need for bold steps to lower tensions, including
pledging to halt further reclamation, new construction and militarization of disputed areas
in the South China Sea.”143 The first official FONOP was launched on October 27, 2015,
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when the USS Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of the Spratlys.144 China
protested the operation calling it a “deliberate provocation.”145
Throughout early 2016, China continued expanding its reclamation projects in the
Paracels, including setting up an International Maritime Judicial Center to parallel
UNCLOS’s role.146 In May, China also launched war drills in the South China Sea,
including its fleet of submarines.147 There were no new developments in the region until
July 12 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected China’s historical claims over
the South China Sea and presented the Philippines with a unanimous award.148 Details of
the court’s decision will be discussed in the next chapter. Would China go so far as to
defy the tribunal? Arguably, China's next steps would be crucial to its ambitions to be a
major global player. The next chapter will discuss the details of the court's decision.
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CHAPTER TWO: Philippines v. China: Historical and Legal Perspectives
Chapter 1 discussed China’s evolving claims in the South China Sea dispute,
stretching from the Han and Song dynasties to the 20th century. China’s interest in the
region was to secure and extract resources to sustain its economic prosperity. As its
military power grew, China started coercing Vietnam and the Philippines to drop their
maritime claims and yield to China’s demands. Unsuccessful implementation of the
ASEAN Code of Conduct also weakened Southeast Asian countries’ claims. The
international community never weighed in on the issue, but it was soon to change when
the Philippines brought the dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
The first part of Chapter 2 will discuss the Philippines and China’s stances
towards the dispute, China’s two-track diplomatic strategy, a description of the
Permanent Court’s award, and the reaction of both parties and other countries to it. The
second part will analyze the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute and the case’s
admissibility. Since the UNCLOS is not concerned with sovereignty over land territory
and islands, applying UNCLOS assumes that sovereignty issues have been resolved
before assessing delimitation. To avoid characterizing the proceedings as a territorial or
maritime delimitation dispute, the Tribunal separated entitlement versus maritime
delimitation disputes. As the second part will examine in detail, there are also precedents
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to entertain territorial sovereignty issues as long as the dispute was ancillary to Article
288(1) that says, “A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is
submitted to it in accordance with this Part.” The third section of this chapter will
examine the Tribunal’s awards given to the Philippines’ Submissions on July 12, 2016.
This section will also highlight important points that Tribunal made in explaining its
rationale for the decision. This includes the Tribunal’s view of China’s historical rights
claim and the differences of rights versus title as well as the environmental aspect of the
dispute and the legal implications of the ruling for the international community.
UNCLOS articles referred in this chapter are copied in Appendix A.
Following China’s forceful removal of Filipino fishers from Scarborough Shoal in
2012, the Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China on January 22, 2013,
under Articles 286 and 287 and Annex VII of the UNCLOS.149 Article 287, Part XV of
the UNCLOS provides rules for dispute settlements. Article 287 allows states to choose a
certain dispute settlement procedure such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea established in accordance with Annex VI (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII, or a special arbitral
tribunal.150 However, “if the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for
the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with
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Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.”151 Since China did not express consent
with the Philippines on selecting a dispute procedure, the Philippines could only initiate
proceedings with the arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VII. These proceedings
were focused on the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China in the Spratlys.
For the Southeast Asian countries, this litigation was significant. This was the first time a
claimant to the South China Sea filed a complaint against China in an international
setting. The Philippines’ bold move was characterized by Philippine President Benigno
Aquino as a “game changer” in the South China Sea dispute.152

Philippines and China: Positions on the Arbitral Proceedings
In its complaint, the Philippines declared that China’s claim to sovereignty over
waters and islands within the “nine-dash line” “interfered with exercise by the Philippines
of its rights under the Convention, including within its own exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf, in violation of UNCLOS.”153 Among other issues, the Philippines
sought relief on three important points that went to the heart of China’s claims. It wanted
an award that:
1. Declares that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its so-called
“nine dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.
2. Declares that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef
are submerged features that are below sea level at high tide, except that each has
small protrusions that remain above water at high tide, which are “rocks” under
Article 121(3) of the Convention and which therefore generates entitlements only to a
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Territorial Sea no broader than 12 M; and that China has unlawfully claimed
maritime entitlements beyond 12 M from these features.
3. Declares that China has unlawfully claimed, and has unlawfully exploited, the living
and non-living resources in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf, and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines from exploiting
living and non-living resources within its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental
Shelf.154
The Philippines also stressed that it did not “seek in this arbitration a
determination of which Party enjoys sovereignty over the islands claimed by both of
them.”155
On February 19, 2013, China declared that it would neither accept nor participate
in the arbitration proceedings. It noted that “the two countries have overlapping
jurisdictional claims over parts of the maritime area in the South China Sea and that both
sides had agreed to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations and friendly
consultation.”156 China kept true to its word and did not participate directly in the
proceedings. China’s next communication was on July 29 when it declined to comment
on the Tribunal’s draft Rules of Procedure and reiterated “its position that it does not
accept the arbitration initiated by the Philippines.”157
Despite China’s absence, the Philippines requested that the Tribunal move
forward with the process pursuant to Article 9 of Annex VII to the Convention on August
27. Perhaps worried about its reputation, China sent its ambassador to the United
Kingdom to request a meeting with the President of the Tribunal on November 14.
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However, the Tribunal reminded the two parties to refrain from ex parte communications
with members of the Tribunal.158 Between February 2014 and July 7, 2015, the Tribunal
received written arguments from third parties such as Vietnam citing “legal interests and
rights may be affected” as well as two letters from the Chinese Ambassador to the
Netherlands stressing that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute and
urged bilateral negotiations for settlement.159 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
published a “Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the
Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines” on December 7, 2014 and forwarded it to the Tribunal the following day.160
The Tribunal gave China until August 17, 2015 to comment on the jurisdiction and
admissibility hearing held on July 7, 8, and 13, 2015. China neither responded nor
participated. On October 29, 2015, the Tribunal unanimously agreed that it had
jurisdiction over the case and that China’s refusal to participate did not prevent the
Tribunal from having jurisdiction over the dispute based on five reasons.161
First, the Tribunal rejected China’s objection that the disputes deal with territorial
sovereignty and therefore were beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.162 In China’s view,
neither the Tribunal nor the UNCLOS had anything to do with the dispute since territorial
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sovereignty had not been established by China and its neighbors. China argued that the
Tribunal would inevitably have to rule on territorial sovereignty if it reviewed the case,
and that would go beyond the Tribunal’s scope. Second, the Tribunal rejected China’s
argument in the Position Paper. China claimed that the parties’ disputes concerned
maritime boundary delimitation. China wanted the dispute to be excluded from the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction in light of China’s 2006 Declaration under the UNCLOS Article
298 that says it would not “accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part
XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in
paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.”163 Article 298 allows
States Parties to declare that they do not accept one or more of the compulsory
procedures entailing binding decisions found in section 2 of Part XV, with respect to
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the articles dealing with
delimitation of the territorial sea. Therefore, in China’s view, “disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of articles 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary
delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles” were beyond the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. Third, the Tribunal rejected China’s demands that the parties resolve the
disputes solely through negotiations.164 Fourth, the Tribunal ruled that there was no other
State indispensable to the proceedings.165 Fifth, the Tribunal ruled that the Philippines
met Article 283’s requirement that the parties exchange views regarding the settlement of
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their disputes before consulting an international body and rejected China’s statement that
“the two countries have never engaged in negotiations with regard to the subject-matter
of the arbitration.”166
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs shot back saying that the Tribunal’s decision
to assess the case was “null and void” and the decision had no binding effect on China.167
China characterized it as a “political provocation.” It stood by its August 25, 2006
declaration under Article 298 of the UNCLOS stating that it “does not accept any of the
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the
categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a)(b) and (c) of Article 298 of the
Convention.”168 Despite China’s protest, the Philippines sent fifteen submissions to the
Tribunal for adjudication on November 30, 2015, and the proceedings went ahead.169 On
July 12, 2016, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines and awarded all of the
Philippines’ submissions except Submission 15 in which the Philippines asked a
declaration from the Tribunal that China shall do what it is already obliged by the
Convention to do. The Tribunal said that it was not necessary or appropriate for it to
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make any further declarations. Summaries of the Tribunal’s decisions for each
Submission is copied below.
Submission 1: The Convention defines the scope of maritime entitlements in the South
China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein.
Submission 2: China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction,
with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant
part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime
entitlements under the Convention. The Convention superseded any historic rights or
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in excess of the limits imposed therein.
Submission 3: Scarborough Shoal contains, within the meaning of Article 121(1) of the
Convention, naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water, which are above water
at high tide. However, under Article 121(3) of the Convention, the high-tide features at
Scarborough Shoal are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own and accordingly shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.170
Submission 4: Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef,
McKennan Reef, and Gaven Reef (North) are high-tide features. Hughes Reef, Gaven
Reef (South), Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal are low-tide elevations.
Submission 5: Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are located within 200 nautical
miles of the Philippines’ coast on the island of Palawan and are located in an area that is
not overlapped by the entitlements generated by any maritime feature claimed by China.
It follows, therefore, that, as between the Philippines and China, Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of
the Philippines.171
Submission 6: High-tide features at Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef are rocks
that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and accordingly shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.172
Submission 7: Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef contain, within the
meaning of Article 121(1) of the Convention, naturally formed areas of land, surrounded
by water, which are above water at high tide. However, for purposes of Article 121(3) of
the Convention, the high-tide features at Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross
170
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Reef are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and
accordingly shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.173
Submission 8: China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels with
respect to M/V Veritas Voyager on 1 to 2 March 2011 breached Article 77 of the
Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the non-living resources
of its continental shelf in the area of Reed Bank. Further, by promulgating its 2012
moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea, without exception for areas of the South
China Sea falling within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and without
limiting the moratorium to Chinese flagged vessels, China has breached Article 56 of the
Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the living resources of
its exclusive economic zone.
Submission 9: China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels in
tolerating and failing to exercise due diligence to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged
vessels at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013, failed to exhibit due
regard for the Philippines’ sovereign rights with respect to fisheries in its exclusive
economic zone. Accordingly, China has breached its obligations under Article 58(3) of
the Convention.
Submission 10: China has, through the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough
Shoal from May 2012 onwards, unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging
in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal. The Tribunal records that this decision is
entirely without prejudice to the question of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal.
Submission 11 and 12(b): China has, through its toleration and protection of, and failure
to prevent Chinese fishing vessels engaging in harmful harvesting activities of
endangered species at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and other features in the
Spratly Islands, breached Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention. The Tribunal
further finds that China has, through its island-building activities at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery
Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief
Reef, breached Articles 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123, and 206 of the Convention.
Submission 12(a) and (c): China has, through its construction of installations and
artificial islands at Mischief Reef without the authorisation of the Philippines, breached
Articles 60 and 80 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights in
its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Tribunal further finds that, as a
low-tide elevation, Mischief Reef is not capable of appropriation.
Submission 13: t China has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels
in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger to
Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7,

173

Ibid.

57

8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the
Convention.
Submission 14: China has in the course of these proceedings aggravated and extended
the disputes between the Parties through its dredging, artificial island-building, and
construction activities.
The Philippines Submissions will be referenced throughout this chapter and are
copied in Appendix B for convenience.
For this chapter, the Tribunal’s “Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility” on
October 29, 2015, will be referred to as “South China Sea Arbitration Award
(Jurisdiction)” in the footnotes. The Tribunal’s award on the merits of the Philippines
Submissions on July 12, 2016, will be referred to as “South China Sea Arbitration
(Award)” in the footnotes.

China’s Two-Track Diplomatic Strategy
Despite ongoing proceedings, China changed the status quo by continuing its
construction and installation of military-capable infrastructures in the Spratlys. China’s
construction increasingly took a strategic character as it built runways, port facilities, and
deployed military equipment for reconnaissance.174 Instead of participating directly in
the Tribunal’s proceedings, China launched a two-track diplomatic strategy. It ramped up
its “dual-track approach” by addressing “negotiations and consultations among countries
directly concerned” and declaring that “China and the ASEAN countries should work
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together to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea.”175 Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi characterized this as the “most practical and feasible way to resolve
the South China Sea Issue.” This track included attempts to meet informally with
members of the Tribunal and send them unofficial documents for review. Notably, prior
to the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, China campaigned globally to enlist support
from at least 70 countries, including the League of Arab States and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.176 China convinced countries bilaterally and multilaterally to
reject the Tribunal’s proceedings. Most of them were beneficiaries of China’s Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI).
Although some countries supported China on the grounds that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction over the case, other countries supported China’s position of resolving the
disputes through consultations and negotiations pursuant to the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties. All of them, however, endorsed the following four points:177
1. China does not participate in the arbitration nor accept, recognize, or implement the
award.
2. China will adhere to peaceful negotiations and settlements of the South China Sea
dispute.
3. While disputes should be settled by the parties directly concerned in accordance with
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China will
work with ASEAN countries to maintain peace and stability in this region.
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4. The temporally-established (ad hoc) arbitral tribunal is neither a part of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) nor the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It does not
have jurisdiction over territorial disputes, which is the core of the arbitration. The
arbitration itself is flawed in procedure. Thus, the award is not legally-binding, nor
representing international law.
China’s attempt to enlist support shows its preference for bilateral negotiations
and consultations among claimant states. China’s strategies in the South China Sea
“reflect an overall reorientation of diplomacy in Southeast Asia, which many scholars
characterize as a “charm offensive” or “soft power.”178

Analysis of the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the Case
The following section will analyze the jurisdiction of the Annex VII Arbitral
Tribunal over the case and the admissibility of the Philippines Submissions. In the end,
the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to consider the Philippines’ Submissions Nos.
3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13.179 The Tribunal reserved consideration of Submissions Nos. 1,
2, 5, 8, 9, 12, and 14 to the Award phase of the proceedings.180
Philippines v. China, also known as the South China Sea Arbitration, is a “mixed
dispute” – i.e., disputes concerning sovereignty over land territory (continental or insular)
and maritime entitlements.181 In past cases involving mixed disputes such as Eritrea v.
Yemen, Qatar v. Bahrain, Cameroon v. Nigeria, and Nicaragua v. Colombia, the ICJ
expected the parties to resolve the sovereignty issue before asking the court to adjudicate
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a maritime boundary dispute.182 This principle stems from the ICJ’s decision in the 1969
North Sea Continental Shelf case that the “land dominates the sea…because the land is
the legal source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extension to
seaward.”183 The UNCLOS is not concerned with sovereignty over land territory and
islands. It assumes that sovereignty issues have been resolved before assessing
delimitation.184

Separating Entitlement and Maritime Delimitation Disputes
Two points summarize China’s arguments.185 First, the subject of the arbitration
was territorial sovereignty over maritime features in the South China Sea. Thus, neither
the Tribunal nor the UNCLOS had anything to do with the dispute since China and its
neighbors had not established territorial sovereignty. China argued that the Tribunal
would inevitably have to rule on territorial sovereignty if it reviewed the case, and that
would go beyond the Tribunal’s scope. Second, ruling on the dispute would touch on
maritime delimitation. However, China declared on August 25, 2006, that it would not
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“accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention
with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b), and (c) of
Article 298 of the Convention.”186 Article 298 allows a State to decline compulsory
procedures on maritime delimitation.
Jiangyu Wang, a noted Chinese expert in international law, finds the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction to assess the case still debatable. Wang argues that two weaknesses in the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction and admissibility stand out. One is on the sovereignty nature of the
disputes. The Tribunal took on highly political issues which are related to sovereignty,
without gaining the consent of the parties. The other weakness was the Tribunal’s narrow
and restrictive interpretation of Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS.187 China’s main
argument was that even though the Tribunal explicitly said that it would not “rule on any
question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary
between the Parties,” the Tribunal’s rejection of the nine-dash line and ruling that “China
has breached Article 77 of the Convention with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign
rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf is obviously handling a
dispute about sovereignty over maritime features.”188
In contrast, the Philippines claimed that its complaint did not require the Tribunal
to address territorial sovereignty. Arguing for the Philippines before the Tribunal,
Philippe Sands said:
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The determination of whether a particular feature is an island, or a rock,
or a low-tide elevation, does not require any prior determination of
which state has sovereignty over the feature. The fact that state A or state
B or state C or state Z has sovereignty over a particular feature is entirely
irrelevant to the question of its characterization. The fact that two or
more states may dispute the matter of sovereignty over a feature -assuming that there can be sovereignty at all -- is entirely irrelevant to its
characterization.189
Therefore, determining the character of a maritime feature does not require any
prior determination of which state has sovereignty over the feature.
However, the Tribunal rejected both views. Instead, it considered the possibility
to entertain the Philippines’ Submissions without rejecting China’s claims that it had
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys. This way, the Tribunal did not
characterize the proceedings as a territorial or maritime territorial delimitation dispute.190
The Tribunal said:
a dispute concerning the existence of an entitlement to maritime zones is
distinct from a dispute concerning the delimitation of those zones in an
area where the entitlements of parties overlap. While fixing the extent of
parties’ entitlements and the area in which they overlap will commonly
be one of the first matters to be addressed in the delimitation of a
maritime boundary, it is nevertheless a distinct issue. A maritime
boundary may be delimited only between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts and overlapping entitlements. In contrast, a dispute over
claimed entitlements may exist even without overlap, where—for
instance—a State claims maritime zones in an area understood by other
States to form part of the high seas or the Area for the purposes of the
Convention. 191
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Although the Tribunal did not provide examples of how a state can claim
maritime zones in the high seas, the Philippines referred to China’s objection to Japan’s
claim for a continental shelf for Oki-No-Tori-Shima as a “textbook example” because
China’s coast is very far from Oki-No-Tori-Shima.192 Thus, China recognized that an
entitlement dispute could be separated from a maritime delimitation dispute.

Entertaining Territorial Sovereignty and Article 288
The Tribunal also highlighted the difference between this case and the Chagos
Marine Protected Area arbitration. The Tribunal acknowledged that the majority’s
decision in Chagos implied a decision on sovereignty, the real objective of Mauritius’
claims.193 However, that was not the case in South China Sea. According to the
Tribunal’s dictum in Chagos, if the issue of the case concerned the Convention’s
application, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction extended to issues supporting or ancillary to the
issue itself. The Tribunal in Chagos said: “The Tribunal does not categorically exclude
that in some instances a minor issue of territorial sovereignty could indeed be ancillary to
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.”194
Thus, the Tribunal implied that it could entertain “a minor issue of territorial
sovereignty” as long as it was related to the dispute that fell within Article 288(1).
However, the Tribunal did not invoke this ancillary issue in South China Sea. The

192

Presentation by Oxman, Hearing on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Day 2, July 8, 2015

193

South China Sea Arbitration Award (Jurisdiction), paragraph 153

194

Chagos Award, paragraph 221

64

Tribunal first had to determine whether the ancillary issue applied and if a territorial issue
would be within Article 288(1). International legal scholars and current and former
judges of the ITLOS have argued that international courts and tribunals have jurisdiction
over mixed disputes or even if a territorial issue was ancillary to the case. Alan Boyle
argues that “in some cases the delimitation of a maritime boundary may necessarily
require a decision concerning disputed sovereignty over land, for example where an
island is used as a basepoint for an EEZ or continental shelf claim.”195 Judge Wolfrum,
former President of ITLOS said: “Issues of sovereignty or other rights over continental or
insular land territory, which are closely linked or ancillary to maritime delimitation,
concern the interpretation or application of the Convention and therefore fall within its
scope.”196
Similarly, Judge Chandrasekhara Rao said, “where no exclusionary declaration is
applicable with respect to delimitation disputes under article 298, a court or tribunal
would be competent to deal with a mixed dispute.”197 Given that the Tribunal in South
China Sea did not invoke the ancillary issue, the judges did not see a need to apply it
because they did not see the case as a territorial issue in the first place. By taking a more
proactive stance in Chagos and South China Sea, the Tribunal placed its judicial authority
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in the center of the arbitration and showed the international community that an
international court or tribunal could impact the development of international law.

What has Part XV Got to Do with the South China Sea? Applying Article 281
The application of Article 281 to South China Sea shows a new development in
interpreting the statute compared to Southern Bluefin Tuna. The Tribunal in South China
Sea presented the three relevant parts in Article 281 that provide the procedure where the
parties have reached no settlement:198
1. no settlement has been reached by recourse to the agreed means,
2. the Parties’ agreement does not exclude any further procedure, and
3. any agreed time limits have expired.
If these three requirements have not been met, the dispute settlement framework in Part
XV of the UNCLOS would not apply. A comparison of Southern Bluefin Tuna and South
China Sea would show the differences in applying Article 281.
In Southern Bluefin Tuna, Japan argued that the dispute did not concern the
interpretation or application of the UNCLOS but rather the 1993 Convention for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). Therefore, ITLOS did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. Second, Japan contended that “Australia and New Zealand
had not exhausted the procedures for amicable dispute settlement under Part XV, Section
1 of the Convention, in particular Article 281 … before submitting the dispute to a
procedure under Part XV.”199 Australia and New Zealand countered that the 1993
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Convention did not provide a compulsory dispute settlement procedure that entailed a
binding decision required by Article 282.200 ITLOS rejected Japan’s argument saying that
a dispute arising under the Convention did exist and met the requirements of Article 279
of Section 1.201 Further, ITLOS found that even if the CCSBT might also apply, this
“does not preclude recourse to the procedures in Part XV, section 2, of the Convention on
the Law of the Sea.”202 Thus, ITLOS said that it did have jurisdiction over the dispute.203
However, when it came to the merits stage, ITLOS reversed course upon analyzing
Article 16 of the CCSBT. Article 16 of the CCSBT established the possibility of
arbitration under that agreement with both parties’ consent. However, if consent was not
forthcoming, the parties were obliged by Article 16, to continue to pursue resolution by
peaceful means to exclude other dispute settlement mechanisms. In ITLOS’s view, the
dispute was at this stage at the time of review.204 Thus, ITLOS concluded that Article 16
of the 1993 CCSBT excluded any procedure within Article 281(1) of the UNCLOS and
the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction after all to assess the merits of the dispute.205
In South China Sea, the Tribunal took a different view in applying Article 281,
stating that “the better view is that Article 281 requires some clear statement of exclusion
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of further procedures.”206 According to the Tribunal, Article 281 provides for an “opting
out” of the Part XV procedure where the parties’ agreement “does not exclude any further
procedure.”207 It does not contain an “opting in” requirement whereby the Parties must
positively agree to Part XV procedures. An “opting in” is only required where the parties
have chosen an alternative compulsory and binding procedure, as set out in Article 282.
Second, parties are required to express exclusion from Article 281 if they do not want
Part XV procedures to apply to them. As a result of exclusion, the rest of the overall
object and purpose of the UNCLOS as a comprehensive agreement remains the same.208
Thus, even if China disagreed with the Part XV dispute procedures, objecting to the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction would not make any difference because it first needed to have an
agreement with the Philippines to exclude the UNCLOS as in Article 16 of the CCSBT in
Southern Bluefin Tuna. Further, China should have expressed exclusion of Article 281
before it objected in South China Sea just as Japan did in Southern Bluefin Tuna.
Comparing the two cases show different approaches to Article 281. In Southern
Bluefin Tuna, ITLOS stressed the “peaceful means of their own choice” set out in Article
16 of the CCSBT and the UNCLOS.209 ITLOS interpreted Article 281 more broadly and
gave the parties more leeway to settle the dispute. Resolution of the dispute is then left to
the political will of the parties. In South China Sea, the Tribunal applied Article 281 more
narrowly. It interpreted the resolution of Article 281 as a global interest when the
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Tribunal stressed that the parties were subject to the UNCLOS. Thus, the Tribunal played
a more significant role in South China Sea because it decided that it had jurisdiction to
apply Part XV dispute procedures to the case.210 It could be argued that the Tribunal
expanded its jurisdiction in South China Sea.
Interestingly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration repeated its application of
Article 281 in South China Sea to Timor Sea Conciliation. In 2016, Timor-Leste referred
to the compulsory conciliation procedures to settle the dispute with Australia and argued
that only a legally binding agreement would be relevant for the purposes of Article
281.211 However, Australia claimed that the 2003 Exchange of Letters between the Prime
Ministers of Timor-Leste and Australia as well as the 2006 Treaty between Australia and
the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor
Sea (CMATS) were “agreements.” The purpose of these “agreements” was to pursue the
delimitation of maritime boundaries between the two countries through negotiation and
excluded further procedures.212 Australia did not view these documents as binding and
argued that a binding agreement was not required for the purposes of Article 281.213 The
Commission referred to the application of Article 281 in South China Sea and ruled that
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in this case, Article 281 required a legally binding agreement.214 Thus, the narrow
application of Article 281 in Timor Sea Conciliation reaffirmed its application in South
China Sea. The Tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and proceeded to
examine the Philippines’ Submissions.

The Awards
On July 12, 2016, the Tribunal issued the merit award covering three major
issues:
1. maritime entitlement of the nine-dashed line
2. legal regime of maritime features and
3. the legality of a handful activities conducted by China in the South China Sea.
In the first award, the Tribunal addressed three issues. It included the nature of the
disputes between China and the Philippines, the procedural requirements for the
Philippine submission, and the limitations and exceptions under Articles 297 and 298 of
the UNCLOS.
On the nature of the dispute, the Tribunal referred to its summary of the award on
jurisdiction held on October 29, 2015. It reaffirmed that the Tribunal proceedings were in
accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS. This pushed back on China’s assertion that
the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction as set out in its Position Paper.215 The Tribunal supported
the Philippines Submissions on the basis of the existence of a dispute between the two
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parties.216 The Tribunal considered Submissions 1 and 2, in which the Philippines
requested that the Tribunal hold “China is entitled only to those rights provided for by the
Convention and that these rights are not supplemented or modified by any historic rights,
including within the area marked by the ‘nine-dash line’ on Chinese maps.”217 In the
Award, The Tribunal again addressed the applicability of Article 298(1)(a)(i) that was
discussed in the Award on Jurisdiction and questioned whether China had historic title in
the South China Sea and what possible implications there are to a title.218 The Tribunal
concluded that China does not claim historic title to the waters of the South China Sea,
but a “constellation of historic rights short of title” not subject to the exception to
jurisdiction in Article 298(1)(a)(i) that is limited to disputes involving historic titles.219
Thus, after examining China’s historical claims, the Tribunal held that China did not have
historical title or rights and its present claims were contrary to the UNCLOS.220 As a
signatory to the Convention, China could not unilaterally modify the statutes by State
practice. It would require the acquiescence of other states with similar interests and
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sufficient time to establish its right.221 The Tribunal found no acquiescence from other
states. Thus, China had neither acquired historic title nor acquired them by the time it
ratified UNCLOS.
The Tribunal examined Submissions 3 to 7, which dealt with the differences in
understanding and applying the UNCLOS to the South China Sea’s maritime features. It
was differentiating between features covered at high tide and features that could support
habitation. The Tribunal also examined the differences between a “low-tide elevation,”
features exposed at low tide but covered with water at high tide, and “islands,” features
above water at high tide. “Rocks” were defined as high-tide features that “cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own.” UNCLOS Article 121(3) says, that
“rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” For high-tide features which are not rocks,
these fall within Article 121(2) and enjoy the same entitlements as other land territory
under the Convention. The Tribunal defined them as “fully entitled islands.”222
The Tribunal first examined Submissions 4 and 6. The Philippines argued that
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef were low-tide elevations. They do
not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf. These reefs were
not capable of occupation and should be governed by Article 13 of the Convention,
which provides that “a low-tide elevation…situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of
the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.” The
Tribunal concluded that out of nine maritime features submitted by the Philippines, six
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maritime features: Scarborough Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Johnson Reef,
McKennan Reef, and Gaven Reef (North), remain above water at high tide and thus,
qualify as high-tide features.
On Submissions 3, 5, and 7, the Tribunal addressed the entitlement of rocks and
islands by applying Article 121 of the UNCLOS. The Tribunal closely interpreted Article
121(3) “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”223 The Tribunal stated that Article
121(3) served as a limitation to prevent expanding the jurisdiction of a country’s EEZ.224
In its ruling, the Tribunal made nine points that clarified Article 121(3).
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

The word “rock” does not limit the provision to features composed of solid rock.
The geological and geomorphological characteristics of a high-tide feature are not
relevant to its classification pursuant to Article 121(3).
The status of a feature is to be determined on the basis of its natural capacity,
without external additions or modifications intended to increase its capacity to
sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own.
With respect to “human habitation”, the critical factor is the non-transient character
of the inhabitation, such that the inhabitants can fairly be said to constitute the
natural population of the feature, for whose benefit the resources of the exclusive
economic zone were seen to merit protection.
The Tribunal considers that the “economic life” in question will ordinarily be the life
and livelihoods of the human population inhabiting and making its home on a
maritime feature or group of features.
The Tribunal considers that a maritime feature will ordinarily only possess an
economic life of its own if it is also inhabited by a stable human community.
Determination of the objective capacity of a feature is not dependent on any prior
decision on sovereignty, and the Tribunal is not prevented from assessing the status
of features by the fact that it has not and will not decide the matter of sovereignty
over them.
The Tribunal considers that the principal factors that contribute to the natural
capacity of a feature can be identified. These would include the presence of water,
food, and shelter in sufficient quantities to enable a group of persons to live on the
feature for an indeterminate period of time.
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8.
9.

A feature that is only capable of sustaining habitation through the continued delivery
of supplies from outside does not meet the requirements of Article 121(3).
If a feature is entirely barren of vegetation and lacks drinkable water and the
foodstuffs necessary even for basic survival, it will be apparent that it also lacks the
capacity to sustain human habitation.
Of the nine points made, the second and sixth points went to the heart of China’s

artificial island-building campaign and sovereignty claims over artificial islands.
Applying this interpretation to the Spratlys, the Tribunal concluded that the
original and natural conditions of high-tide features cannot “generate entitlements to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” and should be considered as rocks as
defined by Article 121(3).225 Further, the Tribunal concluded that the Spratlys are not an
archipelago from which to draw straight baselines.226
The Tribunal examined Submissions 8 to 13. These Submissions relate to the
application of the UNCLOS on China’s activities in the South China Sea, its exploration
and extraction of natural resources, fishing, construction at sea, and marine environment
protection. Submission 8 showed China’s violation of the Philippines jurisdiction,
interference with the Philippines’ petroleum exploration, and seismic survey on Reed
Bank located within the Philippines’ EEZ.227 China’s 2012 fishing moratorium 12°N
latitude through the Hainan Regulation prevented Philippine vessels from fishing at
Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal. Construction and installations on artificial
islands at Mischief Reef, without the authorization of the Philippines, also violated the
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UNCLOS.228 The Tribunal’s decision on Submission 8 rejected China’s nine-dash line
and found Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, located within 200 nautical miles of
the Philippine coast of Palawan, within the Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf.229
While the Tribunal based its decisions for the other submissions on Submission 1
to 7, its decision for Submission 11 was notable. It reads,
the Tribunal finds that China has, through its toleration and protection of, and
failure to prevent Chinese fishing vessels engaging in harmful harvesting
activities of endangered species at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and
other features in the Spratly Islands, in breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of the
Convention.230
As will be discussed later, the Tribunal accepted the Philippines argument that China
violated its obligations under the UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine
environment. The Philippines’ Submission 11 had standing even though China’s actions
on the environment did not directly injure the Philippines.231
After the ruling, eight countries, including the U.S. and the Philippines, called for
the Tribunal’s decision to be respected. Only a few EU countries issued independent
statements, but all signed on an EU statement representing the position of all members.
The general EU document acknowledged the ruling, but it did not call for compliance.
Eight countries made neutral statements without addressing the decision. They called for
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a solution on the “basis of international law.”232 Notably, ASEAN’s statement did not
refer to the Tribunal’s ruling, but the implementation of the 2012 Declaration of the
Conduct of Parties.233 Its neutral stance reflected how ASEAN states could not get
consensus on how to counter China. Seven countries including China and Russia opposed
the ruling entirely. Although 70 countries supported China’s rejection of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, many of these countries chose to remain silent after the Tribunal’s ruling.
In the Philippine Presidential campaign, the future president, Rodrigo Duterte,
announced that he would “shut up” about the South China Sea if China built a railway
that would link Manila to Mindanao.234 However, he also joked about taking a jet ski to
the disputed islands to plant a Philippine flag and assert jurisdiction.235 Following his
election, Duterte began sending mixed signals about countering China. Duterte
announced his “separation” from the U.S. and began realigning Philippine foreign policy
with China when he visited Beijing in October 2016.236 Two months later, Duterte
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announced that “In the play of politics, now, I will set aside the arbitral ruling. I will not
impose anything on China” and repeated threats to expel American forces after the
Obama administration criticized his bloody war on drugs campaign.237 The Duterte
administration partnered with China through trade, finance, and development
infrastructure. As recent as June 2019, the administration was heavily criticized for not
doing anything after a Chinese vessel crashed into a Philippine fishing boat near Reed
Bank, a reef well within the Philippines’ EEZ. Duterte downplayed the incident as a
“little maritime accident” and did not take measures to rescue the fishermen or issue a
warning to China.238 Duterte’s willful ignorance of the Tribunal’s ruling proved
detrimental as China accelerated its building campaign in the South China Sea. In light of
Duterte’s bid for economic development aid from China, Gregory Poling, Senior Fellow
for Southeast Asia and Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) characterized the Philippines maritime policy
as “well-intentioned but naïve.”239
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Examining the Tribunal’s View on Historical Title versus Historical Rights
This subsection will build on the chronology discussed in Chapter 1 and examine
the Philippines’ Submissions 1 and 2. The debate on the validity and conformance of
China’s “nine-dash line” with the UNCLOS was a source of contention between China
and the Philippines. The Philippines argued that:
1. China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines,
may not extend beyond those expressly permitted by the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea;
2. China’s claims to sovereign rights jurisdiction, and to ‘historic rights’ with respect to
the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so called ‘nine dash
line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they
exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements
expressly permitted by UNCLOS.240
It was similar to the Note Verbale the Philippines issued on April 5, 2011, arguing
that the “so-called 9-dash line … would have no basis under international law,
specifically UNCLOS.”241 China immediately rejected the Note by publishing its Note of
April 14, 2011, claiming that “China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in
the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence.”242 The
Tribunal’s decision to entertain the Philippines Submissions 1 and 2 was dependent on
whether historic rights were excluded from jurisdiction over “historic bays or titles” in
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Article 298.243 In the end, the Tribunal ruled that “China’s claims in the South China Sea
do not include a claim to ‘historic title’, within the meaning of Article 298(1)(a)(i).”244
Further, the Tribunal found that “China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign
rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea
encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to the Convention
and without lawful effect.”245
As shown in Chapter 1, China’s nine-dash line evolved from its first appearance
in 1933 to broken indeterminate lines ranging from nine to twelve dashes. Having no
exact geographic coordinates, the line had dubious origins and characterizations.
As far as precedence was concerned on whether China’s nine-dash line implied
title or rights to the South China Sea, the ICJ stated in the Frontier Dispute case that
“maps merely constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of
themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial
title.”246 In the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, Judge Oda of the ICJ said, “A map on its
own, with no other supporting evidence, cannot justify a political claim.”247 According to
the Judgement in the Frontier Dispute, maps may acquire legal force “when maps are
annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part.”248 Accuracy also plays a
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significant role when using maps as evidence of sovereignty. Max Huber, the arbitrator in
the Island of Palmas case, said, “The first condition required of maps that are to serve as
evidence on points of law is their geographical accuracy.”249 Given China’s inaccurate
and vague claims in the South China Sea, the 1947 map it uses as evidence of sovereignty
would arguably be invalid. Its claims of having “abundant historical and legal evidence”
to support the nine-dash line’s validity are hollow.250
There is no reference to “historic rights” in the UNCLOS. However, there is
mention of historic title in Articles 15 and 298(1)(a)(i). On August 25, 2006, China
declared it “does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of
the Convention which respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph
1(a)(b) and (c) of Article 298.”251 Therefore, in China’s view, “disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of articles 15, 74, and 83 relating to sea boundary
delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles” were beyond the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. However, for the Tribunal, did China really have historic title over the
South China Sea? The Tribunal differentiated historic rights versus and historic title and
found China to have neither. The Tribunal said:
The term ‘historic rights’ is general in nature and can describe any rights
that a State may possess that would not normally arise under the general
rules of international law, absent particular historical circumstances.
Historic rights may include sovereignty, but may equally include more
249
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limited rights, such as fishing rights or rights of access, that fall well
short of a claim of sovereignty. ‘Historic title’, in contrast, is used
specifically to refer to historic sovereignty to land or maritime areas.
‘Historic waters’ is simply a term for historic title over maritime areas,
typically exercised either as a claim to internal waters or as a claim to the
territorial sea, although “general international law . . . does not provide
for a single ‘régime’ for ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic bays’, but only for a
particular régime for each of the concrete, recognised cases of ‘historic
waters’ or ‘historic bays’.” Finally, a ‘historic bay’ is simply a bay in
which a State claims historic waters.252
Past judgements align with this interpretation. In the Fisheries case, the ICJ
wrote, “By ‘historic waters’ are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters
but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic
title.”253 Thus, historic title is related to territorial sovereignty. It could then be argued
that the historic bay or title in Article 298(1)(a)(i) was referring to the territorial sea.
Qatar v. Bahrain discusses the recognition of sovereignty by activity. The ICJ ruled that
Bahrain’s historic pearl diving industry in the Gulf
seems in any event never to have led to the recognition of an exclusive: quasiterritorial right to the fishing grounds themselves or to the superjacent waters. The
Court, therefore, does not consider the existence of pearling banks, though
predominantly exploited in the past by Bahrain fishermen, as forming a
circumstance which would justify an eastward shifting of the equidistance line as
requested by Bahrain.254
In this case, Bahrain’s activity did not constitute sovereignty. Applying this
concept to South China Sea, China cannot enjoy historical title on the basis of historical
fishing. In Eritrea/Yemen, the Tribunal ruled that “’historic rights’ which accrued in
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favour of both parties through a process of historical consolidation as a sort of ‘servitude
internationale’” falls short of territorial sovereignty.255 For China to legitimately assert its
jurisdiction over the South China Sea, it should have claimed historic title and part of its
territorial sea rather than historic rights. However, China could not modify its narrative
now because China accepted the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China
Sea. As late as 2015, when China’s Foreign Ministry was asked to comment on the USS
Lassen passing within 12 nautical miles off Zhubi Reef in the Spratlys, Spokesperson Lu
Kang said:
The Chinese side respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and
over-flight in the South China Sea to which all countries are entitled
under international law, but stands firmly against the harm caused by any
country to China's sovereignty and security interests under the cloak of
navigation and over-flight freedom.256
Besides innocent passage, states neither enjoy freedom of navigation nor
overflight in the territorial sea.257 Therefore, allowing freedom of navigation and
overflight while claiming sovereignty over the South China Sea is contradictory. The
Tribunal viewed China’s contradictory claims as a signal that China “does not consider
the sea areas within the ‘nine-dash line’ to be equivalent to its territorial sea or internal
waters.”258 The Tribunal further said: “China declared baselines for the territorial sea
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surrounding Hainan and the Paracel Islands … China would presumably not have done so
if the waters both within and beyond 12 nautical miles of those islands already formed
part of China’s territorial sea (or internal waters) by virtue of a claim to historic rights
through the ‘nine-dash line.’”259 Thus, China did not have historic title over the South
China Sea. China cannot exclude Article 298(1)(a)(i) because it did not have historic title
in the first place.

Obligation to Protect Marine Environment and Granting Legal Standing
The Tribunal’s decision to assess and ruling on the Philippines’ Submission 11 is
notable because it provides a precedent for an international body to adjudicate a case
brought by a party not directly impacted by the breach that concerns the protection of
community interests. This was the first time these community interests were discussed in
the context of marine environmental protection. The Tribunal accepted the Philippines
argument. China violated its obligations under the UNCLOS to protect and preserve the
marine environment even though China’s actions on the environment did not directly
injure the Philippines. The Tribunal ruled:
The Tribunal thus considers the harvesting of sea turtles, species
threatened with extinction, to constitute a harm to the marine
environment as such. The Tribunal further has no doubt that the
harvesting of corals and giant clams from the waters surrounding
Scarborough Shoal and features in the Spratly Islands, on the scale that
appears in the record before it, has a harmful impact on the fragile
marine environment. The Tribunal therefore considers that a failure to
take measures to prevent these practices would constitute a breach of
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Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention, and turns now to consider
China’s responsibility for such breaches.260
Indeed, expert ecologists testifying before the Tribunal on China’s activities in the
South China Sea said: “More recently, fishermen in the South China Sea are reported to
utilise the propellers of their boats to excavate shells from reef flats in the Spratly Islands
on an industrial scale, leading to near-complete destruction of the affected reef areas.”261
Further, “the most widespread issue has been overfishing, which…has likely reduced the
growth capacities of some of the reefs.” 262 Regarding China’s artificial island-building
campaign, John McManus, a marine biology expert, told the Tribunal that China’s
“presence of the extended and new islands will undoubtedly lead to increased fishing
pressure in their vicinities as settled fishing populations increase and transient fishers stay
nearby for safety reasons.”263
The next step for the Tribunal was to assess whether China fulfilled its obligations
under the UNCLOS to conduct an environmental impact assessment and monitor
mechanisms to oversee its activities in the South China Sea. Article 204 says: “States
shall keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which
they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to pollute the marine
environment.” Article 205, says, “States shall publish reports of the results obtained
pursuant to article 204 or provide such reports at appropriate intervals to the competent
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international organizations, which should make them available to all States.” Further, in
Article 206, States are required to “assess the potential effects of such activities on the
marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such assessments in
the manner provided in article 205” if “harmful changes to the marine environment” are
expected. However, neither the Tribunal nor the Philippines identified “any report that
would resemble an environmental impact assessment that meets the requirements of
Article 206 of the Convention, or indeed under China’s own Environmental Impact
Assessment Law of 2002.”264 Thus, the Tribunal concluded, China did not fulfill its
obligations under Articles 204, 205, and 206.
When it ruled that China failed to protect the environment, the Tribunal expected
that states would cooperate to enforce the protection of the South China Sea. The
Tribunal referenced Article 197 and the ITLOS decision in the MOX Plant case: “the
duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine
environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law.”265 Article
197 requires States to cooperate on a global or regional basis “directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.” The ICJ ruled similarly in
Argentina v. Uruguay, saying: “The Court observes that it is by co-operating that the
States concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the environment that might be
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created by the plans initiated by one or other of them, so as to prevent the damage in
question.”266
As shown, there are precedents for the Court to assess concerns regarding the
protection of community interests in the context of marine environmental protection.
However, can a State, not directly impacted by another State’s actions have legal
standing and ask the Court to assess the actions of the other State which is breaking its
obligations under the Convention? The Court’s approach to this issue has varied, but
South China Sea made it clear that a State does not necessarily have to show injury to
have standing. The following cases show the Court’s approach to assessing cases in
which neither party had jurisdiction over the violation.
In 1966, the ICJ rejected Ethiopia and Liberia’s standing in South West Africa
because they had not experienced direct impacts of South Africa’s apartheid situation.
The Court said:
the "necessity" argument falls to the ground for lack of verisimilitude in
the context of the economy and philosophy of that system. Looked at in
another way moreover, the argument amounts to a plea that the Court
should allow the equivalent of an "actio popularis", or right resident in
any member of a community to take legal action in vindication of a
public interest. But although a right of this kind may be known to certain
municipal systems of law, it is not known to international law as it stands
at present267
However, the Court applied the concept of erga omnes in Barcelona Traction
saying:
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an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature the former are the concern of al1 States. In view of the importance
of the rights involved, al1 States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.268
The Court further clarified,
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection
have entered into the body of general international law.269
From a public relations standpoint, Barcelona Traction was a major about-face from
South West Africa because not only did the Court reassert its position, but it also defined
the international community’s obligation to defend international law.270
In the 1974 Nuclear Tests case, Australia and New Zealand argued that France’s
nuclear testing in the South Pacific violated the “rights of all members of the international
community.”271 However, the Court did not examine this argument. In the end, the Court
accepted the French Foreign Minister’s argument, “France was ‘still reserving to itself
the right to carry out atmospheric nuclear tests’ so that ‘In legal terms, Australia has
nothing from the French Government which protects it against any further atmospheric
tests.’”272
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Arguably, the Court had different views on when it could give standing to parties
not directly impacted by the action being questioned. However, the fact that the Court
expands and contracts its jurisdiction is a projection of power dynamics.273 The Court’s
definition of erga omnes in Barcelona Traction opened a new mindset. This new mindset
could not have been possible had the Court decided that the case was beyond its
jurisdiction. The concept of third-party involvement was now applied to enforcing values
that the international community agreed upon. Further, each state had an obligation to
protect these fundamental values.

Implications for Maintaining International Peace and Security
One of the purposes of the UNCLOS was to establish “a legal order for the seas
and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans.”274 The South China Sea dispute is testing the legal
order and the maintenance of international peace and security.
As shown in Chapter 1, the South China Sea is home to natural resources that
sustains China and its Southeast Asian neighbors. China has militarized the area and
poses a threat to freedom of navigation. Besides its importance to Asia, the South China
Sea is the main trade route for global trade. U.S. FONOPs keep China in check, making
sure ships enjoy the freedom of navigation. Since the late 1970s, the U.S. has been
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conducting FONOPs to counter excessive claims by coastal States and to enforce the
concept of the freedom of the seas. However, U.S. enforcement of the Tribunal’s ruling
and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea risks escalation. While U.S. naval
power is bent on defending the status quo and invoking international law as its
justification, China is using its rising power to question this status quo.
Enforcing the Tribunal’s decision and the freedom of the seas concept risks a
conflict between the U.S. and China. Both countries are sleepwalking into a Thucydides
trap. The current climate in the South China Sea could be compared to pre-World War I
Europe. Although the period before World War I witnessed important progress in the
codification of international law and the institutionalization of the peaceful settlement of
disputes, codified international law did not prevent the outbreak of war. Similarly, the
Tribunal or the UNCLOS will not compel China to respect international law if it finds
more benefit in breaking it. Another point of comparison to pre-World War I is that the
defense of international legal order was also a primary reason for the Allied Powers such
as Britain and France to enter the war in 1914. They considered themselves “engaged in
the defense of international law and justice,” affirming “the sanctities of treaties” against
the “dangerous challenge to the fundamental principles of public law” posed by
Germany.275 On the other hand, Germany challenged international law by arguing that
international law had to shelved when there was military necessity to use force and
national self-preservation at stake. In the context of the South China Sea, the interest of
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the revisionist and the status quo power, in this case China and the U.S. depends on their
ability to avoid any miscalculations that can escalate and lead to a violent confrontation.
In light of the South China Sea’s security and economic importance, under what
conditions will China increasingly challenge the jurisdiction of international waters by
coercively taking control of the South China Sea? Can China’s domestic politics shed
light on China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy? China’s domestic challenges and
development of a more assertive foreign policy will be addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: China’s Shift Towards an Assertive Foreign Policy
This chapter addresses the following research questions: Under what conditions is
China’s foreign policy affected by domestic factors? How does China’s domestic politics
persuade the CCP to modify its strategy and take a more coercive position? I argue that
four contextual factors: symmetrical distribution of power, economic satisfaction, thirdparty threats, and political stability shape how and when China decides to employ
extreme forms of coercion to acquire territory or otherwise compromise the vital interests
of other states.
The first part of the chapter will examine China’s political economy and how its
domestic developments and crises impact China’s relations with the U.S. and Southeast
Asian countries on issues such as the South China Sea dispute. Compared to its foreign
policy in the 1990s through the early 2000s, China dramatically increased its
assertiveness on foreign policy since 2008. The first part of the chapter examines what
led China’s approach to foreign policy to shift from peaceful to more active and
confrontational. The second part of the chapter will introduce my “escapement”
framework to show how the presence or absence of a combination of domestic and
international factors could force a state to deviate from its initial strategy. The framework
will also be applied to the five events when China asserted jurisdiction over the South
91

China Sea from 1973 through 2016. Appendix C discusses how the escapement
framework was put together.

China’s Relatively Peaceful Rise in the 1990s
China approached foreign policy as a careful, tactful player focusing on
maintaining contact with the outside world while making its foreign relations conducive
to China’s economic development. As China was navigating its way out of political
instability following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, the government focused on
increasing economic satisfaction and maintaining political stability. Although China still
projected power during the 1996 Mischief Reef skirmishes with the Philippines and the
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China emphasized the need to strengthen diplomatic ties
with major world powers. China established strategic partnerships with Russia and the
U.S in 1996 and 1997, respectively. In 1998, China held the first Sino-European Summit
with the EU and launched bilateral negotiations with India.276
China also participated in multilateral mechanisms and international organizations
during the 1990s to show the international community that its intentions were peaceful.
By participating in international organizations, China saw the opportunity to strengthen
ties with other nations and pursue trade and cooperation with the global community as it
benefitted China’s domestic economic development. Plans to implement this strategy
were already in the making as early as 1986 when Zhao Ziyang, China’s former Premier,
reported to the National People’s Congress,
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China is a developing socialist country with a population of over 1 billion. We are
well aware of our obligations and responsibilities in the world. We will therefore
continue to work hard on both fronts, domestic and international, to push forward
the socialist modernization of our country and to make greater contributions to
world peace and human progress.”277
To assure the international community of its peaceful intentions, China ratified
the UNCLOS in 1996 and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty the same year.278
As its economy increased, China used these multilateral forums to demonstrate its
economic importance to the international community. From joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to promoting the China-ASEAN free trade agreement, China has
viewed its economic diplomacy as an opportunity to encourage trade and economic
interdependence to reduce tensions over disputes and competing ideologies.279
Regionally, China expanded its engagement with Southeast Asian nations by
pursuing negotiations bilaterally and multilaterally.280 In 1996, it became a dialogue
partner with ASEAN. The following year, along with Japan and South Korea, China
joined the ASEAN Plus Three forum to increase dialogue and cooperation with Southeast
Asian countries. This forum was essential in signing the “Declaration on the Conduct of
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Parties in the South China Sea” in 2002 and the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia” in 2003.281
China’s increased participation in regional and international forums convinced
some scholars that China’s appearance as a revisionist with its increasing military
capabilities could actually be moderated and its policies could be brought in line with the
U.S.-led world order.282 However, this outlook changed when China shifted its strategy
towards a more confrontational foreign policy in 2008. Based on the timeline of events,
China’s foreign policy from the 1990s to 2008 followed Deng Xiaoping’s policy to “hide
one’s capabilities and bide one’s time.”

China’s Shift Towards Assertive Foreign Policy
Since 2008, China has been taking a more confrontational approach to crafting its
foreign policy. Scholars in Chinese and East Asian studies such as Michael D. Swaine
and Thomas J. Christensen have described China’s new foreign policy as “assertive.”283
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They cite examples such as Wen Jiabao, China’s former Premier, criticizing the U.S. for
its economic mismanagement as well as the increasing cyber-attacks on foreign firms in
China such as Google and strong indications that the CCP was behind the attacks.284
Indications of China’s more assertive foreign policy were also evident in the CCP’s
response to President Obama’s decision in late 2009 to sell arms to Taiwan and meet with
the Dalai Lama. Chinese leadership warned the U.S. with strong retaliatory responses,
including threats to sanction U.S. defense industry companies operating in China such as
Boeing.285 Geoff Dyer writes, “While China has reacted angrily to US arms sales to
Taiwan before—by cutting off military-to-military ties—and has in effect blacklisted
some companies, this is the first time it has threatened sanctions publicly.”286
China showed new assertiveness in the South and East China Seas around this
time. As discussed in Chapter 1, China harassed the USNS Impeccable on March 17,
2009. Ten days before, on March 7, a Chinese intelligence ship contacted the Impeccable
via bridge-to-bridge radio calling Impeccable’s operations illegal and ordering the ship to
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leave the area immediately or “suffer the consequences.”287 China increased its
assertiveness against the Philippines and Vietnam in 2011, culminating in the forced
removal of Filipino fishermen in Scarborough Shoal on April 8, 2012. Although there
were attempts to revive the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group to Implement the
Declaration on Conduct of Parties, ASEAN acquiesced to China’s demands to remove
the clause mentioning how ASEAN members would first gather consensus before
meeting with China. During this time, China also increased power projection by
conducting naval exercises, including firing anti-ship missiles at Philippine makeshift
fishing vessels at Jackson Atoll on February 25, 2011. China also showed assertiveness in
the East China Sea. In 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japan’s Coast Guard
near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. After Japan arrested the boat’s captain, China
demanded that Japan release the captain and immediately apologize. In addition, China
suspended trade of rare earth elements and cancelled high-level bilateral negotiations
with Japan.288
Politically, China also began modifying its outlook to match its new assertive
behavior. This could be seen in its increased usage of economic sanctions, increased
engagement with countries both multilaterally and bilaterally by establishing its own
organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and
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Road Initiative unveiled in 2013, and shifting its language in government documents
from “basic interests” or “major concerns” to “core interests.”289
For decades before 2008, China denounced unilateral economic sanctions as an
immoral punishment of innocent, vulnerable populations.290 However, that changed
around 2007 and 2008 when Chinese scholars began advocating to include economic
sanctions in China’s foreign policy toolbox. Liu Wei, an economics professor at Wuhan
University, said, “The argument that economic sanctions bring about a humanitarian
disaster is increasingly weak,” “This provides China with a new opportunity to
implement economic sanctions.”291 Jian Jisong, an international law expert at Zhongnan
University said,
As China increases its international economic influence, China should
increase its use of unilateral economic sanctions in order to maintain its
legal international interests and achieve its foreign policy objectives.
China should liberate its thinking, and fully utilize the important tool of
unilateral sanctions. In order to fully and effectively use this foreign
policy and legal tool, China should also establish supportive domestic
laws and regulations.292
Since 2008, China has expanded its reach of economic sanctions. In 2010, Liu Xiabo, a
Beijing author calling for more democracy in China, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
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In response, China cancelled a ministerial trade delegation to Norway, imposed economic
sanctions on Norway, prompting a drop in total salmon imports from 90% to less than
30%, and started a disinformation campaign that Norwegian fish is “unhealthy” because
Norwegians are “of bad quality” and “badly behaved.”293 Another example was discussed
in Chapter 1. Following the Scarborough Shoal incident with the Philippines in 2012,
China also banned the importation of Philippine bananas and other fruits that affected
$75 million in the market with 200,000 jobs. Bananas are the Philippines’ second-largest
export that employs about one-third of the population and almost half of all Philippines’
banana exports are shipped to China. Beijing wanted to pressure Manila to give up
Scarborough Shoal in exchange for loosening economic sanctions.294
China has also played a more assertive role in WTO trade negotiations since
2008. Beginning with the Doha Round, China refused to concede to U.S. demands that it
should commit to special agricultural products and certain industrial sectors. China
viewed this demand as unjustified relative to the concessions the U.S. was willing to
make. Had China conceded, Doha Round negotiations would have been concluded in
2008.295 China also began taking a more proactive role in the UN as the U.S. cut off $80
million in annual funding to the UNESCO, about 22% of its entire budget, to retaliate
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against the organization’s acceptance of Palestine as a member organization in 2011.296
Beijing raced to fill in the vacuum, increased monetary contributions fivefold, and
declared itself a “champion of multilateralism.”297 China’s investment in the UN would
be important for its assertive foreign policy while protecting itself from controversial
topics such as the human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet and its policy to isolate
Taiwan. China has leveraged its increased influence in the UN to legitimize its
authoritarian rule.
Regionally, China has been taking more assertive steps to impose its vision of a
regional order that shifts Southeast Asia’s geopolitics in its favor. In 2014, China hosted
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA) in
Shanghai, and the APEC summit in Beijing. President Xi announced a “New Asian
Security Concept” at CICA, emphasizing that problems within Asia should be solved by
Asians themselves.298 China also initiated a “Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific”
(FTAAP) at the 2014 APEC summit that was designed to make it an attractive alternative
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).299 These regional initiatives have been important
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stepping stones for China to influence ASEAN and sign on to the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a China-led trade agreement. Introduced
during the 19th ASEAN meeting in 2011 and formally signed in 2020, RCEP could be
argued as a significant win for China. It reinforces the economic interdependence
regionally and brings ASEAN closer into China’s economic influence. This would let
China have more influence over the regulations and standards as it has already done with
the BRI.300 It would also create more efficient supply chains for China as it tries to
bolster its economic resilience to trade tensions and dampen negative impacts of
“decoupling.”301 Ultimately, China’s regional initiatives would sway U.S. allies in the
Indo-Pacific to ally with China. China is taking this opportunity to set the rules in
Southeast Asia.
At the center of China’s new assertive policies was shifting its language in
government documents from “basic interests” or “major concerns” to “core interests.”
Michael D. Swaine notes how the term “core interests” was first used in official Chinese
government public statements alongside the term “major concerns.” However, usage of
the term “core interests” skyrocketed in 2008.302 From 2008 onwards, the term was used
alongside phrases such as “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” “national security,” and
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“national unity” or reunification.”303 China’s State Councilor Dai Dai Bingguo) publicly
defined the general elements of China’s core interests in July 2009, during a session of
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Dai stated in his closing
remarks at the S&ED that the term includes three components:
1. preserving China’s basic state system and national security,
2. national sovereignty and territorial integrity and
3. the continued stable development of China’s economy and society.304
“Core interests” was again mentioned in 2009 during President Obama’s visit to China.
Both sides said in a joint statement, “The two sides agreed that respecting each other’s
core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in China-US relations.”305
China has also conveyed privately to U.S. government senior officials that it considers
both South and East China Seas as part of China’s “core interests.”306

Possible Origins of China’s New Assertive Foreign Policy
The timeline of events in Chapter 1 chronicling China’s assertion of jurisdiction
suggests that domestic factors played a significant role in prompting China to defend its
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claims in the South China Sea. In 1921, when Sun Yat-sen licensed the Paracels
Archipelago Industries Ltd. to mine guano in the Paracels, Sun faced economic and
political challenges. He had to deal with the implications of the North China Famine of
1920 that starved millions while local warlords battled with politicians for control over
resources. The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, also presented a challenge to
Sun’s fledgling government’s efforts to gain legitimacy. In 1928, after the Communistled Guangzhou Uprising in 1927, Sun sent ships to the Paracels again to gather data and
investigate the islands. In December 1927, China was going through “excessive dryness,”
and locusts had brought “natural calamity” to seventy counties in north China. In 1928,
Guangdong authorities commissioned Chen Tianxi to write A Compilation of Materials
Concerning the Xisha and Dongsha Islands Case as evidence supporting their historical
claim to the islands. These are just two examples of when China decided to claim historic
rights to the Sea. Thus, there is reason to examine China’s domestic factors to determine
how domestic politics and societal interests could critically shape China’s assertive
foreign policy.307 This section will show how China’s turbulent politics and economic
challenges have both driven the government to adopt a more assertive foreign policy.
Although it may be argued that its use of diplomacy and cooperation in the South China
Sea from 2008 onward was much less compared to 1990s, the only difference in how
China used its foreign policy tools was that it was more on par with the capabilities and
influences of other global powers. As China emerged from the 2008 financial crisis as the
world’s third-largest economy, it knew that its decisions had more impact on geopolitical
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issues. It could afford to take a more assertive foreign policy without fearing immediate
backlash that could threaten the existence of the state. China’s cycles of political and
economic challenges have not changed. The only thing that changed is the way it is being
expressed now.

Political Challenges: Dissonance in Crafting Foreign Policy
There are dysfunctional dynamics within China’s domestic politics that prevent
the government from making a clear decision-making process. Michael D. Swaine argues
that civil-military relations between the PLA and the civilian agencies have lacked a
coordinating mechanism that poses a significant problem for China’s foreign
policy.308This problem would have critical implications especially given the expanded
scope of PLA activities and the increasing presence of the PLA beyond China’s borders.
In maritime security issues, China’s top leadership relies heavily on the PLA Navy since
CCP officials have limited military experience. Christopher D. Yung, an expert in PLA
Navy strategy, has identified four points on how the PLA Navy shapes central
authorities’ decision-making process:
1. Shaping the leadership’s understanding of the strategic or security environment
2. Formulating options and giving the Politburo Standing Committee recommendations
on the risks involved in conducting military operations
3. Providing advice on how to conduct a military operation once the Central Committee
has approved that operation
4. Providing advice on the resources needed to carry out a specific military operation or
military operations in general309
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Although the Politburo has the last word on whether or not to continue an operation, the
lack of stable civil-military relations could create more problems. For example,
establishing an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea covering the disputed
Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands in 2013 seemed to be at odds with President Xi’s foreign policy
vision since he emphasized that his new leadership should focus on restoring China’s
relations with its regional neighbors, launching a more constructive approach toward an
eventual agreement on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and avoiding
escalating territorial disputes.310 However, the PLA still pushed for an air defense
identification zone in the East China Sea.311
To add to the dysfunctional mechanisms of formulating China’s foreign policies,
managers of state-owned industries may favor certain national interests to complement
their businesses. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, experts in Chinese foreign policy and
industries, have observed that executives of state-owned enterprises hold ministerial or
vice-ministerial ranks, and some serve as alternate members of the Central Committee.312
Executives and high-ranking CCP officials working on foreign policy deliberations
closely operate. This collaboration is especially seen in the relationship between large oil
companies and the political establishment. Writing in 2010, Jakobson and Knox also
observed that in the past five years, two members of the China National Petroleum
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Corporation were transferred over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appointed to
senior diplomatic posts in the country where they used to work for the petroleum
company.313 Thus, the participation of leaders from state-owned enterprises in crafting
foreign policy risks formulating policies that only benefit a certain business, not the
national interest.
When the interests of state-owned enterprise executives intersect with the state,
such as in the case of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
energy security strategy, corporations are found to have more leverage in crafting the
foreign policy. The NDRC’s energy security strategy is based on oil and gas extraction at
the well.314 To secure energy resources at the point of extraction, the PLA Navy
maintains a military presence to ensure these wells are not threatened. The policy has
been strongly supported by oil companies benefitting from state subsidies for diversifying
their sources of supply.315 Letting the PLA Navy guard these wells risk further
militarizing the South China Sea and escalating an already tense situation. Another
example of the danger of allowing state-owned enterprises have more leverage on foreign
policy could be seen in China’s foreign policy during the 2011 Libyan Civil War.
Although the UN passed a resolution imposing sanctions on the Qaddafi regime, Chinese
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state-run weapons firms continued to coordinate arms sales with Qaddafi’s
government.316
The dysfunctional internal dynamics within the government’s decision-making
process are drivers for China’s provocative behavior.317 As different ministries and
agencies such as maritime agencies, military, and extractive industries compete to
influence foreign policy to their favor, the result is an incoherent plan.318 In this case,
whichever stakeholder has the will to resort to jingoism wins over the other stakeholders.
This has led political elites to amplify China’s hawkish policies. For example, Colonel
Dai Xu, a PLA Air Force official, explained in his 2009 book, C-Shaped Encirclement,
that China was encircled in a C-shape by U.S. allies to destroy China. According to
Colonel Dai Xu, war with the U.S. was inescapable. Since the U.S. provoked China by
supporting regional allies, it was the responsibility of Chinese leaders to end the
cooperation with the U.S. and instead form plans to take the offensive.319 In 2018, Dai Xu
suggested that the PLA Navy should ram and use intimidation tactics against U.S. Navy
ships passing through the South China Sea.320 A year later, Colonel Liu Mingfu's book,
The China Dream, advocated for a more hawkish foreign policy. It called on the Chinese
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leadership to abandon the modest foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping’s era and instead
build the world’s strongest military to deter the U.S. from challenging China’s rise.321
The dissonance between political elites could be illustrated by the debate on whether the
South China Sea should be considered among China’s “core interests.” Although CCP
officials were hesitant to put the South China Sea among China’s “core interests,” they
refrained from contradicting political opponents such as Dai Xu to avoid unwanted
criticism.322

Economic Challenges: Unrest and Anxiety as Drivers of a Hawkish Foreign Policy
China’s economic growth has been slowing down since 2008. From 2008 to 2018,
China’s overall debt increased from 164% to 300%.323 Domestic factors such as labor
unrest have resulted from the economic slowdown, and Chinese leaders have responded
by being ever more focused on preserving Party rule in the face of economic challenges.
Challenges at home caused anxiety for workers. This can arguably drive the China’s
foreign policy to push the BRI and seek opportunities to keep its people employed. In this
regard, China’s hawkish foreign policy is an effort to sustain its economic growth and
employment, preserve the Party’s legitimacy as a provider for people’s economic
satisfaction, and a chance to shape rules and norms to China’s advantage.
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Since the legality of labor strikes in China is ambiguous, accurate information on
strikes and protests is unavailable.324 However, in 2011, the China Statistics Press
released data showing the rise of “mass incidents” from 1993 to 2010. China’s uses the
term, “mass incidents,” to collectively describe strikes, protests, and riots.
Although the media is strongly suppressed especially when it features unrest in
China, several incidents have caught the eye of news services outside China. Notable
examples include when workers at a Honda parts plant in Zhongshan, Guangdong
Province, went on strike demanding higher pay, better working conditions, and more
representative union in June 2010.325 Another example is when about 2,000 workers at
the state-owned Pangang Group Chengdu Steel and Vanadium Co. struck to demand
higher pay, more stable contracts, and the dismissal of managers whom workers felt were
“lazy, redundant personnel.”326
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Figure 7. “Mass Incidents” and Labor Disputes Accepted for Mediation, Arbitration, and
Court, 1993-2010327

Figure 7, from the 2011 China Labor Statistical Yearbook, shows a significant increase in
disputes for 2008 when cases doubled from 350,182 to 693,495 involving 1.2 million
workers according to China’s Department of Population and Employment Statistics 2011.
However, even before the spike, there was already a clear upward trend of “mass
incidents.”
Before 2008, strikes and protests were described as “reactive” or “defensive.”328
Throughout the late 1990s, there was an increase in unrest by workers from rural China
who migrated to cities to work in coastal factories. These workers only had limited rights
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and access to urban social insurance and schools for their children.329 However, they
resorted to legal routes and NGOs to seek help. This shows that they were empowered to
use the law to pressure state institutions and demand for equal workers’ rights.330
However, Manfred Elfstrom and Sarosh Kuruvilla, scholars in China’s industrial
relations, argue that since 2008, Chinese workers have been striking more “offensively,”
demanding more money, better working conditions, and more respect from employers.331
After gathering data, they found that the number of strikes increased from 3.6 actions per
month in 2008 to 32.1 actions per month in 2012.332 Workers after 2008 are less easily
satisfied monetarily than previous generations. They demand more leisure, measures for
worker satisfaction, and respect for the work they do.333 Workers are also more flexible,
leaving their employer when their demands are not met. Employers have also witnessed
employees taking violent actions over small disagreements.334 Social media and faster
communication also suggest that strikes and protests are more coordinated now.335 How
can the increase of unrest affect China’s foreign policies? Can it in anyway cause the
government to adopt a more hawkish foreign policy. The answer may be in the way the
government has employed its “social management” strategy to control unrest.
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Besides increasing surveillance and internet policing, China also launched a social
management strategy to expand its measures of propaganda and indoctrination to
influence public attitudes towards the government. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao
outlined the improvement of social management and placed the initiative at the top of the
agenda. The following month, at the annual session of the National People’s Congress, he
specified four categories for the purpose of the initiative: alleviating inequality and social
hardship, heightened indoctrination, decentralization of service provision, and improving
public security.336 The goal of this initiative was to remove sources of public grievances
and keep social unrest in check.
Since 2008, China’s central government has implemented stricter measures to
influence public opinion using propaganda and indoctrination. During the 2008 Olympic
Games in Beijing, China bombarded residents and visitors with propaganda posters and
President Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society,” a catchphrase for his social management
strategy. Posters flooded Beijing’s streets that said, “Welcome Olympic Games with
joyfulness and construct a harmonious society.”337 In 2008, the CCP’s Central
Propaganda Department also restricted television stations from reporting on air quality
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and food safety due to political reasons.338 The following year, China launched a roundthe-clock English-language news channel as part of President Hu Jintao’s plan to “go
global” and make “the voice of China better heard in international affairs.” According to
Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, the goal of this initiative
was to ensure that information broadcast should reflect the government’s views while
adapting to Western style media marketing to compete with other international news
networks.339 The public was also banned from physically attending China’s 2009
National Day military parade.340 People who were specifically invited to attend were
ordered to sign secrecy agreements prohibiting them from talking to journalists and
posting pictures of rehearsals.341 The PLA logistics department said the parade was “a
comprehensive display of the party's ability to rule and of the overall might of the
nation.”342
China’s propaganda campaign went beyond using just the media. It also increased
its efforts to indoctrinate politicians and the general population through patriotic
education in schools such as teaching and testing Chinese students that James Shoal is the
southernmost point of Chinese territory and that the “nine-dash line” has always belonged
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to China.343 This also seems true with Chinese international legal scholarship.
Throughout the research, I have not found literature written by a Chinese scholar working
in China criticizing the Chinese government’s position on the South China Sea dispute or
the Tribunal’s decision in 2016. There has been a significant push to strengthen China’s
practical and academic international legal training guided by CCP initiatives. The
Xiamen Academy of International Law aims “to be both practical and highly
scholarly.”344 The young generation of aspiring Chinese international lawyers is expected
“to develop distinctively Chinese theories of international law.”345 The Chinese approach
to international law includes: a flexible and functional approach to benefit from and
exploit the international order without amending the law, reinterpreting existing law to
shape legal norms to advance its interests, and using international law to legitimize or
delegitimize actions that either support or go against China’s ambitions.346 Arguably,
welcoming China’s perspectives would increase diverse opinions. However Chinese
scholarship is hampered by partisanship. Articles about the South China Sea written by
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Chinese scholars working in China have centered on China’s purported historical rights,
the Chinese government’s position paper, and the rejection of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction
over the dispute. There is no discussion on the UNCLOS, EEZs, and territorial
entitlement.
The 12th Five-Year Plan also allowed more extensive government involvement in
producing popular entertainment such as films, literature, and art.347 At the Sixth Plenum
of the Seventeenth National Congress of the CCP in October 2011, the CCP called for
intensifying propaganda work, improving cultural education, and producing attractive
cultural content.348 It includes making films and writing books with patriotic and
nationalistic overtones. This would also provide the momentum to produce films such as
Abominable in 2019 in which the “nine-dash line” is featured as China’s territory, or
place restrictions on films that struck too close to the CCP’s home.349 Thus, there is a
clear resurgence of nationalism to implement a social management strategy and control
social unrest.
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China’s hawkish foreign policy and attempts to rewrite global norms could be
argued as a response to complement the resurgence of Chinese nationalism. Elizabeth
Economy, a senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations writes,
China’s drive to remake global norms is also fueled by a resurgent
nationalism that heartens back to the days when China was a world
trading power. For some Chinese officials, the past century—in which
China has been largely absent as an economic and military force—was
merely a historical aberration. In their eyes, things are now returning to
normalcy.350
Chinese leadership has encouraged popular nationalism and followed popular nationalist
calls for a more confrontational approach against the West to defend China’s national
interests.351 In response to nationalist sentiment, China’s leadership is forced to adapt its
foreign policy to preserve its claim to legitimacy.352 Thus, China began harassing foreign
vessels in the South China Sea, opposed U.S. joint naval exercises with allies in the
region, and challenged disputes against the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan in the South
and East China Seas. As nationalism began to surge, people turned to China’s history for
answers. However, historical narratives with vestiges of the CCP’s characteristics will
yield skewed results. Edward Friedman, an expert on Chinese foreign policy, notes, “It is
China’s goal of Asian predominance, a supposed return to China’s supposedly historical
and natural role, which undermines peaceful possibilities.”353
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China’s political and economic challenges drive China’s hawkish foreign policy.
Although the correlation between domestic challenges and foreign policy may be
expressed differently today compared to the pre-2008 period, the pattern remains the
same: the absence of economic satisfaction and political stability can prompt China to
take a more hardline stance.

Developing the “Escapement” Concept
When the state decides on how to approach international law, it frequently
deploys normative arguments.354 This leads to the question how can we justify a state’s
normative judgement and theory? For this thesis, the question is: how can China justify
its actions in the South China Sea? How can it go against UNCLOS when it is a signatory
to the Convention and claims it is still in compliance with international law?355 China
could consider the increasing demand for resources and control over the South China Sea
and test them against their own general beliefs in international norms and vice versa.
Through a process of revision and reflection, the state can either discard its principles by
breaking its promise to its citizens or breaking its commitment to international law. It can
modify its interpretation of international law or let one principle override the validity of
the other. The state can also change its opinion or history of the principles to conform
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with its beliefs by deciding that international law is not relevant in this scenario.
Whichever decision the state takes, it has moved towards a new equilibrium.
My “escapement” framework considers four factors that are essential for a state to
maintain its initial strategy: symmetrical distribution of power, economic satisfaction,
third-party threats, and political stability. I argue that these four factors shape how and
when China decides to employ extreme forms of coercion to acquire territory or
otherwise compromise the vital interests of other states. Further, I argue that at least three
of the four factors should be absent from the framework to persuade China to modify its
initial strategy. Appendix C details how the escapement framework was put together
along with game theory, statistical evidence, and graphical representation.
Applying the Escapement Framework to the South China Sea Case

As covered in Chapter 1, five periods that stand out in the history of Chinese
assertion of jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Since China’s assertion of jurisdiction
from 1973 through 2016 has been discussed in Chapter 1, this section will only
summarize the information pertinent to the escapement framework. Graphs for each case
to illustrate the application of the framework are in Appendix D. I will discuss the 2017
case in depth because I have not covered China’s resumption of operations after the
Tribunal’s ruling.
January 1974: Battle of the Paracel Islands – Throwing the Gauntlet
Symmetric balance of power: No – Although the Vietnamese fleet had better
weapons than the Chinese fleet, the Chinese had smaller boats that
117

outmaneuvered Vietnam’s larger boats. However, the U.S. Navy detected
additional Chinese guided missile frigates on their way to the Paracels from
Hainan.356
Economic Satisfaction: No – The economic decline and increasing chaos were
due to the Cultural Revolution.357
Political stability: No – China was dealing with political struggles due to the
Cultural Revolution.
3rd-party threat/involvement: No – The U.S. was withdrawing from the region
following heavy losses during the Vietnam War (Paris Peace Accords). The U.S.
was also trying to warm up relations with China following the Sino-American
rapprochement in 1972.

Based on the timeline, it seems that China’s cue to assert sovereignty over the
Paracels was South Vietnam’s losing situation in the battle with North Vietnam. On
December 3, 1973, the Viet Cong hit the Nhà Bè fuel depot, the largest fuel storage
facility in South Vietnam accounting approximately 80% of the nation's storage capacity.
South Vietnam was also taking heavier losses due to America’s absence. China may have
exploited this opportunity to take over the Paracels and side with North Vietnam on this
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issue. Thus, the asymmetry would be the last factor to fail while the absence of a thirdparty threat is only second on China’s motivations to deviate from their initial strategy.
March 1988: The Johnson South Reef Skirmish – China’s Second Round with Vietnam
Symmetric balance of power: No – China had superior naval technology
compared to Vietnam. China used its guided missile escort ships that
overpowered Vietnamese forces, sinking all Vietnamese ships within half an
hour.358
Economic Satisfaction: No – Although grain harvest was at a record high and the
trade deficit significantly reduced, 1987 showed significant inflation and food
shortages. The economy started to have macroeconomic imbalances.359 China
began to take an interest in the South China Sea’s hydrocarbon and fisheries
resources in 1985. China’s economic model rapidly increased its demand for
energy while launching fishing enterprises for profit.360
Political stability: No – Throughout late 1986 and early 1987, students led
demonstrations calling for more individual rights and freedoms. This caused a rift
in the CCP and communist hard-liners called for the suppression of the
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“bourgeois liberalism.”361 Perhaps economic and future uncertainty with China’s
economic reform program also fed into the political instability that would lead to
the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Uncertainty with orderly succession and
ideological direction at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 may have forced
Deng Xiaoping to tighten the party’s grip on Chinese society. Thus, political
stability seemed to be the last factor to fail before China changed its initial
strategy.
3rd-party threat/involvement: No - Han Yujia of the PLA General Staff
Department's Intelligence Division told a naval research center that, because
China was already at war with Vietnam on the land border, fighting Vietnam in
the Spratlys “will not have much of an effect internationally … we estimate that
the US and USSR will not stand with China, nor directly oppose China … in
military terms the probability of their direct involvement is low.”362 There are also
other internal documents echoing this observation.363 This turned out to be true.
Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union based at Cam Ranh Bay intervened.

Although there is debate on who authorized the Chinese navy to fire on the
Vietnamese, the party leadership in Beijing approved the navy’s assertive actions that led
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to conflict, including the seizure of six disputed reefs.364 Since the first clash was in
January 1988 between two Vietnamese armed cargo ships and the Chinese navy, the data
examined for the four factors were from 1987.365 During this period of political and
economic uncertainty, China’s goal was to secure the resources in the South China Sea,
even if it meant violence. The last factor to fail was political stability. Economic
dissatisfaction seemed to have only fueled political instability.
1992 to 1995 – Chinese oil drilling, seizure of Mischief Reef within Philippines EEZ, and
deterioration of Sino-Philippine relations
Symmetric balance of power: No – China’s military was superior to the
Philippines.
Economic Satisfaction: No – China’s demand for energy resources continued to
increase while production growth flattened.366 Although China’s assertion may
have weakened after 1995 due to increased reliance on the global market, it may
be argued that the threat of energy insecurity initially contributed to the push for
energy bids in the South China Sea.
Political stability: Yes – Following the Tiananmen crisis, China’s police and
criminal courts adopted harsh intimidation tactics and massive government
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propaganda campaign portraying dissent as a “counterrevolutionary criminal
conspiracy.” This reminded people that the government still had the power to be
powerful.367
3rd-party threat/involvement: No – U.S. removed all of its military bases and
turned over Subic Naval Base to the Philippine government in 1992. This period
was also in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, so there was no Soviet
threat stationed at Cam Ranh Bay.
Beijing protested Manila’s actions and characterized them as a violation of
Chinese sovereignty and an infraction of the joint exploration agreement in 1988, the
beginning of deteriorating Sino-Philippine relations. In January 1995, Chinese patrols
detained a Philippine fishing vessel on Mischief Reef and a month later, China claimed
Mischief Reef, a maritime feature within the Philippines EEZ. China began constructing
“a shelter by Chinese fishermen, not for any military purpose” and extracting energy
resources. Based on the timeline and on China’s intent, the renewed assertion of
jurisdiction in 1992 was fueled by need for economic resources. According to datasets
prepared by Andrew Chubb in his article “PRC Assertiveness in the South China Sea:
Measuring Continuity and Change, 1970–2015,” “more than one-third of the newly
assertive Chinese actions identified in 1992–94 concerned energy resources, compared to
around 10 percent in earlier surge periods.”368 Thus, in 1992, the energy resources factor
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was the last to fail before China changed its initial strategy while political stability
remained.
March 5, 2009 – Chinese Gray Zone Tactics: Hitting Below the Belt
Symmetric balance of power: No – Compared to other Southeast Asian countries
with interests in the South China Sea, China’s naval capabilities are superior.
However, it may be argued that China’s plans to patrol the South China Sea
regularly dated back to October 2000 when the State Council allocated 1.6 billion
yuan to deploy thirteen large oceangoing patrol vessels.369 2009 was notable
because it challenged a 3rd-party (USNS Impeccable) and began using
intimidation tactics.
Economic Satisfaction: No – There is evidence that China’s renewed
assertiveness was due to a significant increase in energy resources. China’s
dependence on oil imports increased from 28% in 2001 to 50% in 2008.370 This
prompted Chinese leadership to gain more control over the South China Sea’s
shipping lanes and increase its navy’s capabilities. Since 2008, Chinese workers
have been striking offensively for more money, better working conditions, and
more respect from employers.

https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3Y7NRU Accessed May 27,
2021 Chubb, p. 110
369
Su Tao, “Zhongguo Haijian xinxing chuanbo, feiji jianzao ceji” [Profiling CMS's new vessel and aircraft
construction], Zhongguo Haiyang Bao [China Ocean News], December 17, 2007.
370

Schofield, Maritime Energy Resources, p. 41

123

Political stability: No – According to the 2011 U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission Report to Congress, “outbreaks of ‘mass unrest’
which sometimes include violent demonstrations against the government and its
policies, have increased from 8,700 incidents in 1998 to over 120,000 incidents in
2008.371
3rd-party threat/involvement: No – Although the Quad organized naval exercises
in the region in September 2007, it fell apart because Australia and India did not
want to jeopardize their bilateral relationships with China.372 Further, the Quad
has resisted identifying China as its primary target.373

All four factors point to an escapement. However, China’s new naval technology
allowed them to develop new strategies mandating “the unity of maritime rights defense
and stability maintenance” – a strategy to meet China’s needs while avoiding further
instability.374 Thus, China began gray zone operations such as ramming, intimidation, and
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actions below the threshold of war. According to the 2008 U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) Annual Report to Congress, this meant fighting and winning local wars under
conditions of informatization and building toward integrated joint operations, with stress
on asymmetric warfare to “make the best use of our strong points to attack the enemy’s
weak points.”375 China describes this new strategy as “using inferiority to defeat
superiority.”376 In U.S. military doctrine, this strategy is regarded as “anti-access
tactics.”377 Thanks to technology, the deniability of gray zone tactics such as cyber
warfare, anti-space warfare such as jammers and directed energy weapons, and sea mine
warfare driven by artificial intelligence (AI) allows China to engineer the security
environment of the South China Sea and its resources without claiming responsibility,
avoiding further cost, and using weapons not yet regulated by international law. Since
China cannot afford the high cost of formally declaring war to protect its interests, it will
find ways to fight in the shadows to keep its presence in the region and perform regular
deniable coercive actions in the nine-dash line. For this period, meeting economic needs
seemed to be China’s primary motivation for the renewed assertion. Economic
satisfaction was the last factor to fail before China resorted to gray zone tactics.
2012 to July 2016 – China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal, acceleration of island
reclamation and development of artificial islands, and oil rig standoff with Vietnam
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Symmetric balance of power: No – Compared to other Southeast Asian countries
with interests in the South China Sea, China’s naval capabilities are superior.
Economic Satisfaction: No – China’s economic growth rate has been slowing
down since 2014.378 President Xi launched the BRI over concerns that access to
the sea, raw materials, and markets was vital to ensuring sustained growth of the
Chinese economy.379 Further, there seems to be a heightened concern for the
environment and conservation.380 However, this also increases anxiety about
unemployment.
Political stability: No - A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global
Attitudes Project reported that 50% of respondents said that corrupt officials are a
very big problem (up from 39% in 2008).381 Chinese officials often identify
government corruption as the greatest threat to the CCP and the state and
President Xi has carried out an extensive anti-corruption campaign since taking
office. However, analysts contend that government anti-corruption campaigns are
mainly used to settle political scores with out-of-favor officials.382
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3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes - The U.S. mediated to diffuse tensions on the
condition that both parties withdraw from Scarborough. However, after both
parties withdrew, Chinese ships returned soon and remained on Scarborough
since then. The U.S. also launched FONOPs in October 2015.

China’s renewed assertion over the South China Sea starting in 2012 seems to
have been driven by decreased economic satisfaction and climate change regulation.
After all, China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal was primarily due to illegal harvesting of
corals, giant clams, and overfishing. To monopolize the resources, China imposed a
fishing ban in the area that remains in effect.383 The goal of developing and militarizing
artificial islands function as China’s security to maritime trade. The Hai Yang Shi You
981 oil rig standoff between China and Vietnam on May 4, 2014 was due to China’s
hydrocarbon drilling. China did not contest the Paracels since 2009, but in 2014, China
moved its oil rig to the south of the Paracels and declared an exclusive zone around it.
Vietnam protested China’s actions immediately and sent 29 ships to disrupt the rig’s
construction.
Due to heightened environmental concerns, the CCP promised to pass legislation
regulating pollution in 2012.384 Regulations came at the expense of economic growth.
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Growth rate has dropped from above 10% in 2010 to below 7% sometime before 2016.
Further, regulations have hurt jobs and risked mass unemployment.385 Thus, to
compensate the loss on the mainland, China may have seen the South China Sea as
another opportunity to exploit. Economic satisfaction was the last factor to fail before
China renewed coercion. Third-party threats were still present, hence that category will
be in the lower right quadrant of the escapement matrix in Figure 38, Appendix D.
February 2017: A Year of Reckoning
After the Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines in Philippines v. China and
invalidated China’s claim on disputed and artificial islands outside of China’s EEZ,
China took measures to partially comply with the ruling despite its refusal to participate
in the proceedings formally. China’s State Council statement after the tribunal’s decision
offered some hope.
Pending final settlement, China is also ready to make every effort with the
states directly concerned to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature, including joint development in relevant maritime areas, in order to
achieve win-win results and jointly maintain peace and stability in the South
China Sea.386

385

Daniel Shane. “China takes economic hit as environment nears 'point of no return” CNN. (November 27,
2017) https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/27/news/economy/china-crackdown-pollution-economy/index.html
Accessed May 27, 2021; Wei Yao, an economist at Societe Generale said "Chinese people are very
concerned about pollution, so it makes sense for the leading party to respond, What's most important to [the
party] is social stability." "The pace of implementing the anti-pollution moves is the critical element," she
said, warning that the government could risk mass unemployment if it moves too quickly.
386

“Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and
Maritime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea,” MFA of China, 12 July 2016
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379493.shtml Accessed May 25, 2021

128

By including the phrase “enter into provisional arrangements,” China signals an
alignment with the language of UNCLOS, Article 74, paragraph 3 and Article 83,
paragraph 3.
Para 3. “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature
and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the
reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without
prejudice to the final delimitation.”

“Joint development” may imply that China is only contesting the disputed islands and
high-tide features that the tribunal included and not the entire nine-dash line that includes
international waters. As late as June 2017, China partially complied with the tribunal
court’s ruling by refraining from militarily supporting illegal Chinese fishing in
Indonesia’s EEZ. It permitted Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen to fish in
Scarborough Shoal after blockading it in 2012. These were consistent with the tribunal’s
ruling that fishermen may continue to enjoy traditional fishing rights. Beijing also did not
stop or condemn Vietnam’s oil drilling project in a disputed area that China had already
leased to a company.387
Although China’s economy seemed stable and GDP growth increased to 6.9%, it
was still recovering from the significant slowdown in 2016.388 Nevertheless, the CCP
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praised Chinese President Xi’s leadership at the 19th Party Congress in 2017.389 Besides
taking control of the South China Sea, President Xi also cut off official contacts with
Taiwanese officials when President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP was elected. This included
military incursions into Taiwan’s waters and airspace.390 President Xi said, “our country
must be reunified, and will surely be reunified.”391 During the Congress, President Xi
announced the transformation of the PLA’s operations and capabilities with the goal of
reforming the military to “world-class forces by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s
founding.”392 Thus, compared to the Southeast Asian countries with interests in the South
China Sea. The distribution of power was asymmetrical. There also seemed to be no
significant political violence before China resumed operations in the South China Sea.

What Went Wrong?
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China was cautiously walking a tightrope between trade sanctions and increased
U.S. military opposition in the South China Sea. Either way, China’s actions would
damage the prospect of long-term economic partnerships with smaller states targeted by
the BRI. It would also demonstrate an incapacity to lead a rule-based international order
should China not comply with the rulings. As noted in Chapter 1, the U.S. has been
conducting FONOPs in the region since 2015 to keep sea lanes accessible, suggesting
that China recognized the diplomatic cost of completely ignoring the ruling. However, in
late July 2017, the conflict took a downturn. China accused the US of stirring up trouble
with FONOPs.393 China used this to justify its stronger assertion of claims in the South
China Sea, but the U.S. has been conducting FONOPs in the area since 2015. What was
different now that would prompt Beijing to act more aggressively?
Perhaps confusion and mixed signals from U.S. President Trump’s administration
could have prompted Beijing to assert more control over the disputed islands. Testifying
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 11, 2017, former Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson said, “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the
island building stops and, second, your [China’s] access to those islands also is not going
to be allowed.”394Similarly, on January 23, former White House spokesman Sean Spicer
said, “The U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there,” referring to the
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South China Sea.395 However, Trump ordered FONOPs to stop as soon as he took
office.396 America’s withdrawal from the region was consistent with Trump’s agenda of
“America First” since it gave the impression to Trump’s base that America does not have
obligations overseas.
From January to May of 2017, no FONOPs were conducted. The decision not to
challenge China’s territorial claims represents a remarkable deference toward Beijing
from an administration increasingly turning towards President Xi Jinping for help in
pressuring North Korea.397 With North Korea escalating provocative behavior and
launching nine missile tests since President Trump came into office, his administration
adopted a more conciliatory tone with China and the suspension of FONOPs in exchange
for more pressure on North Korea.
China saw the absence of FONOPs and President Trump’s relaxed attitude
towards the South China Sea as opportunities to advance the militarization of the
disputed islands. Aerial imagery from mid to late 2017 shows that China deployed antiship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles and electronic jammers to the Spratly Islands:
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Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef.398 This included improvements
suggesting a communications and intelligence gathering center for Chinese forces in the
area.
Without U.S. support, the countries increased their military capabilities and
turned to self-help.399 Its absence in the region failed to check China’s aggressive push in
the South China Sea. FONOPs send the important message that countries care about a
maintained open South China Sea and rules matter. Trump finally resumed FONOPs in
late May 2017, but by then, China had already significantly increased its presence in the
region and further militarized its artificial islands.400 Trump tried to compensate by
increasing FONOPs and reportedly hit a record high in 2019.401
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A comparison of Beijing’s behavior in the first and second years after the
tribunal’s ruling suggests that it responds to coordinated pressure to abide by
international law and takes advantage at times when the world looks away. As a great
power, the U.S. should spearhead regional and international efforts to insist that Beijing
comply with international law. In this case, where political stability is still present, the
third-party threats quadrant is the last factor to fail before deviating from its initial
strategy.
This chapter has shown that domestic factors play a significant role in China’s
hawkish foreign policy. The significant breaking points in China’s assertion of
jurisdiction in the South China Sea correlated to political and economic challenges at
home. Although China has displayed forms of nationalism in the past, today’s resurgence
of nationalism is consequential because China is now a global player with an advanced
military. It now has the capability to shape global affairs to align with its ambitions and
alter important relations with ASEAN and the U.S. However, China’s response to its
domestic challenges carries with it Chinese characteristics that are determined by the
CCP and challenges the U.S.-led liberal international order. What would China’s likely
strategy be moving forward? How will China’s grand strategy likely impact the U.S. and
what can the U.S. do to mitigate it? Using the four factors in the “escapement”

do enough in terms of stopping China’s land reclamation and occupation or militarization of the South
China Sea artificial islands.” Quoted in Ralph Jennings “Why Trump Has Gotten Extra Tough in
Monitoring China at Sea” article https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/why-trump-has-gotten-extra-toughmonitoring-china-sea (June 21, 2019) Accessed May 26, 2021.
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framework, the next chapter will forecast China’s four possible strategies and recommend
a two-level foreign policy strategy for the U.S.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Strategic Forecasting and Recommendations for U.S. Foreign Policy
I proposed a framework in Chapter 3 isolating four factors that would persuade a
state to shape its initial strategy: symmetric distribution of power, economic satisfaction,
third-party threats, and political stability. The hypothesis was that the likelihood of a state
to “escape” the matrix or shift the equilibrium increases when at least three of the four
factors are not present. These factors influence the way a state may shape its strategy.
The same framework will be used in Chapter 4 to identify which two factors
would drive China's strategy in the South China Sea on the basis of analysis of China’s
historical behavior. From this analysis, four scenarios will be designed to aid in
forecasting China’s likely strategy in the next ten to fifteen years. These scenarios will be
based on trends analysis. There will be a discussion on how China’s grand strategy could
impact U.S. foreign policy. The chapter will end with discussions on whether or not the
U.S. should join UNCLOS based on China’s likely strategy. At the end of the chapter,
there will be recommendations for U.S. foreign policy. The recommendations will
consider compromises of any kind the U.S. and ASEAN states can propose to the
Chinese to pursue a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
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What the Future Holds for the South China Sea: Four Possible Scenarios
Using the framework in Chapter 3, I created four differentiated scenarios
exploring the changing geopolitical landscape for states with interests in the South China
Sea. Each scenario was informed using trends analysis to find high-impact drivers and
their implications. This included reviews of Congressional testimonies from former U.S.
Indo-Pacific (INDOPACOM) Commander, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, the U.S. State
Department’s (DoS) Indo-Pacific Strategy published on November 4, 2019, the U.S.
Department of Defense’s (DoD) Indo-Pacific Strategy Report published on June 1, 2019,
the DoD’s Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) published in May 2021, and the Office of
Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) Global Trends 2040 report. Horizon scanning
open-source materials on the internet and social media to understand China’s perspective
and ambitions in the region was also used in the process. Intellectual sources of China’s
conduct such as the CCP’s views on political significance of opinion, culture, and
tradition, and the links between the “Go” board game, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, and current
Chinese strategy were also considered to understand China’s ideologies.
Each scenario suggests that the South China Sea will play a more important role
in the future. The resources and geography the South China Sea offers will be crucial for
the development of Southeast Asian nations and the preservation of a free, open, and
rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific.
Figure 8 shows the indicators and drivers used for each axis. Since the DoD and
DoS documents that were reviewed mainly focused on China’s increasing military
capabilities as well as economic and demographic challenges, I will focus on these
indicators because they seem to be high-impact and high-risk factors. The economic axis
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considers China’s uneven development, economic contraction, and fragility. For the
symmetrical distribution of power axis, I chose indicators that may affect China’s ability
to alter the distribution discreetly by leveraging its advanced cyber and military
technological capabilities. Although the U.S. and China have built a relationship of
competitive coexistence by prioritizing economic interdependence and avoiding the risk
of a major war, would gray zone operations such as offensive cyber capabilities,
unmanned vehicles, and covert special forces change the power dynamics? Would these
operations create geopolitical friction between China and the U.S. and violate economic
interdependence? The scenarios show that advancements in military technology could
potentially create more asymmetry and cause more conflict.

Figure 8. Scenario Axes

To generate the four scenarios, the variables in Figure 1 form the X and Y axes of the
deductive model in Figure 2. On the X axis, + or – for economic satisfaction is
interpreted as increased (+) economic satisfaction and decreased (-) economic
satisfaction. On the Y axis, + or – for symmetrical distribution of power is interpreted as
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increased (+) symmetry and decreased (-) symmetry or increased asymmetrical
distribution. Pictures and labels are used for easy reference.402

Figure 9. Scenario 2x2 Matrix

Each scenario is named for easy reference and to provide a bumper sticker summary of
the possible implications. These labels were taken from a poem by Cao Cao entitled
“Viewing the Ocean.” Cao Cao was a Chinese statesman and poet who rose to power
during the final years of the Eastern Han dynasty around 200 CE. The poem is copied
below in its entirety.
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East, looking down from the Jieshi,
I scan the endless ocean:
waters restlessly seething,
mountain islands jutting up,
trees growing in clusters,
a hundred grasses, rich and lush.
The autumn wind shrills and sighs,
great waves churn and leap skyward.
The sun and moon in their journeying
seem to rise from its [the ocean's] midst,
stars and Milky Way, brightly gleaming,
seem to emerge from its depths.
How great is my delight!
I sing of it in this song. (translation by Burton Watson)403
The upper right-hand corner (“Scan the Endless Ocean”) is a scenario where China and
the U.S. will prioritize economic interdependence and strengthen trade relations. While
both countries will still compete over political influence in Southeast Asia, the South
China Sea dispute will be manageable and China will find it beneficial to negotiate a
Code of Conduct with ASEAN. The lower left-hand corner (“Great Waves Churn and
Leap Skyward”) is a directionless and volatile scenario. This is the worst-case scenario.
International rules will no longer be followed and China will aggressively move to seal
the Luzon Strait, declare the nine-dash line as its own territorial waters, and eventually
annex Taiwan. The upper left-hand corner (“The Autumn Wind Shrills and Sighs”)
considers the implications of increasing the symmetry between U.S. and China military
capabilities while China’s economic satisfaction decreases. In this scenario, China will
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isolate its economy to avoid future supply chain disruptions. Demographic challenges
will feed into China’s shrinking economy. To keep social unrest from spreading, China
will be forced to crack down aggressively on internal security. Although China will be
busy with domestic issues, it will use the South China Sea dispute as a way to divert
attention away from weaknesses at home. The lower right-hand corner (“A Hundred
Grasses Rich and Lush”) is a scenario in which China will achieve most national
strategies and plans, but not all of its mid-century goals. Among its goals not achieved is
the annexation of Taiwan. Chinese leadership will find conciliatory and cooperative
policies as best serving the national interest and the South China Sea Code of Conduct
will include stipulations on how to best mitigate environmental damage. China’s cyber
and emerging technologies will focus on mitigating environmental issues. China and the
U.S. will bilaterally agree on a cyber mitigation strategy to prevent the disruption of
supply chains necessary for access to resources.
Since China finds the South China Sea an important resource to support its
economy and political stability as shown in Chapter 1, economic satisfaction will only be
examined from China’s perspective. According to Admiral Davidson’s testimony, U.S.
allies and partners in the region are looking for the surety that the U.S. will be a reliable
partner to balance China in the South China Sea.404 Thus, the symmetrical distribution of
power will be a comparison between China and the U.S. It should be noted that the U.S.
can no longer rely on its conventional military strength to perform coercive diplomacy or
retributive actions to defend the South China Sea against unconventional threats from
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China. China has been working within the confines of gray zone operations. Considering
all the variables in Figure 8, I now put them together to create narratives for each
scenario for China by 2035.

China and the South China Sea: Four Scenarios for 2035
Scenario 1: Scan the Endless Ocean
Increase in economic satisfaction and balance of power
Symmetric balance of power: Yes
Economic Satisfaction: Yes
Political stability: Yes
3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes
Economy
Productivity and economic development will increase for both the U.S. and
China. China will surpass the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy in terms of
GDP by 2030. Both countries will prioritize economic interdependence and competition
over strategic advantage. Trade will be prioritized over disputes and China will find
negotiating a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to its benefit.
Inequality may decrease depending on the rate of distribution of advanced
technology and education to rural China. This would include developing agribusinesses
in the rural areas. It may also come at the cost of relocating rural populations with
agricultural businesses to urban areas for manufacturing. Since shifting the economy
from agriculture to manufacturing industries suddenly may increase inequality, China
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will relocate fishers to take over agricultural production to compensate and dampen the
impact.405
Advances in renewable energy generation and storage and in carbon capture
technologies will dampen the growth of emissions, but not fast enough to prevent
catastrophic impacts. Climate challenges have been partly put aside in favor of short-term
economic gains. However, technology and innovation will increase options for renewable
energy solutions.
Fertility will increase as economic satisfaction increases. However, the
replacement will not be fast enough to mitigate the shrinking labor force by 1% a year to
2035. Although income increases, labor shortage will force China to outsource or
encourage domestic and foreign migrants to address the labor shortage. As long as the
Chinese government can deliver economic satisfaction and guarantee job security among
its citizens, political stability will be maintained.

Military capabilities
In the short term, China and the U.S. will practice deterrence by denial to show
each side that the cost to take aggressive action against one another is too high. The U.S.
will maintain the momentum of the PDI as China continues to militarize the region. The
U.S. will match China’s capabilities by developing an agile and lethal Joint Force in the
first and second island chains, establishing a network of compatible and interoperable
allies in Southeast Asia, and regaining positional advantages by distributing capabilities
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in the Indo-Pacific. Once China’s economic slowdown begins to impact economic
satisfaction, China will turn towards trade to stimulate the economy. Thus, in the long
run, there would be a decreased incentive to invest and deploy missile systems as China
tries to persuade the international community that it respects freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea. China and the U.S. would de-escalate the region, cooperate on arms
control, and refrain from pursuing aggressive behavior as a policy of renewed interest in
economic interdependence flourishes. China will remain assertive, but the economic
benefits it receives from trade with the U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies will contain
China’s ambitions for revisionism and aggression. The U.S., China, and Southeast Asian
countries will cooperate to mitigate disruption of economic interdependence.
Although strengthened economic interdependence lowers the risk of an all-out
war, China will leverage its advanced cyber capabilities for corporate espionage and
other means to maintain a competitive edge without risking a destructive war.
Chinese and U.S. companies will expand their roles to maintain space systems.
They will cooperate on Earth observation satellites to monitor climate change and invest
in space lift capabilities. Deterrence will be determined by monitoring and left-of-launch
capabilities to disable opponent’s missiles immediately after launch. China’s Air and
Naval innovation will take cues from U.S. military innovation. China and the U.S. will
cooperate on using autonomous underwater vehicles to avoid navigational collisions with
cargo ships.
China will scale down military equipment in the Paracels and replace them with
Jiaolong special forces and amphibious equipment to keep Taiwan and Pratas in check.
To ensure domestic control and eliminate possible pockets of resistance within China,
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Xuefeng special forces from Xinjiang and Tibet will be used to suppress protests brought
by ethnic resentment of internal migration. However, there will be economic satisfaction
for a majority of the Chinese population.

Scenario 2: Great Waves Churn and Leap Skyward
Decrease in economic satisfaction and balance of power

Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes
Economy
Productivity and economic development will decrease. The majority of China’s
income will be spent on military expenditure and investing in AI technology and
unmanned aerial or naval vehicles. China will use military coercion to settle the South
China Sea and stabilize political legitimacy in the face of lower economic satisfaction.
Inequality will rapidly increase and force China’s leadership with a choice
between oligarchy or autocracy.406 To keep social unrest from breaking out, China will
choose autocracy. The narrow circle of top CCP and government officials will pursue an
aggressive information campaign to secure its legitimacy. China will experience a surge
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of popular protests against rising inflation. Widespread corruption among local officials
and worsening unemployment in one provincial capital spread to cities across China. This
scenario will be similar to the Cultural Revolution in which China will witness
widespread social and political upheaval.
China will experience many of the same environmental and societal problems, but
the government will attempt to use its power to create stronger social cohesion and trust,
agile direction from centralized authority, and ability to repress competing voices in an
effort to mitigate political instability. However, poor health quality and wellbeing will
contract the economy and people will protest against the government for its inability to
provide basic needs. There will be critical water shortages especially in northern China.
Famine will contribute to economic failure and increase in sociopolitical instability.
Thus, China will secure resources in the South China Sea for itself as demand for food
increases at home. China’s move to deny access to any country trying to access the South
China Sea will also be a prestige strategy for the CCP.
The decline in fertility from its population planning policies will halt the growth
of its labor force. It will further burden labor force growth with a doubling of its
population over 65 during the next two decades to about 350 million. This doubling is
projected to be the largest by far of any country.407 China will hit a middle-income trap
by the 2030s, which may challenge domestic stability and prompt internal security forces
to tighten their grip on society.
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To dampen the impact of its economic and demographic challenges, China will
try to shape international law by spreading its influence and acquiring allies. To acquire
allies, China will accelerate the development of the BRI and launch more infrastructure
development programs in the developing world. It will try to shape international law and
set technology standards to fit with its agenda. Although governments of developing
countries will enjoy the profit from China’s market and assistance such as surveillance
and security technology, only a few will want to live under a Chinese-led international
order.

Military capabilities
With a decreased incentive to preserve economic interdependence, China’s main
goal would be to choke the Luzon Strait and control shipping and communications
passing through the South China Sea and telephony services connecting Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.408 Given its weak economy, the CCP will pursue a
“prestige strategy” to keep its legitimacy. It will include the annexation of Taiwan and
the declaration of the nine-dash line as its territorial waters.
China will increase investment in hypersonic missiles. China’s military leadership
will see this technology as an important element of its regional warfighting strategy and
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possibly its strategic deterrent. More Chinese anti-ship missiles (DF-21D) will be
deployed on the mainland and the artificial islands.
China will increasingly cyberattack communications to disrupt the U.S. network
with regional allies before deploying small amphibious vessels to secure remaining
islands in the nine-dash line claimed by other Southeast Asian countries. Underwater
quantum communications and AI will support unmanned underwater vehicles and the use
of directed energy weapons to disable communications and sensitive monitoring
instruments will increase. In this scenario, weakened international rules of behavior, lack
of multilateral cooperation, and technology will fail to provide solutions.
China will deploy anti-ship YJ-12 supersonic weapons on 5th generation stealth
fighters such as the J-20. The RENHAI guided-missile cruiser and the LUYANG III
MOD guided-missile destroyer will provide China’s PLAN greater maneuverability and
flexibility to perform a diverse set of missions, ranging from littoral warfare to far-seas
operations. By 2025, China will have a 3:1 ratio of aircraft carriers compared to the U.S.
while the ratio for amphibious assault ships will be 6:2. Space capabilities will include
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). More satellites will be deployed to
pursue counter-space technologies such as satellite jammers and directed energy and
direct-ascent kinetic weapons. The U.S. will respond by trying to match these threats. It
will deploy long-range ground-based precision fires to Guam and enhance the Guam
Defense System with naval and land missile defense systems such as the MK-41 VLS,
Aegis Ashore, and SM3/SM6 missile systems. The new U.S. warfighting architecture that
integrates maritime, land, air, cyber, and space capabilities will not deter China. China
will first use cyber and directed energy weapons to disable U.S. monitoring assets and
148

then use autonomous torpedoes launched from unmanned underwater vehicles to sink
U.S. navy ships. The cost to undermine international law will be low for China as it seeks
domestic political legitimacy and economic satisfaction. Both countries will be in a
security dilemma.
Jiaolong special forces will focus to fight short wars against regional adversaries
while having a technological advantage. China will increase investment in amphibious
landing operations to invade Taiwan and the Pratas Island. After calculating that it would
take weeks before the U.S. or another power to position combat assets to counter a
Chinese attack on Taiwan, Chinese amphibious forces will surround the island rapidly by
using swarm tactics Drone swarms will be used to degrade Taiwanese air-defense
systems.409 The sudden appearance of Chinese special forces off Taiwan’s coast will take
the Taiwan and the U.S. by surprise and force the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s governing
body, to dissolve and acquiesce to China’s demands for annexation. By achieving its
objectives without firing a shot, China will stay true to Sun Tzu’s doctrine: The supreme
art of war is to subdue your enemy without fighting.

Scenario 3: The Autumn Wind Shrills and Sighs
Decrease in economic satisfaction and increase in balance of power
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Symmetric balance of power: Yes
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes
Economy
GDP will decrease due to a decrease in market competition. Limited resources
and market access are going to be hit hard as both import and export markets dry up.
Economic stagnation will foster widespread insecurity prompting domestic security
forces to increase their counter-terrorism efforts. There will be friction between the CCP
and ethnic minorities, fueling a struggle among ethnic and religious identities, strained
societies, fragmented states, and spreading instability.
Trade and economic interdependence will be disrupted, and China’s economy will
isolate to dampen the impact of future supply disruptions. However, this would also
contribute to massive financial losses and inefficiency.
Inequality will slowly increase, and a slower industrial output will occur as the
income gap between rural areas and cities widen.
In the short run, there will be an increase in illegal mining jobs in the South China
Sea driven by increased efficiency in exploiting natural resources for export. It will lead
to environmental damage and a growing number of climate refugees. Given the
symmetrical distribution of power, China will scale down its dredging operations.
However, it will cyberattack U.S. and allies monitoring instruments to disrupt
observation and take advantage of the time to accelerate harvesting of resources. In this
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scenario, there will be a lack of coordinated multilateral efforts to mitigate emissions and
address climate-sensitive issues.
New waves of ethnic migrants will head to cities hoping to escape extreme
poverty and increasingly harsh environmental conditions. However, their hopes are
crushed when the government ultimately fails to deliver jobs and opportunities and
instead becomes increasingly techno-authoritarian to deter crime and suppress political
dissidents. Migration to cities will put a strain on the welfare system which will create an
increased demand of resources from the government.

Military Capabilities
China will accelerate missile systems programs to maintain a military edge in the
region. However, the U.S. will have a first-mover advantage as it first deploys a 360degree air and missile defense capability to complement existing weapons of the Guam
Defense System. Show of force will primarily be used to contest scarce resources such as
in the South China Sea, Arctic, and space. Since China will be more focused on internal
security, it will avoid direct armed conflict in the South China Sea. Although rivalry will
be based on a competition for scarce resources, flash points of conflict will decrease.
Chinese threats to attack U.S. or Southeast Asian assets in the South China Sea will
mainly be used to divert attention from domestic problems and rally public support for
the CCP’s legitimacy.
In the short run, China will use its cyber advantage to disrupt the U.S. network
with allies. Since China will focus more on domestic security, advances in technology
will be used to improve surveillance within China’s borders rather than for coercive
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means against the U.S. and its allies. The CCP will increasingly become more
authoritarian and use technology to sow confusion, ignorance, prejudice, and chaos,
thereby facilitating manipulation and undermining accountability. While China cannot
directly confront U.S. naval assets in the Indo-Pacific, its main goal would be to
aggressively propagate a disinformation campaign about their historic rights to the South
China Sea.
China will focus on military technology capable of enhancing speed such as AI as
well as deploy more conventional and nuclear hypersonic weapons. To maintain a
strategic advantage and gain political objectives, China will shift its strategy towards
surprise disruptive attacks on its adversaries using outer space assets and intensify gray
zone competition to create asymmetry.
Working with the Chinese Coast Guard, the Chinese Jiaolong special forces will
continue to seek asserting China’s hold over its militarized assets in the South China Sea.
Since China’s economy will be isolated, choking the Luzon Strait would cost less. The
Jiaolong will routinely monitor this Strait to provoke Taiwan. The purpose would be to
create a nationalistic narrative to unify China’s population against a perceived enemy
threat.

Scenario 4: A Hundred Grasses, Rich and Lush
Increase in economic satisfaction and decrease in balance of power
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: Yes
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Political stability: Yes
3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes
Economy
By 2030, China will successfully surpass the U.S. economy and become the
world’s largest economy. U.S. and China will prioritize economic interdependence and
competition over strategic advantage, and China will find negotiating a Code of Conduct
in the South China Sea to its benefit. China will achieve most national strategies and
plans, but not all of its mid-century goals. While China has become the world’s largest
economy, it continues to lag slightly behind the U.S. in technology and innovation.
Despite the periodic economic challenges, the CCP’s reputation as a legitimate
government will stand the test of time with its proven ability to deliver jobs, goods, and
services. The CCP will show that by delivering a growing economy, public health, and
safety, it can tolerate slight traces of political dissent without losing social trust and
endangering political stability. China’s massive middle class will largely be quiescent
now. However, Chinese leadership will tread cautiously because an economic slowdown
could change this.
Inequality may slowly decrease as more rural Chinese migrate to cities. Although
there will be small pockets of localized unrest due to rural-urban inequality, Tibet,
Xinjiang, and Hong Kong will maintain relative social stability.
China’s large corporations will concentrate on advancing technological solutions
to food, climate, and health challenges. This will open opportunities for the CCP to
collaborate with progressive European political parties. China will lead in exploiting new
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energy technologies. With a rising economy, China will find it less costly to seek
alliances with populations hardest hit by climate change and expand its BRI network.
Global priorities will take precedence over national interests, and the South China Sea
Code of Conduct will include stipulations on how to mitigate environmental damage
effectively.
Fertility will increase as economic satisfaction increases. However. this will be a
steep climb. China’s shrinking workforce, rapidly aging population, and internal
migration from rural to urban will raise concerns about the future sustainability of the
basic urban pension fund. If the total spending will start to exceed contributions in 2028,
reserves will then decline exponentially, leading to a full depletion of the fund by 2035.
The economic pressures created by the decline in China’s working-age population and
the increase in aging cohorts have been mitigated by bringing in guest workers from
Southeast Asia.

Military capabilities
To sustain economic satisfaction, there would be a decreased incentive to increase
deployment of military assets to the South China Sea in exchange for more commercial
trade to pass through these waters. China will persuade the U.S. to give up FONOPs in
exchange for pressure on North Korea and restarting negotiations on the South China Sea
Code of Conduct. The U.S. will give up FONOPs hoping that this move will incentivize
China to loosen its grip in the South China Sea. However, the U.S. will still operate
behind the scenes by encouraging Southeast Asian allies to assume responsibility of
FONOPs. Instead, the interoperable military equipment between the U.S. and its allies as
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well as the strong U.S. defense network in the Indo-Pacific will provide a credible thirdparty deterrent. Given the third-party threat in the region, China will keep its militarized
islands in the South China Sea, but it will refrain from taking drastic actions such as
claiming the nine-dash line as its territorial waters. Missile systems will continue to be a
reminder of China’s ambitions, but trade will flourish under the shadow of China’s threat
to impede the freedom of navigation.
China’s cyber and emerging technologies will focus on mitigating environmental
issues. China and the U.S. will bilaterally agree on a cyber mitigation strategy to prevent
the disruption of supply chains necessary for access to resources. Both countries will
realize that a cyberattack will cost significant losses in revenue and disrupt the economic
interdependent relationship.
Although China will be the dominant military force in the Indo-Pacific, the
military will have to develop its capabilities to reach parity with the U.S. China will use
its economic success as leverage for all of Asia-Pacific, except India, to accept China as
the primary guarantor of regional security and the core engine of regional economic
dynamism. In this scenario, India’s military has also modernized and possesses improved
naval capabilities, especially in the Indian Ocean. As it prioritizes economic
interdependence, China will loosen its hold on the South China Sea. Instead, it will
project power by mining in space and on the moon. This will include extracting Helium-3
and lithium to sustain its renewable energy investments in batteries and nuclear power.
Anticipating the centenary of the PRC’s founding in the next fifteen years,
Beijing will remain disappointed that the Taiwan unification remains unresolved in 2035.
Although China will maintain good relationships with Taiwan, Jiaolong special forces
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will covertly stand ready in the Paracels. It will use speed to create an asymmetrical
advantage against Taiwan if Beijing’s Politburo Standing Committee decides to use a
military solution. The Jiaolong’s strategy will hold true to Sun Tzu’s teaching: Let your
plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
Based on the escapement framework, listed below each scenario, the first scenario
is the strongest. The second scenario is the weakest among the four scenarios and the
equilibrium is more likely to escape. This is followed by the third scenario which is
slightly more stable since there is symmetry in the distribution of power between China
and the U.S. along with its Southeast Asian countries. The equilibrium in the fourth
scenario is more stable and there is rich potential for both countries to cooperate.

China’s Grand Strategy
According to China’s 2019 “China and the World in the New Era,” a white paper
published by the State Council Information Office, China’s goal is to have a persistence
of peace and development, a shifting balance of global power, the deepening of economic
globalization, a changing mode of global governance, and trends toward multipolarity.410
These observations were echoed during the CCP’s 19th Party Congress in 2017. The
Congress report said that “peace and development” had become “irreversible trends.”411
These initiatives are fundamental to the “China Dream” advocated by President Xi during
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the 19th Party Congress. “China Dream” aims to increase Chinese standard of living and
launch China into a wealthy, prosperous power under CCP leadership by the centennial
anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049.412 However, in light of China’s
upcoming challenges, countertrends such as China’s slower growth will make it harder
for China to achieve its goals.
Based on the discussion in Chapter 3, China’s potential to succeed and ensure
steady growth, stability, and security of its interests will depend on economic satisfaction
and political order. Although China’s grand strategy is to have a persistent presence of
peace and development, Chinese cyber forces’ main objective would be to erode the
U.S.-led network of allies in the Indo-Pacific by disrupting communications and
compromising intellectual property from U.S. defense industries and research institutions.
If China sees the benefit to pursue a strategy of cyber brinksmanship, China’s goal would
be to weaken U.S. capabilities while building a technologically superior force. The goal
would be to turn scenario two in favor of China and persuade the U.S. to reconsider its
commitments in the Indo-Pacific. China’s goal is to cut off Southeast Asian countries
especially Taiwan from U.S. support so that the U.S. will lose regional allies.
China cannot afford to directly coerce the U.S. into armed conflict. It will pursue
strategic advantage while avoiding armed conflict. To lower the cost while protecting its
interests, China will engage in consolidating Chinese control over disputed regions and
extending Beijing’s influence.413 As the balance of power becomes more asymmetric,
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China will then pursue a strategy to remove the U.S. as a credible third-party threat. As
outlined in the RAND Report “China’s Quest for Global Primacy,” China will move in
three ways related to the South China Sea to reduce U.S. influence.414 First, China will
deter the U.S. military from operations threatening CCP rule by developing cyber
capabilities to disrupt U.S. political and economic systems. Second, China will deter the
U.S. military from intervening in any contingency in the first island chain. China will do
this by fielding cyber and directed energy weapons to disable U.S. naval and air
interventions and developing superior amphibious capabilities to seal off the Luzon Strait
and ward off any U.S. attempts to help Taiwan. China will aggressively propagate a
disinformation campaign by asserting its historic rights to the South China Sea while
smearing the U.S. as an incompetent ally to lure Southeast Asian countries away from the
U.S. Third, China will also develop credible deterrence capabilities in nuclear, space, and
cyber domains.
According to the RAND report, China’s strategy against U.S. competition will
rest on four points as described in China’s defense white paper published in 2019,
“China’s National Defense in the New Era.”415 All four points target the erosion of
bilateral relationships between the U.S. and its regional allies. First, China will protect
CCP rule, eliminating any suspected Western efforts to disparage or threaten CCP
credibility. Leveraging its advancements in cyber, China’s State Council can direct the
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PLA to go on the offensive by interfering in U.S. domestic politics.416 Second, China will
protect sovereignty and territory. According to China’s 2019 defense white paper
published in 2019, national unity strategy will include initiatives to “oppose and contain
‘Taiwan independence,’” “crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as
‘Tibet independence’ and the creation of ‘East Turkestan’” (in Xinjiang), and “safeguard
China’s maritime rights and interests.”417 Third, China will “safeguard China’s overseas
interests” including support for China’s “sustainable development.”418 China will
leverage economic incentives to consolidate client states and turn them against the U.S.
As the U.S. loses allies in the Indo-Pacific, China will capture these states and adopt
alliances. Fourth, China’s mission is to “deepen bilateral and multilateral security
cooperation,” develop a “coordinated, inclusive, and complementary cooperation among
security mechanisms,” and provide a “security architecture featuring equality, mutual
trust, fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits.”419 Although China’s
intentions may look virtuous at first, “the PLA could increase participation in bilateral
and multilateral exercises with U.S. allies and other countries as a way of eroding those
alliances” according to the RAND (2021) report.420 China will stabilize BRI investments
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by building rapport with U.S. allies along the BRI routes to secure its economic
agenda.421
In addition, China’s vision on global governance on cyber, space, and
international law is to outcompete the U.S. and shape rules and norms to accommodate its
economic challenges. Understanding China’s short-term priorities and long-term
objectives require an approach that considers interests and ideas. A close examination of
CCP statements, speeches, and authoritative writings reveals a tight connection between
the CCP’s words and deeds. As John Garnaut, an authority on Chinese elite politics,
argues, “There is no ambiguity in Xi’s project. We see in everything he does and - even
in a system designed to be opaque and deceptive - we can see it in his words.”422 On
September 12, 2016, China’s Politburo held a study session on global governance in
which President Xi said the “structure of global governance depends on the international
balance of power.”423 He further said that China “must make the international order more
reasonable and just to protect the common interests of China and other developing
countries.”424
In the cyber domain, China seeks to take the lead in crafting cyberspace
governance. Starting in 2014, President Xi organized a new Internet Security Group to
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address “a major strategic issue concerning a country’s security and development as well
as people’s life and work” in internet security and informatization.425 Later that year,
President Xi established the Cyberspace Administration of China to control online
content, boost cybersecurity, and develop the digital economy.426 According to the
RAND (2021) report, “China’s Quest for Global Primacy,” China’s vision is to create a
stronger international coalition in support of its leadership on cyber governance, persuade
countries to favor Chinese norms and technology standards, maintain a cyber defense
against the U.S., and create a cyber force capable of launching offensive operations
against U.S. networks.427
In the space domain, China has developed the PLA Strategic Support Force to
deny U.S. access into space. Chinese military theorists have said, “whoever controls
space will control the Earth.”428 China’s 2019 defense white paper states that “Outer
space is a critical domain in international strategic competition. Outer space security
provides strategic assurance for national and social development.”429 China views space
supremacy as a political advantage by denying the U.S. entry into this domain. It also
sees space as an essential element to boost economic development and cyber governance.
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According to the RAND (2021) report, China wants to create a stronger international
coalition to support its leadership in space, persuade space-capable nations such as Japan
and India as well as incoming space nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan to
favor Chinese norms and technology standards in space, and deter the U.S. from
attacking Chinese space assets by securing defense assets and fielding offensive weapons
capable of taking down space weapons.
China’s ambitions to shape international law are integral to China’s vision of
global governance. President Xi said, “China must lead the reform of the global
governance system with the concept of fairness and justice.”430 Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi explained to People’s Daily that China would “push forward the international
order toward a fairer and more rational direction.”431 Wang argued that “justice” required
“opposing the interference in the internal affairs of other countries and opposing the act
of imposing one’s will on others.” Wang further argued that UN documents have begun
adopting Chinese concepts such as the “community of common destiny,” as evidence of
China’s growing influence. According to the RAND (2021) report, China wants its
narrative of order to prevail over that of the U.S., international organizations to adopt the
Chinese vision of international law, and lead the way for global media, commerce, and
academic discourse.432 China has also tried to implement domestic law in the South
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China Sea, where international law should be applied instead. In its note verbale
submitted to the UN in 2009, China said, “China has indisputable sovereignty over the
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and
jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.”433
However, words such as “adjacent” or “relevant” in UNCLOS do not designate
sovereignty. China’s highest judicial body, the Supreme People’s Court, also declared
that the court’s jurisdiction extended to “jurisdictional seas” including “contiguous zones,
exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, and other sea areas under China's
jurisdiction.”434 The term “jurisdictional seas” is not in UNCLOS. By applying domestic
law in international waters, China is evidentially claiming that its jurisdiction goes
beyond UNCLOS rules. For example, non-Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea
may be in compliance with international law but in violation of Chinese domestic law. In
this case, fishermen may be imprisoned for up to one year.435 In another example, a
vessel may perform innocent passage and be in compliance with international law.
However, if China decides that the vessel is not in compliance with domestic law,
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China’s judiciary has the power under domestic law to prosecute and imprison violators
up to one year.436 In 2013, China’s maritime agencies were consolidated to form the
Chinese Coast Guard command. Ryan Martinson, a member of the China Maritime
Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, argued that the reorganization was part
of a bigger plan to implement a “‘strategic management of the sea,’ which appears to
mean a comprehensive state effort to achieve maritime dominance of [China’s] near seas
in peacetime.”437 China’s new Coast Guard Law which took effect on February 1, 2021,
allows the coast guard to use lethal force on foreign ships operating in China’s claimed
waters.438 Article 3 of the new law states, “the CCG [China Coast Guard] Organization
shall conduct law enforcement operations in the waters under the jurisdiction of China
and in the airspace above the waters under the jurisdiction of China and apply this
Law.”439 A few months later, China revised its Maritime Traffic Safety Law requiring
foreign vessels passing through waters claimed by China to obtain permission first.440
The new law also allows the Chinese Coast Guard to take “necessary measures” to stop
the passage of foreign ships into “territorial waters.”441 Enforcement of this domestic law
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would violate innocent passage rights under the UNCLOS and allow China to extend its
right of hot pursuit within its claims of “jurisdictional waters.” This law will take effect
on September 1, 2021.442

Examining China’s Trends and its Likely Strategy
If China’s trends continue and nothing is done to mitigate their directions, a
scenario similar to “Great Waves Churn and Leap Skyward” may likely be China’s
strategy. China has launched gray zone operations to harass U.S. naval ships, fishing
vessels from the Philippines and Vietnam, and impede freedom of navigation.443 It has
also launched drills simulating an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.444 China has plans to
deploy electromagnetic weapons in the South China Sea and has reportedly fired a laser
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weapon at a U.S. Navy’s P-8A in February 2018.445 China’s defense budget has increased
by 6.8% and China has built the world’s largest naval fleet.446
Economic satisfaction is projected to decrease. China’s economy is beginning to
contract and economic growth is projected to decrease due to demographic challenges
such as population decrease and an aging population. 447 According to UN projections,
China’s population will decline by 2030, but China’s state media has been more
pessimistic by predicting population decrease in the next few years.448 Constraints on
sustainable economic growth will be driven by an aging population impeding the
accumulation of human capital and a low total fertility rate.449
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If China’s economic growth fails, it may be argued that political instability will
increase and the CCP would strengthen its authoritarian statism.450 There is already
evidence that the CCP is in a leadership crisis as the CCP has expanded its campaign to
silence critics.451 In 2015, David Shambaugh, a noted expert in Chinese domestic politics,
wrote that “The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun … and it has
progressed further than many think.”452 Andrew J. Nathan, an expert in Chinese politics,
has argued that the CCP still believes that it is under “siege from enemies at home
colluding with enemies from abroad; … that economic reform must take a back seat to
ideological discipline and social control; and … that the party will fall to its enemies if it
allows itself to be internally divided.”453 In his new book, The China Nightmare: The
Grand Ambitions of a Decaying State, Dan Blumenthal has argued that political elite
split, citizen backlash against repression, and the absence of a secure and peaceful
transition of power after President Xi will create anxiety and internal dissension.454
Blumenthal also projects that if the U.S. successfully undermines China’s agenda in the
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South China Sea, President Xi will be blamed in China for imperial overreach.455 Thus,
the CCP’s legitimacy will be compromised. However, China has set up internal security
measures to respond to this crisis. According to CSIS, China leads in exercising total
information control such as the “Great Firewall” and establishing a “credit score” for
political obedience.456 It has also used internment and political indoctrination tactics, AIenabled mass surveillance systems, and biometric databases to combat potential
dissenters.457
U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is projected to continue as the DoD shifts its
focus to securing the Indo-Pacific and countering China. Admiral Davidson told the
Senate Armed Services Committee that a military showdown between Taiwan and
mainland China could come “in the next six years.”458 In the same hearing, Admiral
Davidson said that INDOPACOM will prioritize the PDI and provide “the foundation for
establishing a forward-deployed, defense-in-depth posture that defends our interests
abroad, deters aggression, assures allies and partners, and provides flexible response
options should deterrence fail.” This means that the U.S. should maintain a persistent
presence in the region and strengthen military assets in Guam to create a defense in depth
structure. INDOPACOM has requested Congress for an increase in additional funding for
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missile defense systems and ballistic missile threats in the Pacific.459 Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin also established a DoD China Task Force to "provide a baseline
assessment of DoD policies, programs, and processes on China-related matters and
provide the secretary of defense recommendations on key priorities and decision points to
meet the China challenge.”460 The U.S. will maintain its presence in the South China Sea
as a deterrent against China.
Given China’s trends, China’s likely strategy would be similar to the “Great
Waves Churn and Leap Skyward” scenario. The U.S. should develop a short and longterm strategy to mitigate escapement. In the short-term, the U.S. should go for “The
Autumn Wind Shrills and Sighs” scenario by taking the first-mover advantage in
balancing China’s capabilities. As the first mover, the U.S. will make a strong impression
on ASEAN which can be leveraged to create more consensus on negotiating and
implementing a Code of Conduct. As the first mover, the U.S. can gain an advantage
when there is a high cost for ASEAN nations to switch alliances with China especially in
light of China’s goal to win over ASEAN nations to China’s side. Although the prospects
of a scenario like “A Hundred Grasses, Rich and Lush” are currently low, influencing
China’s trends to work towards that scenario would require a delicate balance between
coercion and conciliation. If U.S.-China relations succeed in this long-term goal, this
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scenario would prompt China to negotiate a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as
China benefits more with economic interdependence over military coercion.

The Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy
First, the implications of China’s grand strategy on U.S. foreign policy
underscores the importance of maintaining strong alliances with Indo-Pacific partners,
especially those along the BRI routes. China considers this network to be America’s
strongest strategic advantage and deterrent. It will move to weaken alliances by capturing
allies through economic incentives and technology transfer. Second, China’s grand
strategy compels the U.S. to boost its international image and leadership bilaterally
among regional allies and in multilateral forums such as ASEAN and APEC. The U.S.
should invest in shaping international organizations and prove that China’s narrative
against the U.S. about ineffectiveness is not sound. The goal would be to persuade
countries to follow a U.S.-led global order that is enshrined in freedom rather than
China’s authoritarian agenda. Finally, U.S. foreign policy should not decouple from the
Indo-Pacific because, as Admiral Davidson testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, “The Indo-Pacific is the most consequential region for America's future and
remains the United States' priority theater.”461
China’s grand strategy of cultivating influences in Africa, the Middle East, and
Latin America will impact America’s ability to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific.
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The RAND report (2021) gives the example of how China could successfully consolidate
influence in the Middle East and ultimately affect Japan and India’s willingness to
constrain Chinese power.462 Thus, the U.S should project leadership in economic
development and leverage China’s lack of allies before China’s economy overtakes the
U.S. There are already trends supporting China’s goal to gain more regional allies
through trade. In addition to signing on to China’s BRI, ASEAN nations, collectively,
overtook the EU and the U.S. as China’s largest trading partner in the first quarter of
2020.463 ASEAN-China trade increased by 6% to US$140 billion and accounted for 15%
of China’s total trade volume. Chinese-Japan ties have strengthened recently. At the end
of 2019, Japan’s total stock of foreign direct investment in China was around $130.3
billion, which was significantly less than Japan’s investment in the U.S.464 More than
7,750 Japanese businesses operate in China which is significantly higher than Japanese
firms operating in the U.S. or EU.465 As of today, Japan is China’s third-largest source of
foreign investment and third-largest trading partner.466 Although South Korea is gingerly
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stepping closer to China, BRI projects are now common throughout the Korean
peninsula.467 China’s share of South Korea’s exports accounts for about a quarter of their
annual total income and foreign direct investment has also increased by 10%.468 As
mutual dependence increases, South Korea enters deeper into China’s sphere of
influence. China is Taiwan’s biggest trading partner accounting for about 24.3% of
Taiwan’s total exports.469 Although Taiwan attempted to reduce dependence on China’s
economy by implementing market diversification policies under the New Southbound
Policy, COVID-19 disrupted trade and investment flows and Taiwan was forced to
increase its dependence on Chinese goods.470
In light of China’s ambitions to shape cyber governance, space, and international
law through coercive means, U.S. global posture should first be established on deterrence
and then followed by strategic restraint. Investing in military diplomacy with allies in the
Indo-Pacific will be important as China tries to sell them military equipment, military
technology, and surveillance technologies. In the short-term, the absence of a credible
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deterrent will encourage China to militarily secure the BRI routes to ensure trade
continuity. The U.S. should present a credible deterrent by deploying capabilities that can
rapidly respond to crisis such as an invasion of Taiwan and present a military superiority
against the PLA. In the short-term, U.S. investment in military capabilities, with the goal
of strengthening conventional deterrence, will avoid a chaotic scenario similar to “Great
Waves Churn and Leap Skyward.” Instead, the U.S. should work towards the “The
Autumn Wind Shrills and Sighs” scenario in which the presence of symmetric balance of
power and third-party threats will prevent escapement. A strong U.S. military capability
as a guarantor of regional security will incentivize regional powers such as Japan and
India to resist Chinese coercion and incentives. This move does not necessarily mean
investing in additional platforms such as ships and aircraft, but focusing on efficient force
development and missile defense systems to protect U.S. sovereignty of Guam471
In the long-term, the U.S. should find ways to strengthen U.S.-China trade, supply
chain linkages, and restore U.S.-China investment flows. Targeting these issues would
strengthen economic interdependence and convince Chinese leadership that China is
better off prioritizing trade, promoting freedom of navigation in a demilitarized South
China Sea, and signing a Code of Conduct to avoid collisions and protect marine
ecosystems. The goal would be to coax China into the fourth scenario, “A Hundred
Grasses, Rich and Lush.” China and the U.S. can cooperate by pursuing an envisioned
relationship built on economic and scientific interdependence.
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First, China and the U.S. have coordinated in the past by securing trade and public
goods through joint effort. U.S. trade with China has grown despite tensions over the
South China Sea and Taiwan. According to Phase 1 of the Economic and Trade
Agreement that went into effect on February 14, 2020, China agreed to expand purchases
of certain U.S. goods and services by a combined $200 billion for the two-year period
from January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2021, above the 2017 baseline levels.472
Although Phase 1 of the trade deal fell short, China’s willingness to agree on this deal
may show that it still recognizes trade as an important factor in U.S.-China relations.473
China has held a record of cooperation if it sees a plan that helps both countries. In a
discussion about the 2008 financial crisis, former U.S. treasury secretary Hank Paulson
argued that China helped him get things done if they were things China wanted to see
done.474 However, there was no cooperation on issues that were not within China’s
interests.
Second, persuading China to adopt the fourth scenario would include a mutual
understanding that solving real problems that affect real people globally will be
challenging if the two most powerful countries are not coordinating for the public good,
but rather opposing each other on every issue due to different ideologies. For example,
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China and the U.S. have collaborated on stopping the spread of the Ebola crisis from
2014 to 2016, agreed to reduce the use of hydrofluorocarbons, cooperated on reducing
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, and ensuring food safety.475 U.S.-China
cooperation could be improved by first avoiding sensitive issues such as sovereignty
issues in the South China Sea. Instead, both countries could spearhead collaborative
projects on the African continent. The U.S. could find shared interests with China ranging
from security, economic development, and public health.476 China and the U.S. should
look at ways to cooperate on science diplomacy issues such as jointly combatting
pandemics, climate change, and AI research.
Third, the U.S. should develop a strategy to mitigate China’s projected economic
collapse. China has already started moving towards the “The Autumn Wind Shrills and
Sighs” scenario in which China will isolate its economy to avoid future supply chain
disruptions. China’s new “Five-Year Plan,” published in March 2021, focuses on selfreliance and a “dual circulation” economic model in science and technology to ensure
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that China’s supply chain for producing semiconductors is secure.477 According to the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Rhodium Group, decoupling from China’s economy
will cost the U.S. economy a loss of more than $1 trillion worth of production and longterm global competitiveness.478 China’s manufacturing infrastructure will also collapse
without foreign technology. China’s industries still lag behind U.S. innovation and
remain dependent on U.S. know-how.479 Thus, actions that impede U.S.-China trade
relations would have significant economic consequences.480 As Robert Rubin and Hank
Paulson, two former U.S. treasury secretaries, wrote in the Atlantic, “the greatest
American threat to China’s economic future is the possibility that America’s economic
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success could come to an end; the greatest economic danger China poses to the U.S. is
the chance that China’s economy fails to grow.”481
In the “A Hundred Grasses, Rich and Lush” scenario, there is rich potential for
China and the U.S. to cooperate on economic and scientific issues. Both countries will
realize that the resilience of their interdependent relationship will be defined by how
closely they work together. Persuading China towards the “A Hundred Grasses, Rich and
Lush” scenario will be the most challenging aspect of U.S.-China cooperation to 2035.
China’s goal of achieving sustainable, balanced, and high-quality growth will be China’s
main challenge. The U.S. goal of ensuring that China’s economy does not collapse will
have to be a balance between incentives and sanctions. The U.S. will be challenged as it
reimagines a new relationship with China built on economic and scientific
interdependence.

Should the U.S. Join the UNCLOS? Why Joining the UNCLOS Mitigates the Worst-Case
Scenario
The debate on whether or not the U.S. should join the UNCLOS has long been an
issue in U.S. politics. After a decade of UNCLOS negotiations, the U.S. still refused to
sign the treaty in 1982 because it objected to Part XI, which dealt with deep seabed
resources beyond national jurisdiction.482 The U.S. argued that the provisions of Part XI
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were not friendly towards free market economies and was biased in favor of Communist
states. President Ronald Reagan issued the United States Oceans Policy Statement saying
that the U.S. views the UNCLOS as customary international law and fulfills U.S. interest
in “a comprehensive legal framework relating to competing uses of the world’s oceans.”
Succeeding administrations have used President Reagan’s statement to legitimize
Freedom of Navigation operations such as those in the South China Sea. The U.S.
suggested further negotiations to amend the UNCLOS, and in 1994, the Clinton
administration sent the Convention to the Senate for advice and consent.483 However, the
Senate failed to ratify it. The Convention went into effect on July 28, 1996.
Opponents of ratification such as Senators Rob Portman and Kelly Ayotte have
argued that “no international organization owns the seas.”484 In 2012, 34 senators
released a statement explaining why they opposed the ratification.
We simply are not persuaded that decisions by the International Seabed
Authority and international tribunals empowered by this treaty will be
more favorable to U.S. interests than bilateral negotiations, voluntary
arbitration, and other traditional means of resolving maritime issues. No
international the seas, and we are confident that our nation will continue
to protect its navigational freedom, valid territorial claims, and other
maritime rights. On balance, we believe that the treaty’s litigation
exposure and impositions on U.S. sovereignty outweigh its potential
benefits.485
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However, Senator Ben Cardin argues that joining UNCLOS “would communicate that for
the United States, resolution of maritime disputes in the South China Sea is not a question
of being for or against any particular country or its claims, but rather for being on the side
of international law, institutions and norms.”486 Recently, Senators Mazie Hirono, Lisa
Murkowski, and Tim Kaine, have introduced a resolution in the Senate calling for the
ratification of the UNCLOS. Senator Hirono, Chair of the Senate Seapower
Subcommittee, “
Our world faces the evolving challenges of those seeking to prevent
international freedom of navigation across the world, including in the
Strait of Hormuz, the South China Sea, the Arctic, and the Black Sea. It
is time for the United States to become party to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides a legal framework to
protect the right of free passage through territorial seas, the United States
should play an active role in decisions that impact Hawaii and the ocean
around us.”487
Based on the “Great Waves Churn and Leap Skyward” scenario, China threatens
freedom of navigation as it applies domestic law in international waters. China will choke
the Luzon Strait to control shipping and communications passing through the South
China Sea and reach its eventual goal of annexing Taiwan. Based on China’s behavioral
trends in the South China Sea, the customary international law the U.S. has relied on to
legitimize U.S. FONOPs has had limited impact to convince China to respect
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international law. U.S. FONOPs have not stopped China’s militarization of artificial
islands. U.S. FONOPs have not stopped China from taking aggressive gray zone tactics
that increase risk of collisions. U.S. FONOPs have not also prevented China from
enforcing domestic law, claiming sovereignty on the high seas, and denying Southeast
Asian countries their resource rights to their respective EEZs. Thus, U.S. strategy
compelling China to respect international law has been limited so far. On the other hand,
joining the UNCLOS does not present any threat that may limit the U.S. from conducting
military activities.
Given the low cost to enter the treaty and the treaty’s potentially high payoff for
the U.S. as an UNCLOS member, joining the UNCLOS outweighs the risks argued by
those opposing ratification. The U.S. should ratify the UNCLOS to legally deter China
from declaring the South China Sea as its territorial waters. Joining the UNCLOS would
not prevent the U.S. from conducting military activities to balance China. Instead, this
action may make “The Autumn Wind Shrills and Sighs” scenario a reality in which China
will be deterred from claiming the South China Sea as its own. In fact, the U.S. runs the
risk as a nonparty of allowing favorable national security provisions which are in the
convention to be eroded such as losing the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
As a party member to the UNCLOS, the U.S. would be in a stronger position to invoke
the treaty’s provisions as well as prevent any potential proposals to amend the
Convention that may be inconsistent with U.S. national interests such as limiting the
freedom of navigation. Although another argument against ratification is that U.S.
intelligence operations will be limited if the U.S. signed on to the Convention, current
U.S. intelligence gathering activities avoid operations while transiting through territorial
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waters are also consistent with UNCLOS Articles 19 and 20 that deal with innocent
passage. Thus, joining the UNCLOS would not change current U.S. naval practices.
Strategic mobility is more important now that China is beginning to build up its military
capabilities intended to deny the U.S. and its allies entry into a major trading route. The
oceans are fundamental to that maneuverability. Joining the convention supports the
freedom to pass through international waterways without a permission slip. The
convention also provides a stable and predictable legal regime to conduct U.S. FONOPs
and deter China from taking the “Great Waves Churn and Leap Skyward” scenario.
Participation in the Convention better positions the U.S. to influence trend directions in
the South China Sea.
As China’s economic and political forecast points to an increased assertion of
national jurisdiction in the South China Sea, the greatest maritime legal risk to the U.S. is
that the law of the sea will change.488 As a member of the Convention, the U.S. will
reinforce international law and give the U.S. more bargaining power to develop the law
of the sea within its national interests. The U.S. should use its leadership and influence to
promote a rules-based order that stresses the importance of freedom of navigation,
responsible use of marine resources, and respect for sovereignty.
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Recommendations for U.S. Foreign Policy
Based on China’s likely strategy, the U.S. should mitigate the negative trends to
prevent China from choosing the “Great Waves Churn and Leap Skyward.” As discussed
in the section about how China’s grand strategy can impact U.S. foreign policy, the U.S.
should strategize to move China towards the third scenario, “The Autumn Wind Shrills
and Sighs.” The goal is to get U.S.-China relations in the South China Sea to the first
(“Scan the Endless Ocean”) or fourth (“A Hundred Grasses, Rich and Lush”) scenario by
2035. It involves a two-tier strategy. The first tier is the short-term strategy that focuses
on balancing China’s military capabilities by deploying advanced military equipment and
preserving the freedom of the seas. The goal is to deter China from taking adverse
actions. The second tier is a long-term strategy that focuses on how U.S.-China relations
can become stronger based on economic and scientific interdependence. The following
section will cover five tactical recommendations for each tier. These recommendations
are based on the previous discussion on how China’s grand strategy can impact U.S.
foreign policy.
Tier 1: Short-Term Recommendations
1. Take the first-mover advantage and deploy 360-degree air and missile defense
capabilities, including the MK-41 VLS, Aegis Ashore, SM3/SM6 missile
systems, and ground-based long-range precision fires to enhance the Guam
Defense System. This new joint force warfighting architecture would integrate
maritime, land, air, cyber, and space capabilities and could be built on the DoD’s
PDI. This arrangement could possibly deter China from taking aggressive action
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and reassure allies in the Indo-Pacific that the U.S. will defend the freedom of
navigation.

2. Secure access to the First and Second Island Chains to ensure freedom of
navigation and deter China from engaging in aggressive action against U.S. allies
in the South China Sea. Monitoring Chinese amphibious operations along the
Taiwan and Luzon Straits and features in the First Island Chain should be
prioritized. Deterring China includes ensuring a persistent air and missile defense
system and a rotational forward-deployed joint force capable of responding
swiftly to an attempted invasion of Taiwan and Pratas Island. Although there may
be repercussions if China decides to take the slow strategy of blockading Taiwan,
the U.S. could use gray zone tactics such as cyberattacks and directed energy
weapons to disable Chinese ships blockading Taiwan. This would include
cyberattacks on Yulin Naval Base and Chinese military assets in the Paracels. The
goal would be to coerce China with deniability. While the Chinese ships and
communications are disabled, the U.S. could communicate to China that it will
launch a counter-blockade strategy unless China pledges to settle the Taiwan
issue diplomatically.

3. Reassure allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific that a strong alliance with the
U.S. is what will deter China from taking aggressive actions and is in their
interests. For example, the U.S. should strengthen ties with India because it is
already a democracy and emphasize that it shares common concerns about
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China’s military buildup on India’s northern border as well as China’s naval
expansion in the Indian Ocean. India’s geographic location in the middle of the
Indo-Pacific allows better reach into the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. Its
demographic diversity and emerging technology capabilities are expected to
surpass China, and it is a target of China’s BRI. The U.S. could also pursue a
similar security framework with Japan and Australia. Although these countries
have their own relationships with China, they are mostly suspicious of China’s
real intentions.

4. Strengthen the Mission Partner Environment (MPE) program and promote a
network security and data-sharing architecture that is interoperable, uses cloudbased technologies, and a centralized command and control center to monitor
Chinese gray zone operations in the South China Sea. This would allow for better
and quicker coordinated decision-making within the Joint Forces Command and
with allies in the Indo-Pacific.

5. Establish mandatory education on Chinese strategic thought and culture for
Department of State and Department of Defense personnel handling East Asia and
Indo-Pacific affairs. The goal is to learn about Chinese stratagem skills and
intellectual sources that affect China’s conduct. As Sun Tzu puts it, “know your
opponent and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”
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Tier 2: Long-Term Recommendations
1. Strengthen areas of existing U.S.-China cooperation and spearhead science
diplomacy with China. Both countries do not need to engage directly on sensitive
issues related to the South China Sea. The U.S. would engage China within its
sphere of influence, but it does not threaten it by competing against Chinese
influence. It could include partnerships between U.S. and Chinese Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDCs), U.S. Food and Drug Administration and
the China Drug Administration, USAID and the China International Development
Cooperation Agency, and U.S. National Institutes of Health and the Chinese
Academy of Medical Sciences. Launching economic development and public
health partnerships in Africa, where both countries already have collaborated
during the Ebola crisis, could be a stepping-stone towards improving U.S.-China
cooperation. On emerging technologies, China and the U.S. can cooperate on
preventing an AI arms race by first setting up a bilateral governance committee
prohibiting the use of unmanned vehicles in the South China Sea. Due to the
technical limitations of AI systems, weapons relying on AI systems could misfire
and rapidly escalate conflict. If the AI governance committee is successful, a
cyber governance committee could be built to regulate what kind of cyber
weapons are permissible in certain contexts.

2. Spearhead the creation of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Building
on the strong alliance network established in Tier 1, the U.S. could influence
Southeast Asia and ASEAN’s role in the region’s security architecture and
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encourage it to speak with consensus on key issues related to China and its
excessive claims in the South China Sea. The U.S. should start by encouraging
those countries with direct interests in the South China Sea and frame the
negotiations among claimants as a fisheries management, environmental
cooperation, and gas development agreement. Issues about sovereignty should be
avoided. ASEAN remains at the center of a free and open U.S. Indo-Pacific
strategy.

3. Test China’s intentions and avoid posing an economic life-threatening situation
for China. It may include decreasing or eliminating U.S. FONOPs to incentivize
China to de-escalate the South China Sea and encourage maritime trade. The goal
would be to convince China that maritime trade encourages economic and
scientific interdependence. The U.S. should frame interdependence as something
more beneficial for China’s growth. Although the U.S. will maintain a third-party
threat to China’s sphere of influence in the South China Sea to interrupt China’s
strategic outlook, U.S. strategy will be more open to long-term options.489 The
U.S. threat will mainly come from its defense systems in Guam and the advanced
interoperable allied network in the First and Second Island Chains. China will be
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left with two options: either declare the nine-dash line as its territorial waters and
run afoul of international law or withdraw its forces and project itself as a
peaceful rising power that respects international law. Depending on its decision,
China will reveal what its true intentions are.

4. Implement the Code of Conduct by framing it as an economic necessity to ensure
China’s access to the market. As the U.S. lightens FONOPs in the South China
Sea, points of compromise between ASEAN and China may include refraining
any military vessel from patrolling the region in exchange for Chinese recognition
that the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries have valid claims to the
resources. Building on the U.S.-China cooperation on science and diplomacy,
both countries will be optimistic because there is rich potential for implementing a
Code of Conduct based on mutual economic and environmental concerns. The
U.S. should assist Southeast Asian nations in accelerating their marine industry
technology to create a Nash equilibrium with China. The maritime rights game
will be cooperative if both sides have symmetric real-time monitoring capabilities
to track vessels, marine information technology, and rapid intervention systems to
respond to emergencies such as collisions, oil spills, and disaster management.
Cooperation could be strengthened by establishing a marine environmental
protection regime headed by an epistemic community appointed by a third-party
such as the UN. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’s High Council can then
function as an arbitration instrument between ASEAN and China on South China
Sea issues.
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5. Assist ASEAN members’ coast guards to focus on enforcing the Code of
Conduct. This would include giving ASEAN members’ capabilities to monitor
and prevent human activities that could destroy the South China Seas’ marine
environment, such as discharge of untreated waste, illegal fishing, and poaching
of endangered species. Armed with advanced monitoring capabilities from the
U.S., ASEAN countries can detect immediately if China has violated its pledge to
protect the environment in the Code of Conduct. The rapid detection mechanism
may deter China from resuming aggression and threatening the economic
potential of the South China Sea. ASEAN and China can launch task forces to
study the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum, which is a cooperation between the
coast guards of Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, Canada, and the U.S. The
cooperation between ASEAN and China should be non-binding, voluntary, and
non-political. These operations are independent of overlapping claims in the
South China Sea and should not address sovereignty claims.
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CONCLUSION
China’s actions in the South China Sea have increasingly been provocative since
China showed its propaganda video at Times Square in 2016. The aftermath of the
Tribunal’s ruling shows that the international legal order is still struggling to assert itself
in the face of a major power such as China.
Implementing the Tribunal’s Award in South China Sea in its entirety will
unlikely be anytime soon. Examining the U.S. and China’s views on the dispute reveal
that both powers cite international law to support their positions. Both countries agree
that international law exists and is relevant. However, they disagree about substantive
elements of the UNCLOS. China has clearly rejected the authority of the mechanism
established by the treaty, hence by international law, to provide definitive binding
interpretations of the UNCLOS. With 60% of the world’s maritime shipping passing
through the South China Sea, a seabed containing one of the world’s largest oil and
natural gas reserves, and an important food source for China and Southeast Asian
countries, China’s claims and actions in the South China Sea are strategically important
both materially and symbolically. They are symbolic because they challenge U.S.
interpretation of international law and, more broadly, of international order. Just as
codifying international law and institutionalizing dispute settlement did not prevent
World War I from breaking out, the arbitral proceedings provided by the UNCLOS have
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not led to a peaceful settlement. Although it has not yet led to armed conflict, the
proceedings have complicated the dispute in China’s view. China claims that its rights to
the South China Sea is based on history and is well within its rights provided by
international law to defend its territory. Similarly, the U.S. claims that its presence in the
South China Sea protects the freedom of navigation and the credibility of international
law and multilateral institutions. The U.S. has invoked the Tribunal’s decision and
declared that China’s claims are inconsistent with the UNCLOS. Thus, neither
international law nor mere rhetorical rejection of China’s actions in the South China Sea
will determine the resolution of the dispute.
Although China is aware that it is challenging the provisions of the UNCLOS,
China’s domestic issues force its foreign policy to take on hardline positions in the South
China Sea. Historically, the Chinese government’s actions to claim islands in the South
China Sea were driven by a desire to counter the decline of economic satisfaction and
promote nationalist legitimacy. China’s actions were not solely to protect preexisting
claims, as China often argues.
China’s hardline policy on the South China Sea will be detrimental to the global
economy and international public order. China’s economy and political stability are
projected to decline within the next decade. If nothing is done to mitigate the danger,
China and the U.S. will sleepwalk into a Thucydides trap. The implications of this
situation would even more strain U.S., ASEAN, China relations and doom any hope for a
code of conduct to be signed and implemented. In an extreme scenario, violent conflict
may break out. Maintaining peace between the revisionist and the status quo powers, in
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this case China and the U.S., will depend on their ability to avoid any miscalculations that
can escalate and lead to a violent confrontation.
The South China Sea dispute challenges international law as a limit to asserting
jurisdiction beyond its borders. Will the tensions in the South China Sea ultimately lead
to a major war? Unless China or the U.S. gives up defending and instead focuses on
cooperating on mutually beneficial issues, the prospects of escalating conflict remain on
the horizon. Despite both countries' technological and scientific advances, human
nature’s desire to secure economic satisfaction and political survival remains the same.
The governments of both countries should look to the past to avoid repeating the same
mistakes in the future. Understanding human nature and showing empathy for the other
side will be fundamental to break this cycle of conflict. The lessons of history will always
be a great light to dispel the shadows of an uncertain future.
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Appendix A: List of UNCLOS Articles Referenced in Chapter 2
Article 9 - Default of appearance
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to
defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and
to make its award. Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal must
satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the claim is well
founded in fact and law.
Article 15 - Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two
States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial
sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is
measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two
States in a way which is at variance therewith.
Article 77 - Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal
State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one
may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable
stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
Article 121 - Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in
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accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
Article 192 - General obligation
States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.
Article 197 - Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking
into account characteristic regional features.
Article 204 - Monitoring of the risks or effects of pollution
1. States shall, consistent with the rights of other States, endeavour, as far as
practicable, directly or through the competent international organizations, to
observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the
risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment.
2. In particular, States shall keep under surveillance the effects of any activities
which they permit or in which they engage in order to determine whether these
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment.
Article 205 - Publication of reports
States shall publish reports of the results obtained pursuant to article 204 or provide such
reports at appropriate intervals to the competent international organizations, which should
make them available to all States.
Article 206 - Assessment of potential effects of activities
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful
changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the
results of such assessments in the manner provided in article 205.
Article 279 - Obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means
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States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph
3, of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a solution by the means
indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.
Article 281 - Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the parties
1. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply
only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the
agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the
expiration of that time-limit.
Article 282 - Obligations under general, regional or bilateral agreements
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute,
be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in
lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise
agree.
Article 283 - Obligation to exchange views
1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negotiation or
other peaceful means.
2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a
procedure for the settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a
settlement or where a settlement has been reached and the circumstances require
consultation regarding the manner of implementing the settlement.
Article 286 - Application of procedures under this section
Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1, be
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having
jurisdiction under this section.
Article 287 - Choice of procedure
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1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a
State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the
following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention:
a. the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in
accordance with Annex VI;
b. the International Court of Justice;
c. an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII;
d. a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for
one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
2. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the
obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and in
the manner provided for in Part XI, section 5.
3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force,
shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.
4. If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the settlement of
the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure, unless the parties
otherwise agree.
5. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement
of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex
VII, unless the parties otherwise agree.
6. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall remain in force until three months
after notice of revocation has been deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
7. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration does not in
any way affect proceedings pending before a court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under this article, unless the parties otherwise agree.
8. Declarations and notices referred to in this article shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the
States Parties.
Article 288 - Jurisdiction
1. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall have jurisdiction over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is
submitted to it in accordance with this Part.
2. A court or tribunal referred to in article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement
related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance
with the agreement.
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3. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea established in accordance with Annex VI, and any other chamber or arbitral
tribunal referred to in Part XI, section 5, shall have jurisdiction in any matter
which is submitted to it in accordance therewith.
4. In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal.
Article 298 - Optional exceptions to applicability of section 2
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a
State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in
section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes:
a.
(i) disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles
15, 74 and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those
involving historic bays or titles, provided that a State having made
such a declaration shall, when such a dispute arises subsequent to
the entry into force of this Convention and where no agreement
within a reasonable period of time is reached in negotiations
between the parties, at the request of any party to the dispute,
accept submission of the matter to conciliation under Annex V,
section 2; and provided further that any dispute that necessarily
involves the concurrent consideration of any unsettled dispute
concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular
land territory shall be excluded from such submission;
(ii) after the conciliation commission has presented its report,
which shall state the reasons on which it is based, the parties shall
negotiate an agreement on the basis of that report; if these
negotiations do not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by
mutual consent, submit the question to one of the procedures
provided for in section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree;
(iii) this subparagraph does not apply to any sea boundary dispute
finally settled by an arrangement between the parties, or to any
such dispute which is to be settled in accordance with a bilateral or
multilateral agreement binding upon those parties;
b. disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by
government vessels and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and
disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3;
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c.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

disputes in respect of which the Security Council of the United Nations is
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United
Nations, unless the Security Council decides to remove the matter from its
agenda or calls upon the parties to settle it by the means provided for in
this Convention.
A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 may at any time
withdraw it, or agree to submit a dispute excluded by such declaration to any
procedure specified in this Convention.
A State Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 shall not be
entitled to submit any dispute falling within the excepted category of disputes to
any procedure in this Convention as against another State Party, without the
consent of that party.
If one of the States Parties has made a declaration under paragraph 1(a), any other
State Party may submit any dispute falling within an excepted category against
the declarant party to the procedure specified in such declaration.
A new declaration, or the withdrawal of a declaration, does not in any way affect
proceedings pending before a court or tribunal in accordance with this article,
unless the parties otherwise agree.
Declarations and notices of withdrawal of declarations under this article shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the States Parties
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Appendix B: Fifteen Submissions of the Republic of the Philippines
On the basis of the facts and law set forth in this Memorial, the Philippines respectfully
requests the Tribunal to adjudge and declare that:
1. China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the
Philippines, may not extend beyond those permitted by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS” or the “Convention”);
2. China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and to “historic rights”, with
respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the socalled “nine-dash line” are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to
the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s
maritime entitlements under UNCLOS;
3. Scarborough Shoal generates no entitlement to an exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf;
4. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that
do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf, and are not features that are capable of appropriation by
occupation or otherwise;
5. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines;
6. Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations
that do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf, but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe,
respectively, is measured;
7. Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef generate no entitlement to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf;
8. China has unlawfully interfered with the enjoyment and exercise of the sovereign
rights of the Philippines with respect to the living and non-living resources of its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf;
9. China has unlawfully failed to prevent its nationals and vessels from exploiting
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines;
10. China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their
livelihood by interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal;
11. China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve
the marine environment at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal;
12. China’s occupation of and construction activities on Mischief Reef
a. violate the provisions of the Convention concerning artificial islands,
installations and structures;
b. violate China’s duties to protect and preserve the marine environment
under the Convention; and
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c. constitute unlawful acts of attempted appropriation in violation of the
Convention;
13. China has breached its obligations under the Convention by operating its law
enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to
Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal;
14. Since the commencement of this arbitration in January 2013, China has
unlawfully aggravated and extended the dispute by, among other things:
a. interfering with the Philippines’ rights of navigation in the waters at, and
adjacent to, Second Thomas Shoal;
b. preventing the rotation and resupply of Philippine personnel stationed at
Second Thomas Shoal; and
c. endangering the health and well-being of Philippine personnel stationed at
Second Thomas Shoal; and
15. China shall desist from further unlawful claims and activities.
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Appendix C: Escapement Framework
As described in Chapter 3, the “escapement” framework considers four essential
factors for a state to maintain its initial strategy. This appendix uses game theory,
statistical evidence, and graphical representation, to discuss how the concept of
“escapement” was put together. It describes a framework showing when a state’s
equilibrium “escapes” the threshold of a matrix. Keeping the equilibrium within the
matrix is essential for a state to maintain its initial strategy. Equilibrium is defined as a
state’s adherence to a certain strategy. Once a state has reached a stable strategy or a
steady point in which it is not expected to change strategies spontaneously, it has reached
equilibrium. A matrix with four contextual factors: symmetrical distribution of power,
economic satisfaction, third-party involvement, and political stability, will be used to
show that the presence or absence of these factors could shape how a state decides to
employ extreme forms of coercion to acquire territory or otherwise compromise the vital
interests of other states.490 Escapement is a deviation from the state’s initial strategy. It
refers to a threshold when a state’s equilibrium “escapes” the matrix and the state is
forced to modify its initial strategy. This equilibrium model is driven by E.H. Carr’s
suggestion in his book, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, that striving for peace is a quest for the
equilibrium between power and morality.
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E.H. Carr writes, “The problem of ‘peaceful change’ is, in national politics, how to effect necessary and
desirable changes without revolution and, in international politics, how to effect such changes without war.
Every effective demand for change, like every other effective political force, is compounded of power and
morality; and the object of peaceful change can be expressed in terms neither of pure power nor of pure
morality.” Thus, in Carr’s view, the problem of peaceful change is dependent on finding the equilibrium
between power and morality. Carr, pp. 191-192
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To find the balance that forces a state to escape equilibrium, I have five
hypotheses to be tested.
•
•
•
•
•

Escapement is less likely when the distribution of power between the parties is
somewhat symmetrical.
Escapement is less likely when there is general economic satisfaction and
availability of choices for people to enjoy the value of doing or being something.
Escapement is less likely when there is a third-party threat or involvement against
at least one of the parties directly involved in the territorial issue.
Escapement is less likely when the state’s political stability and its governing
capabilities are not threatened.
Any combination of at least three failures of the four factors increases the
likelihood of escapement. Assuming there is an underlying conflict between two
entities, one state’s chance to take coercive action against the other is greater if
any of these factors change.

For graphical reference, the factors may be arranged using a matrix.

Figure 10: Escapement Matrix

As long as equilibrium is kept among these four quadrants, peaceful or no territorial
change is likely. For this study, I will use the following parameters: military capabilities
to measure power distribution, economic factors to determine well-being, political

213

stability, and 3rd party involvement as an interventionist. I argue that when three or more
factors are absent, the prospect of a state engaging in violent predation is high.

Distribution of Power and Military Capabilities
The distribution of power is essential to understanding any process involving
negotiation and bargaining. This structural variable determines the parameters and
opportunities of interaction whether both parties are symmetric or asymmetrical. My first
hypothesis is: Escapement is less likely when the distribution of power between the
parties is somewhat symmetrical. By somewhat symmetrical, I argue that peace is more
likely when states have roughly equal amounts of capability. Although predicting a
peaceful or violent outcome based on distribution of power is debatable, I argue that
nations having equal amounts of power will be cautious about pursuing their goals
violently. They see their chances of winning as a low payoff if the other state retaliates or
simply resists.491 It is also important to note that incentives to use force are not
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Randolph Siverson and Michael Tennefoss show in their article, “Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of
International Conflict, 1815-1965,” that “equality of national power, supplemented by major power
alliances for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.” They
collected 256 conflicts from 1815 to 1965 and cross-tabulated the conflict data by the power of the
revisionist and the status quo powers. They found that differences in power had a significant impact on the
level of the conflict. On a scale of 1 to 3, with 1 being the lowest level of coercion and 3 being the highest
level of violence, 61.7% of the conflicts never moved beyond the lowest level, and only relatively few
(19.8%) involved mutual military action. In cases where there was asymmetry in power distribution, a
much higher proportion escalated to more violence.
In his article “Stability and the Distribution of Power,” Robert Powell considers both schools of thought.
The balance-of-power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable. The preponderanceof-power school generally argues the opposite, that a preponderance of power is more stable. Powell uses
game theory to argue that the probability of war is minimal when the distribution of the revisionist’s power
mirrors the status quo distribution. When power is symmetric, the gains of using force are too small to
outweigh the cost of fighting. However, when the disparity between the revisionist and status quo powers is
large, then a state may be willing to use force to overturn the other.
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necessarily reserved for the stronger power. As it will be shown later, the asymmetry of
the distribution in the power structure, not a certain state’s bargaining power, is the
significant factor. My concept is only concerned about how much power variance
between the two parties may exacerbate or prolong the dispute.

Economic Satisfaction Factors
Amartya Sen’s 1999 book, Development as Freedom, defined economic wellbeing using his capability approach as having functions and capabilities. The concept of
functioning, how a person may value doing or being, is subjective. Sen argues that, “This
is not because income and wealth are desirable for their own sake, but because, typically,
they are admirable general-purpose means for having more freedom to lead the kind of
lives we have reason to value.” Capabilities, on the other hand, refer to opportunities
people can utilize functioning. The capabilities approach ties the two together. Using this
approach to measure economic satisfaction, the availability of choices, whether to enjoy
certain functions or well-being indicators such as decent labor and living standards, is
more important than wealth accumulation. I argue that when citizens of State X are
satisfied with their lives and enjoy well-being, State X will be less incentivized to take
coercive action against State Y. However, if State X already has economic dissatisfaction
and decides to go against State Y, the impact of State Y’s retaliation on State X’s
slumping economy would not be felt as much compared to a critical attack on a country
with a good economy. Thus, my second hypothesis is: Escapement is less likely when
there is general economic satisfaction and an availability of choices for people to enjoy
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the value of doing or being something. To measure well-being and capabilities, I use life
expectancy, years of education, and GDP per capita. Later, I will combine all three
variables to measure the Human Development Index (HDI) for each country used in the
datasets. If people are given the capability to perform tasks and earn income to help them
live the way they want to, the risk of conflict with other states will decrease. 492

Factors of Credible Third-Party Threats or Involvement
The perception of third-party threats directly relates to the power scheme
described in my first hypothesis. The historian George Blainey suggests, “It is not the
actual distribution or balance of power which is vital: it is rather the way in which
national leaders think that power is distributed.”493 I take the position that perception of a
credible third-party threat or involvement is also dependent on psychological aspects.
These would include the third party as an authoritative figure that could alter the balance
of power between the two states or a judicial entity that could classify an action as illegal
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Several studies have shown that sharp economic downturns and low levels of income increase the
likelihood of conflicts. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler show how there seems to be a causal direction
running from economic conditions to conflict. There is also literature showing how severe lack of positive
health and education outcomes resulting from poverty correlates with conflict. Collier has shown how
growth rates are strongly associated with risks of conflict. The study finds that an increase in 1% from the
mean would decrease the risk of conflict by 0.6 percentage points to 4%. Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios
Skaperdas have also shown using game-theoretic tools such as the contest model to correlate human
development, governance, and conflict. When human development is low, resources may not be allocated
properly and efficiently by a weak government due to institutional instability and low human capital.
Revolutionary leaders could exploit the government’s fault, and chances of overthrowing the current
government increases unless it corrects its faults or suppresses resistance. Thus, low human development
can incentivize rebellion and risk political instability. To compensate, leaders of these impoverished
countries have resorted to authoritarianism to protect the legitimacy of the state. This will be the subject of
political stability, a closely linked issue to economic satisfaction.
493

Italics in original; Blainey, p. 114
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and the violating state would risk losing its place in the international community if it does
not change its behavior. The third-party does not necessarily need to engage in coercion
to be effective. For this factor, I first assess the threat from the third-party and then
analyze under what conditions the threat functions. Does the threat function as an ally to
one or both conflicting parties? Does the third party have any self-interest in intervening?
Despite the topic’s subjectivity, I generalize both questions and record only the presence
or absence of a third-party. Thus, my third hypothesis is: Escapement is less likely when
there is a credible third-party threat or threats against at least one of the parties directly
involved in the territorial issue.494 This is irrespective of whether the threat is against the
status quo or the revisionist state.
Third-party threats or involvement play a significant role in encouraging another
state to comply with the law. On the other hand, a state will have an incentive to violate
the law if it forecasts a greater payoff than the risk of negative consequences.

Political Stability
Richard Rosecrance argues in his book, Action and Reaction in World Politics,
that the primary determinant of international stability and peace in the Westphalian
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Based on eighty-one international conflicts and major civil disputes between 1945 and 1985, Hugh Miall
has shown historical data supporting the argument that early third-party intervention positively correlates
with peaceful resolution. Several scholars have also found similar results. In “Understanding Mediation’s
Role in Preventive Diplomacy,” Jacob Bercovitch found that about two-thirds of post-Cold War conflicts
that were successfully settled had been mediated by a third-party – there was some formal or
institutionalized intervention by an outsider or a third party. Collecting conflicts between 1918 and 1996,
Jonathan Wilkenfeld et al. found that two-thirds of settled international crises involved third-party
mediation. The third-party pressured the parties to resolve the conflict or altered the balance of power by
allying with one of the parties.

217

system from 1740 to 1960 was internal stability and the resulting security of elites, while
domestic instability and elite insecurity were associated with external war. He also argues
that numerous historical case studies suggest that a major cause of individual wars was
political leaders’ motivation to solve their internal problems through a diplomatic or
military victory abroad. Studies also indicate that internal politics have the greatest
impact on foreign policy, providing incentives or disincentives for going to war. I take
the position that political stability and instability relate to a government’s legitimacy.
Combining this position with Rosecrance’s second argument, I find that political leaders
are incentivized to go to war and win to show their legitimacy as a leader.495 To examine
this aspect of the matrix, I use the rule of law index, political violence, institutionalized
democracy scores, health equality, and corruption indices. Thus, my fourth hypothesis is:
Escapement is less likely when the political stability of a state and its governing
capabilities are not threatened.

Putting the Matrix Together

495

States pursue “prestige strategies” to seek international success and bolster their domestic popularity.
This is done to deter domestic political movements from threatening the government’s stability and
governance. Governments that choose these “prestige strategies” sometimes provoke war in the pursuit of a
popular military victory. A.B. Rodger has shown that Napoleon’s demand to increase the French naval
fleet to challenge Britain’s maritime superiority in North Africa was connected to his need for military
success to sustain his domestic legitimacy. Similarly, Russia’s maritime strategy in the North Pacific
during the Russo-Japanese War reflected the need to win a conflict with Japan to avoid backlash from
Russia’s elite. Japan also adopted a similar strategy in the early 20th century. Kenneth B. Pyle showed how
increased Japanese nationalism was the government’s response to the Showa Depression and social
instability due to diminished resources. As vestiges of Marxist and Communist influences and the apparent
success of Soviet Russia started to appear in Japan’s domestic politics, the government’s validation for
legitimacy was industrialization and expansion. These factors dictated Japan’s security agenda into the
1930s and Japanese ambitions for hegemony in World War II. Manfield and Snyder, pp. 33-34; Rodger, pp.
18-21; Malozemov, pp. 41 to 68; Nish, pp. 163, 247
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To graphically explain the escapement concept, I will use supply and demand
curves and the escapement matrix in Figure 10. As discussed earlier, escapement is the
tendency of a state to deviate from its normal behavior. I will first identify the
equilibrium, the steady point in which an entity is not expected to change or take drastic
action spontaneously. I will then explore what changes will be required to keep the
curves within the matrix when either supply or demand changes.
While the factors in the matrix may change, the last factor to fail for a given
conflict should be placed in the lower or upper right quadrant. To show how an
equilibrium shifts, I will use a supply and demand graph.
As shown in Figure 11, suppose that the supply curve for food is Qs = 2P. The
demand curve for food is QD = 12 – P. To find the equilibrium, I will set quantity
demanded and quantity supplied equally: QD = QS.
Q D = QS
Q = 12 – P = 2P = QS
12 = 3P
4 = PE
D

Plugging the optimal P (PE) into the supply or demand curve equations, I get QE = 8.
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Figure 11: Supply and Demand Curves for Food

However, if the population increased and groceries ran out of food, this would cause the
demand curve to become QD = 27 – P as shown in Figure 12.
Q D = QS
QD = 27 – P = 2P = QS
27 = 3P
9 = PE

Figure 12: Supply and Increased Demand for Food
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Since the equilibrium has shifted due to the increased demand, supply will also need to
increase to meet people’s demands. If supply remains constant, this would also increase
food prices as shown by the new price equilibrium (PE = 9) as shown in Figure 12.
However, an increase in food prices would force people to find alternatives to satisfy
their needs. Depending on the severity of the food shortage, people’s reactions may
include peacefully finding alternate groceries with food, protesting the government, or
resorting to violence. Prices will increase if nothing is done, so quantity demanded must
shift the supply curve to the right as shown in Figure 13 to keep the same price. The
government and the market will need to find ways to increase supply and reduce the
price. It could be done by increasing the number of sources and introducing alternate
products to the market.

Figure 13: Supply Increases to Keep Price
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In a territorial conflict, this scenario can be translated as two countries vying for
dominance over a resource. In this case, a state with increasing demand and few
resources will need to increase the number of resources for supply. However, how far
would the state go to find these additional resources? Would this mean violating another
state’s territory and challenging its jurisdiction? How strong would be the incentive to
resort to violence? Applying the escapement matrix, I argue that this method may
determine to what extent people may react.
The matrix rotates allowing the last factor to fail to be in the lower or upper right
quadrant whichever the equilibrium last rested before escapement.496 The circle allows
for situations with all four factors present. However, even then, it cannot achieve perfect
equilibrium. In situations where a line passes through the circle, all four factors are
present, but at varying strengths.
Putting the four factors together, Figure 14 shows the escapement model in
perfect equilibrium.

496

Since not all factors could possibly be equal in strength in a given situation, the last factor to fail will be
critical in keeping peace.
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Figure 14: Escapement Model in Perfect Equilibrium

I substituted price (vertical line) with judgments and quantity (horizontal line) with
principles. Applying John Rawls’ reflective equilibrium argument, that getting to a
decision where there is a balance between our principles and our judgment of what is
right or wrong, I find that the state’s principles include the responsibility to protect and
provide to satisfy the demands of its citizens.497 It includes upholding the rule of law and

497

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we
can revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to
revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at
others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find
a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which
match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective
equilibrium. Rawls, p. 18, Likewise, the state weighs factors before deciding to violate the law.; In
Chapters 13 and 14 of the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes describes the social contract as the responsibility of
the sovereign to make and enforce laws to secure a peaceful society. Similarly, John Locke believed that
the role of government was to protect its citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. If the government
failed to provide these protections, the social contract was broken, and the people had the right to revolt and
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good governance. The government provides its services to fulfill these responsibilities,
and providing services is correlated with the quantity that may be needed to supply the
demand. On the judgement line, the state’s initial judgement or reaction to a situation
includes actions that are innate and automatic self-preserving behavior patterns to ensure
survival in an anarchic context. Since the state is composed of people, the brain’s natural
function as the source of primitive emotions such as fear and aggression will arguably be
present regardless of the state.498 However, given a person’s cognitive abilities, the final
decision will result from finding the equilibrium after the competition between principles
and judgements. The state’s initial reaction or judgement correlates with the price people
want to pay to satisfy their demands for a resource.

Escaping the Matrix
Perfect equilibrium, where all four factors are equally present and stable, will not
be achievable. The model is dynamic, and a factor will always dominate the matrix. The
following models show the relationship when either supply or demand is controlled.

establish a new government. Charles Montesquieu also followed this argument and wrote that the main
purpose of government is to maintain law and order, liberty, and protect the property of the citizen.
498

The discussion on how the brain works is beyond the scope of this study. However, research has shown
that it is natural for all people to have aggression and impulsive reactions because of the brain’s
neurobiology. Connor et al. 2006; Nelson and Trainor 2007; and Blair 2016.

224

Figure 15: Controlling the Supply Curve

As shown in Figure 15, when supply stays the same while demand increases, the same
amount of supply will only go so far before the equilibrium escapes the matrix. In this
case, the equation will be similar to Figure 13, where QD increased from 12 to 27.

Figure 16: Controlling the Demand Curve

Likewise, if the demand curve is controlled and supply increases, the same amount of
demand will only go so far before the equilibrium escapes the matrix. In this case, the
model will be similar to Figure 16. As shown in Figures 15 and 16, every time one of the
curves moves, the equilibrium significantly moves up or down. This shift in the
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equilibrium may result in the severity or likelihood of changing its initial strategy. To
prevent this, the supply and demand curves need to shift simultaneously as shown in
Figure 17. In this case, when demand increases, supply will also increase.

Figure 17: Simultaneous Shift

A simultaneous shift would keep the equilibrium at roughly similar levels. However, this
would not last long. There is only limited supply. If the supplier wants to keep the same
equilibrium level, it will have to increase supply as the demand increases even if that
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means escaping the matrix. Breakpoints may be identified as the threshold before the
equilibrium escapes. As the supply curve traverses less quadrants, the likelihood of
deviating to a new strategy increases. If the curve only runs through one quadrant, the
equilibrium will likely escape the matrix and the state will deviate from its initial
strategy. The supply or demand curve must traverse at least the two right quadrants of the
matrix to maintain peace. This corresponds to the fifth hypothesis that at least three
failures of the four factors increase the likelihood of escapement. However, what keeps
the equilibrium from moving? The Nash equilibrium and game theory may provide
insight on keeping the equilibrium within the matrix.

Game Theory, Nash equilibrium, and Compliance with International Law
Although I am not aware of works discussing what may move the equilibrium,
there is literature written about how a state keeps the equilibrium by complying with
international law. Several schools of thought explain why states comply with
international law. First, some schools of thought say that states act in their self-interest
and ignore international legal norms when they run against the state’s agenda.499 Another
school concludes that states follow international law because states risk losing reputation
and hinder the ability to increase reputational interests and negotiate future agreements

499

Abbott, p. 337-338; Setear (1996), p.139
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that are in their interests.500 However, both schools agree that states do not comply with
international law simply because it is the law.
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s The Limits of International Law used basic
economics and game theory to explain how international law emerges from and is
sustained by states acting rationally to maximize their interests. They argued that states
follow international law because participants are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.501 In their
recent review of Limits, Goldsmith and Posner summarized their theory.
International law refers to equilibrium outcomes in games of
cooperation and coordination among rational, self-interested
states…International law can be, and often is, effective and stable
because once cooperation begins, it is in the rational self-interest of
states to maintain it. But international law can be, and often is, violated,
as the relative power of states change, the preferences of states changes,
and new problems arise…International law may be normatively
desirable for the simple reason that it facilitates mutual gains across
states. But it need not be: states frequently act in predatory fashion, and
can use international law to entrench normatively undesirable
outcomes.502
The equilibrium mentioned in their book is defined as a point where “two states will
continue engaging in this behavior as long as the underlying payoffs do not change.”503
According to their theory, a new equilibrium or a proposal to revise existing international

500

Setear (1997), pp. 1, 8, 74-75

501

Goldsmith and Posner (2005) says “[w]hen states cooperate in their self-interest, they naturally use the
moralistic language of obligation rather than the strategic language of interest. But saying that the former is
evidence of moral motivation is like saying that when states talk of friendship or brotherhood they use these
terms, which are meant to reflect aspirations for closer relations, in a literal sense” pp. 32 and 184
502

Goldsmith and Posner (2021) p.4

503

Goldsmith and Posner (2005), p. 28
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law happens when it better serves the interests of the state and the interests of other states
that have sufficient power and influence.504 Several scholars criticized Goldsmith and
Posner’s rational choice framework and use of game theory. They claimed that the book’s
arguments framed international law as irrelevant or nonexistent.505 Others argued that
these approaches were simply incompatible with international law.506 However, the
common criticism was that Goldsmith and Posner focused too closely on international
law as a function of national interest and distribution of power. As the authors
acknowledged in their recent review, the book was based on theories and minimal
empirical work.507
Other scholars have also examined international law from a game theory
perspective. Applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain compliance, Andrew T.
Guzman’s How International Law Works – A Rational Choice Theory argues that states
are more likely to comply with their legal obligations if a violation of international law
will negatively impact the State’s “three Rs of compliance: reciprocity, retaliation, and
repudiation. Reciprocity refers to States’ incentive to honor their international law
obligations out of fear that other States will violate their corresponding obligations if the
State does not honor its obligations. Retaliation refers to the threat of sanctions against
States that do not comply with their obligations. Repudiation refers to the claim that
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Ibid. p. 195
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Trachtman p.117; Murphy, p.3
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Raustiala, p.429
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Goldsmith and Posner (2021), p. 8
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States suffer “reputational payoffs” when they violate their obligations under
international law. 508
Robert E. Scott and Paul B Stephan’s The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory
and the Enforcement of International Law argues that “formal enforcement” for
cooperative relationships can happen when verified by a third party with credible
coercive powers. If there is no coercive power to enforce compliance, they will rely on
“informal enforcement”.509 They define formal enforcement as a legally binding decision
rendered by an independent tribunal, while informal enforcement is when states comply
with the law because they fear retaliation from a third party or the victim itself.510
Borrowing from literature written about game theories and contract law, Scott and
Stephan argue that self-enforcement or compliance with international law is driven by
reputational costs and reciprocity.511
In their article, “The emergence and evolution of customary international law,”
Francesco Parisi and Daniel Pi examine compliance with international law from the
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Guzman says, "[W]hen states enter into international agreements, they are in effect pledging their
repudiation as a form of bond. If they violate the agreement, they give up some of this reputational
collateral, and this fact both increases the likelihood that they will comply and makes their promise more
credible." Guzman, p. 40
509

Scott and Stephan, p.16-20

510

Ibid. pp 8-9

511

Scott and Stephan use Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt’s inequity aversion theory to argue that people
compare themselves with others in their group to find the equality of distribution. Inequity aversion forces
people to respond to an inequity in a contractual relationship either by rewarding a generous action or
punishing a selfish action. Scott and Stephan find the theory to have important implications on selfenforcement. They say, “If one can count on self-enforcement to deliver the same gross benefits as formal
enforcement, self-enforcement will be superior simply because it is less costly. In addition, parties to selfenforcing agreements can condition performance on observable factors that might not be verifiable to a
third party. Ibid. pp. 89-92
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perspective of a fragile equilibrium between short-sighted opportunism and long-term
rules. They first consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but they critique its application to
comply with international law because the game is conditional that the players are not
allowed to communicate.512 They also consider other coordination games but conclude
that self-interest is what motivates states to comply with the agreement.513 Considering
ways to avoid treaty fragmentation, they argue that “forming agreements limited to
participation by homogenous nations, i.e., where costs and benefits for all the parties are
similar” creates a situation where “low-cost/high-benefit nations may avoid the problem
of treaty fragmentation that may arise from multilateral agreements with heterogeneous
parties.”514 It may also include tailoring treaties to the economic and technological
development of states by setting variable requirements in the treaty.515
So far, the arguments in the articles discussed focus on the state’s self-interest to
comply with international law. However, Jens David Ohlin’s article, “Nash Equilibrium
and International Law,” argues that “the best way to understand international law is as a
Nash Equilibrium—a focal point that states gravitate toward as they make rational
decisions regarding strategy in light of strategies selected by other states.” This may be
another perspective to explore why countries would deviate from their initial strategy.516
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Parisi and Pi, p. 109
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Ibid. p. 110
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Ibid. p.119

515

Ibid. p. 119
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Ohlin, Abstract
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The Nash Equilibrium may explain the reason why a state would not unilaterally change
its strategy because it sees no reason why it should.
The self-enforcing nature of the Nash Equilibrium is often illustrated using the
driving game. Suppose two cars are driving at each other from perpendicular directions.
The stoplight is red for one car and green for the other. The Nash Equilibrium would
argue that even without a police force to regulate traffic, both drivers would have
incentives to follow the law. If both drivers go, they will crash into each other. If both
drivers stop, they will waste time. However, if one goes and the other stops, the one with
the green light gets to the destination quicker than the one with the red light. Following
the stop light is a Nash Equilibrium because there is no incentive for either driver to
switch strategies. Switching strategies that run against the stoplight would either cause a
crash or waste time.
However, it should be added that this scenario is only applicable under three
conditions. First, both cars must be capable of running at more or less the same speed.
Second, both drivers do not have very strong incentives to get to their destination quickly
so far as to risk crashing into each other. Third, both drivers must agree that they are
better off following the law.
It is also possible to move the equilibrium in this scenario. This is where
escapement may be applied. Violating the stop light requires three conditions. First, one
car must be capable of moving faster than the other. Second, one of the drivers must have
a very strong incentive to get to the destination quickly even if it means running the risk
of crashing into each other. Third, one driver must be satisfied that the violating the law
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was justified. A strong incentive is not enough to not cooperate. The driver would still
need a faster car and risk-taking mindset to prevent a crash and successfully outwit the
other driver.
This scenario can be translated to international law. States cannot predict when
the Security Council will authorize the use of force. Therefore, they cannot rely on the
Council to protect them in case another state attacks them. In this case, states reserve the
right to use force in self-defense because even if another state changes strategy and
decides to use force, the victim state can defend itself by deploying a proportional
response. Given the uncertainty about both states’ strategies, it would be in the best
interest of both states to comply with international law and restrain the use of force unless
the incentive to violate the law is too strong, the violator state is much more powerful and
finds that it can get away with using force, and the violator state is satisfied that violating
the law is justified. Thus, a revisionist state needs to satisfy certain criteria before
projecting actual power and establishing new norms or move to a new equilibrium. The
concept of escapement may provide a framework to determine the criteria a state needs to
meet and become a revisionist.

Applying Statistics
Sources
Military capabilities
Correlates of War Project - National Material Capabilities (v5.0)
https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities Accessed March 21,
2021
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Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). "Capability Distribution,
Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and
Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage, 19-48.
Economic Factors
Life expectancy. Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on Human Mortality Database
(2008), Riley (2005a, 2005b), Human Life Table Database (2007), United Nations
Population Division (2010). Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Human Mortality
Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2017), World Bank (2013), MontevideoOxford Latin America Economic History Database
(http://moxlad.fcs.edu.uy/es/basededatos.html).
Average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older. Clio Infra
(clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), US Census Bureau,
UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2014), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári
(2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen
(2012).
GDP per capita. Maddison Project Database, version 2020
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-projectdatabase-2020 Accessed March 21, 2021
Political Stability
Rule of law index. V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
2020. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v11/ Accessed March 21, 2021
Political Corruption index. V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
Project. 2020. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v11/ Accessed March
21, 2021
Political violence. V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
2020. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v11/ Accessed March 21, 2021
Institutionalized democracy. V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
Project. 2020. https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v11/ Accessed March
21, 2021
Health equality. V-Dem Codebook v10" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. 2020.
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data/v-dem-dataset-v11/ Accessed March 21, 2021
Third-Party involvement
Third-party involvement was done by surveying each case study and identifying another
country expressing interest or actively participating in the dispute.
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Dataset Description
Collecting territorial transitions from 1817 to 1992, I sampled 97 case studies in
total: 74 non-violent and 23 violent territorial disputes. The sample datasets are based on
Garry Goertz and Paul Diehl’s Territorial Change Coding Manual and from C.R.M.F.
Cruttwell’s A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World.

Year

Territory

Status quo

Revisionist

Outcome

1853

Palestine

Russia

France

Crimean War

1877

Turkey

Turkey

Russia

War of 1877-78

Atacama

Chile

Bolivia

Pacific War

Bulgaria

Bulgaria

Serbia

2nd Balkan War

1929-32

Chaco Boreal

Paraguay

Bolivia

Chaco War

1932 to 1939

Lake Khasan,
Manchuria

Japan

USSR

stagnation

1938

Czechoslovakia

UK/France

Germany

invasion (1939)

1939

Finland

Finland

USSR

Winter War

1941

Oriente/Mainas

Peru

Ecuador

war, stagnation

1947-49

Palestine

Israel

Transjordan

war, stagnation

1947-48

Kashmir

Pakistan
North Korea,
USSR

Kashmir

1878-79
1913

1950

Korea

India
South Korea,
US

1948

Hyderabad

Hyderabad

India

Korean War
invasion - Annexation
of Hyderabad

1954

Taiwan Strait

Taiwan

China

Taiwan Strait Crisis

1961

Goa

Portugal

India

invasion (1961)

1961

West Irian

Netherlands

Indonesia

invasion (1961)

1962

Aksai Chin

China

India

China-India War
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1963

Sarawak

Malaysia

Indonesia

"Confrontation"

Kashmir

India

Pakistan

Kashmir War (1965)

1971

Bangladesh

Pakistan

India

secession, war

1973

Sinai, Golan

Israel

Arab states

Yom Kippur War

1976

Ogaden
Falkland
Islands
NagornoKarabakh

Ethiopia

Somalia

war (1976-)

UK/France

Argentina

war and stagnation

Azerbaijan

Armenia

war

1949-64

1982
1992

Figure 18. Sample of Violent Territorial Change

Status quo

Revisionis
t
Outcome

1815 Switzerland

Prussia, Austria

France

Status change

1817

Great Lakes

UK

US

Status change

1818

Oregon, Astoria

UK

US

exchange

1819

Florida

Spain

US

mixed transfer

1839

Belgium

Netherlands

Belgium

Status change

1842

Maine

UK

US

mixed transfer

1846

Oregon, Astoria

UK

US

mixed transfer

1851

Yaguaron

Uruguay

Brazil

cession

1853
1860

Arizona
Amazonas

Mexico
Venezuela

US
Brazil

cession
cession

1860

Savoy/Nice

Italy

France

cession

1864

Ionian Island

UK

Greece

mixed transfer

1866

Atacama

Bolivia

Chile

cession

1867

Alaska

Russia

US

cession

1867

Acre-Abuna

Bolivia

Brazil

cession

Year

Territory

236

1867

Luxembourg

Netherlands

France

status change

1875

Sakhalin/Kuriles

Japan

Russia

exchange

1878

Cyprus

Turkey

UK

status change

1878

Bosnia/Herzegovina

Turkey

Austria

status change

1878

Dobruja/Bessarabia

Romania

Russia

exchange

1878

Ardahan/Kars/Batumi

Russia

exchange

1878

Antivari

Turkey

Turkey
Montenegr
o

1881

Thessaly/Epirus

Turkey

Greece

cession

1881

Illi Valley

Russia

China

cession

1895

Misiones

Argentina

Brazil

cession

1899

Br. Guiana/Venezuela

UK

Venezuela

mixed transfer

1900

Amapa

France

Brazil

mixed transfer

1902
1903

Patagonia/Los Andes
Alaska

Chile
UK

Argentina
US

exchange
mixed transfer

1903

Acre-Abuna

Bolivia

Brazil

exchange

1904

Pirara

UK

Brazil

mixed transfer

1904
1907

Iza
Apaporis

Ecuador
Colombia

Brazil
Brazil

cession
cession

1909

Acre-Abuna/Madre de
Dios

Bolivia

Peru

cession

1920

Teschen

Czechoslovakia

Poland

exchange

1920

Carinthia

Yugoslavia

Austria

cession

1920

Trieste

Yugoslavia

Italy

cession

1920

Schleswig North

Germany

Denmark

cession

1921
1921

Burgenland
Batumi

Hungary
Turkey

Austria
USSR

cession
cession

1921

Aland Island

Finland

Sweden

status change

1922

Arauca/Yavita

Venezuela

Colombia

cession

1922

Upper Silesia

Poland

Germany

exchange

237

status change

1922

Shantung

Japan

China

cession

1925

North Sakhalin

Japan

USSR

cession

1929

Tacna/Arica

Chile

Peru

cession

1934

Leticia

Peru

Colombia

cession

1934
1933

Cuba
Saar

US
France

Cuba
Germany

status change
cession

1951

Chandernagor

France

India

mixed transfer

1954

Trieste

Italy

Yugoslavia

status change

1955

Austria

USSR

US/UK/Fra
nce

status change

1957

Saar

France

Germany

cession

1958

Tarfaya

Spain

Morocco

mixed transfer

1959

Wadi Halfa

Sudan

UAR

status change

1959

Antartic Island

UK

Chile,
Argentina

status change

1960

Indus Canal

India

Pakistan

status change

1960

Coco River

Honduras

Nicaragua

cession

1960

Namwan Tract

Burma

China

exchange

1961
1963

Mt. Everest
Sinkiang

China
China

Nepal
Pakistan

cession
cession

1963

Eastern Hodh

Mauritania

Mali

exchange

1963

Chamizal Tract

US

Mexico

cession

1968

Rann of Kutch

India

Pakistan

exchange

1969

Ifni

Spain

Morocco

mixed transfer

1970

Gadaduma Wells

Kenya

Ethiopia

exchange

1971

South Tirol

Italy

Austria

status change
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1971

Ryukyu Island

US

Japan

mixed transfer

1975

Shatt-al-Arab

Iraq

Iran

cession

1975

Spanish Sahara

Spain

Morocco

mixed transfer

1977
1978

Panama Canal
Sinai

US
Israel

Panama
Egypt

mixed transfer
cession

1984

Hong Kong

UK

China

status change

1984

Beagle Channel

Chile

Argentina

status change

1989

Taba

Israel

Egypt

cession

Figure 19. Sample of Peaceful Territorial Change

Figure 20. Distribution of Violent vs. Non-Violent Case Studies

Variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Year – Date of the transfer (nominal)
Territory – Disputed territory (nominal)
Status quo – Country initially controlling disputed territory (nominal)
Revisionist – Country contesting disputed territory (nominal)
Iron/steel production (thousands of tons) measures trends from 1816 to 2012.
The data also looks at transitions concerning the categories of iron produced and
the types of fuels used in making iron and steel. Since iron and steel are widely
used for military products such as ammunition, this data can indicate a country’s
military capability. (continuous)
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6. Military expenditure (in thousands) measures each state’s total military budget
in each year from 1816 to 2012. For data before 1914, the data was converted to
British pounds. Data after 1914 is in U.S. dollars. According to a RAND report,
“the size of the defense budget serves to identify the relative importance of the
coercive arm in comparison to other organs of state, and it conveys a general
sense of the size of the military establishment in absolute terms.” Military
expenditure will be used to analyze power distribution. (continuous)
7. Military Personnel (in thousands) measures a state’s military personnel in each
year for the period 1816-2012. These are people under the command of the
national government intended to defend the country against foreign adversaries.
(continuous)
8. Primary energy consumption (in thousands) measures a state’s consumption of
energy in each year from 1816 to 2012. (continuous)
9. Life expectancy measures the expected longevity at birth based on current agespecific mortality rates in each year from 1800 to 2018. (continuous)
10. Years of education measures the average years of education in the total
population aged 15 years and older in each year from 1820 to 2019. (continuous)
11. GDP per capita measures gross domestic production on a per capita basis in each
year from 1789 to 2016. (continuous)
12. Rule of law index measures the extent laws are transparently, independently,
predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions
of government officials comply with the law. (continuous)
13. Political violence measures how often non-state actors have used political
violence domestically in each year from 1900 to 2019. (ordinal and index) How
often is political violence each year?
0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.
1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.
2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.
3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.
4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.
14. Institutionalized democracy measures the presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about
alternative policies and leaders, the existence of institutionalized constraints on
the exercise of power by the executive and the guarantee of civil liberties to all
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. The Democracy
indicator is an additive eleven-point scale with 0 representing no democracy and
10 representing strong democracy.
15. Health equality measures the extent high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to
all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult
citizens. (ordinal)
0: Extreme - 75% of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as
adult citizens is undermined.
1: Unequal – 25% of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as
adult citizens is undermined.
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2: Somewhat equal - 10 – 25% of citizens’ ability to exercise their
political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
3: Relatively equal – 5 – 10% of citizens’ ability to exercise their political
rights as adult citizens is undermined.
4: Equal - less than 5% of citizens cannot exercise their basic political
rights as adult citizens.
16. Political corruption index measures both “petty” and “grand” offenses.
(continuous)
17. Third-party involvement categorizes whether or not another country actively
supporting or making threats. (dummy-ordinal)
Before testing the four variables, descriptive statistics were first used to determine
how each variable may impact an outcome. To give a bird’s-eye view of the dataset,
distributions and correlations are used to chart the variables from 1817 to 1992 and
compare peaceful and violent variables. Comments on the implications for each
comparison are provided below each graph. These appendices provided an initial
foundation to build the contingency tables in the next section.
Contingency Tables
To identify joint frequencies, joint probabilities, and conditional probabilities,
contingency tables were constructed.
First hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when the distribution of power between the
parties is somewhat symmetrical.
To analyze if the power distribution between countries has an impact on a violent
or peaceful outcome, the percentage of military expenditure relative to its GDP was first
taken. This meant isolating cases where both military expenditure and GDP were
reported. According to a RAND report, “the size of the defense budget serves to identify
the relative importance of the coercive arm in comparison to other organs of state, and it
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conveys a general sense of the size of the military establishment in absolute terms.” Thus,
the share of military expenditure from the GDP was calculated to determine the size of
the defense budget relative to the state’s overall income. A larger share of the defense
budget may indicate an increased interest in arming the country, while a small share of
the defense budget may indicate a decreased interest in financing the military. After the
military expenditure percentages were determined, they were compared between the two
competing powers - revisionist military expenditure versus status quo military
expenditure. To classify them as symmetrical or asymmetrical distribution, anything
above 0.09 (Yes) or below -0.09 (Yes) was scored as asymmetrical. Anything in between
was considered symmetrical (No). Based on the Yes/No classification, a contingency
table was constructed.

Figure 21. Asymmetric Balance of Power? Distribution of Power Contingency Table
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The table shows that there is an 81.25% chance of violent transition when there is
asymmetrical balance of power between the parties. There is a 50% chance of nonviolent
transition when there is symmetrical balance of power.
Second hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when there is general economic
satisfaction and an availability of choices for people to enjoy the value of doing or being
something.
A higher HDI score, an indicator capturing the population’s well-being, shows a
slight preference to be a peaceful revisionist. After HDI scores were calculated using HDI
!

= √𝐿𝐸𝐼 × 𝐸𝐼 × 𝐼𝐼 , the scores were ranked on an ordinal scale. 1 = 0 to .25, 2 = .25 to .50,
3 = .50 to .75, 4 = .75 to 1. Since there were no scores in the fourth rank, only three
categories were used.517

517

In the equation, the acronyms are LEI (life expectancy index), EI (education index), and II (GNI per
capita). For case studies with no GNI available, II was replaced with GDP. Four indices were used, life
expectancy at birth (to assess a long and healthy life); adult literacy (percentage of the population aged over
15 years who can read and write); educational enrolment rates (percentage of population in the relevant age
cohort enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary education); gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (to
assess standard of living). https://ourworldindata.org/human-development-index Accessed May 29, 2021;
https://frdelpino.es/investigacion/en/category/01_social-sciences/02_world-economy/03_humandevelopment-world-economy/?lang=en Accessed May 29, 2021.
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Figure 22. HDI Contingency Table

There is an 18.75% joint probability that the revisionist will choose a violent transition
when its HDI is between .50 and .75. There is a 25% joint probability that the revisionist
will choose a non-violent transition when its HDI is between .50 and .75. Similarly, there
is a 43.75% joint probability of violent transition when HDI is between 0 and .25.
However, there is only a 31.25% joint probability for non-violent transition when HDI is
between 0 and .25.
Third hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when there is a third-party threat or threats
against at least one of the parties directly involved in the territorial issue.
The presence or absence of a third-party threat was qualitatively analyzed and
answered with Yes (3rd-party present) and No (3rd-party absent). The table below shows
that non-violent transition is more likely when a 3rd party is involved. There is a 71.62%
joint probability that non-violent transition will occur when a 3rd party is present. There
is a 52.17% joint probability that violence will occur when no 3rd party is present.
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Figure 23. Contingency Table for 3rd- Party Participation

Out of a total of 97 case studies, 76.2% transitioned nonviolently: 55% with 3rd party
involvement and 22% without. 23.7% transitioned violently: 10% with 3rd party
involvement and 13% without. The pie graph below shows this.

Figure 24. Share of 3rd-party Participation to Outcome
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Fourth hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when the political stability of a state and its
governing capabilities are not threatened.
Two contingency tables were constructed to measure the correlation between the
political stability of the state and its tendency to become a revisionist. The first table
measures the rule of law. The rule of law index was ranked to an ordinal scale by scoring
the index: 1 = 0 to .25, 2 = .25 to .50, 3 = .50 to .75, and 4 = .75 to 1.0.

Figure 25. Contingency Table for Rule of Law

As shown in the table, a stronger presence of the rule of law may indicate a peaceful
territorial transition. 93.55% of the territorial transition cases with a score of four were
resolved peacefully. While scores 2 and 3 have at least 70% chance of peaceful
settlement, there is no significant difference between the two scores.
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Figure 26. Contingency Table for Political Violence 1900 – 1992

The second contingency table (Figure 26) measures political violence to determine the
level of political stability.518 Due to the data limitation, the contingency table only
considers conflicts from 1900 to 1992. The table ranges from 0 where there is no political
violence and 4 where political violence happens often. As shown, category 4 tends to be a
revisionist with 63.64% of cases in category 4 turning revisionist. For this table, I did not
differentiate between peaceful or violent revisionist or status quo. On the other hand,
60% of cases in category 1, kept the status quo.

518

Alesina and Perotti (1996), Gupta et al (1998), Rodriguez (2000), Blanco and Grier (2000) consider
social unrest as political instability. Their measurement of political instability focuses more on a society’s
reaction towards government such as the number of protests or the episodes of political violence due to
internal war as a measure of political instability.
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Fifth hypothesis: Any combination of at least three failures of the four factors increases
the likelihood of escapement. Assuming that there is an underlying conflict between two
entities, one state’s chance to take coercive action against the other is greater if any of
these factors change.
Due to limitations in the dataset, the contingency table below only considers
conflicts starting from 1920. Cases were chosen by the completeness of the data covering
all four factors of the matrix. Cases with missing data were eliminated. In total, there
were 28 peaceful and 20 violent cases.

Figure 27. How Many Factors Were Present?

As the table shows, 85.71% of those with no factors present resorted to violence and 70%
of violent cases only have one factor. Cases with two, three, and four factors present
resulted in peaceful transition of territory. Thus, it takes at least three factors to be absent
from the matrix to increase the likelihood of violent conflict.
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Hypothesis tests for the Violent and Peaceful Revisionist
First hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when the distribution of power between the
parties is somewhat symmetrical.
Statement to test Distribution of Power
Since the symmetrical balance of power assumes there are no power differences between
State X and State Y, I assign 0 to represent symmetric distribution.
Null Hypothesis: The distribution of power in violent territorial transition is μ = 0.
Alternate Hypothesis: The distribution of power in violent territorial change is μ ≠ 0.
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is 3.9813.
b. There is a 0.0012 higher probability than hypothesized value of 0.
c. There is a 0.0006 lower probability than hypothesized value of 0.
d. Since the test statistic is above 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
To find the critical value and rejection region, I calculated the mean.
Null Hypothesis: The distribution of power in violent territorial transition is μ < 10.6.
Alternate Hypothesis: The distribution of power in violent territorial change is μ ≥ 10.6.
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is -1.9692.
b. There is a 0.9662 higher probability than hypothesized value of 10.6.
c. There is a 0.0338 lower probability than hypothesized value of 10.6.
d. Since the test statistic is above 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
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Figure 28. The Distribution of Power in Violent Territorial Change is μ ≥ 10.6

Null Hypothesis: The distribution of power in peaceful territorial transition is μ > 6.1.
Alternate Hypothesis: The distribution of power in peaceful territorial change is μ ≤ 6.1.
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is -1.9761.
b. There is a 0.9724 higher probability than hypothesized value of 6.1.
c. There is a 0.0276 lower probability than hypothesized value of 6.1.
d. Since the test statistic is below 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
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Figure 29. The Distribution of Power in Peaceful Territorial Change is μ ≤ 6.1

Interpretation
Therefore, peaceful territorial transition is more likely when the balance of power is more
symmetric.
Second hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when there is general economic
satisfaction and an availability of choices for people to enjoy the value of doing or being
something.
Statement to test economic satisfaction based on HDI
Null Hypothesis: There is violent territorial change when HDI is somewhat high with μ >
0.25.
Alternate Hypothesis: There is violent territorial change when HDI is somewhat low with
μ ≤ 0.25.
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is 1.9841.
b. There is a 0.0353 higher probability than hypothesized value of 0.28.
c. There is a 0.9647 lower probability than hypothesized value of 0.28.
d. Since the test statistic is above 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
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Figure 30. Revisionist Chooses Violent Territorial Change When HDI is μ ≤ 0.25

Null Hypothesis: There is peaceful territorial change when HDI is somewhat low with μ
< 0.28.
Alternate Hypothesis: There is peaceful territorial change when HDI is somewhat high
with μ ≥ 28.
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is 2.1074.
b. There is a 0.0416 higher probability than hypothesized value of 0.28.
c. There is a 0.9792 lower probability than hypothesized value of 0.28.
d. Since the test statistic is above 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
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Figure 31. Revisionist Chooses Peaceful Territorial Change When HDI is μ ≥ 0.28

Interpretation
Therefore, the revisionist will choose a peaceful territorial transition when it has a
slightly higher level of HDI.

Third hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when there is a credible third-party threat or
threats against at least one of the parties directly involved in the territorial issue.
Since the presence or absence of a 3rd-party threat was qualitatively analyzed and
answered with Yes (3rd-party present) and No (3rd-party absent), a t-test is not applicable.
The contingency table in Figure 23 shows that more revisionists chose peaceful transition
when a 3rd-party threat was present. Thus, the revisionist chose to be peaceful when a 3rdparty threat was present.

Fourth hypothesis: Escapement is less likely when the political stability of a state and its
governing capabilities are not threatened.
I will use the political violence index to test the hypothesis.
Statement to test political stability based on the political violence index.
Null Hypothesis: There is violent territorial change when political violence is somewhat
low when μ < 1.28.
Alternate Hypothesis: There is violent territorial change when political violence is
somewhat high when μ ≥ 1.28 .
1. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
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2. Choice: t-test
3. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
4. Sample-decision
a. Test statistic is -1.9922.
b. There is a 0.9682 higher probability than hypothesized value of 1.28.
c. There is a 0.0318 lower probability than hypothesized value of 1.28.
d. Since the test statistic is below 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.

Figure 32. Revisionist Chooses Violent Territorial Change When Political Violence is μ ≥
1.28

Null Hypothesis: There is peaceful territorial change when political violence is somewhat
high when μ > 0.7.
Alternate Hypothesis: There is violent territorial change when political violence is
somewhat high when μ ≤ 0.7.
5. Significance: 0.05 = 95% confidence
6. Choice: t-test
7. When α = 0.05 level of significance for a two-tailed test, anything above + 1.96 or
anything below -1.96 the null hypothesis should be rejected. This is a Type 1
error. The alternate hypothesis should be accepted.
8. Sample-decision
e. Test statistic is 2.6938.
f. There is a 0.0108 higher probability than hypothesized value of 0.7.
g. There is a 0.0054 lower probability than hypothesized value of 0.7.
h. Since the test statistic is above 1.96, the null hypothesis should be
rejected.
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Figure 33. Revisionist Chooses Peaceful Territorial Change When Political Violence is μ ≤
0.7

Interpretation
The revisionist will choose a peaceful territorial transition when it has lower levels of
political violence.
Fifth hypothesis: Any combination of at least three failures of the four factors increases
the likelihood of escapement. Assuming that there is an underlying conflict between two
entities, one state’s chance to take coercive action against the other is greater if any of
these factors change.
Since the presence or absence of the four factors was qualitatively analyzed and answered
with Yes and No answers, a t-test is not applicable. As shown in Figure 27, 85.71% of
those with no factors present resorted to violence and 70% of violent cases only have one
factor, while the revisionist chose peaceful transition during instances where there were
at least two factors present. Thus, at least three failures of the four factors in the matrix
significantly increases the likelihood of violence.
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Appendix D: Escapement Graphs for China’s Assertion in the South China Sea
January 1974: Battle of the Paracel Islands
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: No
Symmetric balance of power was the last to fail between China and Vietnam’s military
capabilities. The absence of a third-party threat, in this case the U.S., is only second for
China’s motivations to deviate from their initial strategy.

Figure 34. Escapement for the Battle of the Paracels (1974)
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March 1988: The Johnson South Reef Skirmish
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: No
During this period of political and economic uncertainty, China’s goal was to secure the
resources in the South China Sea, even if it meant violence. The last factor to fail was
political stability. Economic dissatisfaction seemed to have only fueled political
instability.

Figure 35. Escapement for Johnson South Reef Skirmish (1988)
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1992 to 1995 – Chinese oil drilling, seizure of Mischief Reef within Philippines EEZ, and
deterioration of Sino-Philippine relations
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: Yes
3rd-party threat/involvement: No
Based on the timeline and on China’s intent, the renewed assertion of jurisdiction in 1992
was fueled by need for economic resources. According to Andrew Chubb, “more than
one-third of the newly assertive Chinese actions identified in 1992–94 concerned energy
resources, compared to around 10 percent in earlier surge periods.”519

Figure 36. Escapement for Chinese Oil Drilling (1992 to 1995)
519

https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3Y7NRU Accessed May 27,
2021 Chubb, p. 110
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March 5, 2009 – Chinese Gray Zone Tactics
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: No
For this period, meeting economic needs seemed to be China’s primary motivation for the
renewed assertion. Economic satisfaction was the last factor to fail before China resorted
to gray zone tactics.

Figure 37. Escapement for Chinese Gray Zone Operations (2009)
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2012 to July 2016 – China’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal, acceleration of island
reclamation and development of artificial islands, and oil rig standoff with Vietnam
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: No
3rd-party threat/involvement: Yes
Growth rate has dropped from above 10% in 2010 to below 7% sometime before
2016. Further, regulations have hurt jobs and risked mass unemployment.520 Thus, to
compensate the loss on the mainland, China may have seen the South China Sea as
another opportunity to exploit. Economic satisfaction was the last factor to fail before
China renewed coercion. Third-party threats were still present, hence that category will
be in the lower right quadrant.

Figure 38. Escapement for China’s Seizure of Scarborough Shoal
520

Daniel Shane. “China takes economic hit as environment nears 'point of no return'.” CNN. (November
27, 2017). https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/27/news/economy/china-crackdown-pollutioneconomy/index.html Accessed May 27, 2021; Wei Yao, an economist at Societe Generale said "Chinese
people are very concerned about pollution, so it makes sense for the leading party to respond,..What's most
important to [the party] is social stability." "The pace of implementing the anti-pollution moves is the
critical element," she said, warning that the government could risk mass unemployment if it moves too
quickly.
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February 2017: The Absence of a Third-Party Threat
Symmetric balance of power: No
Economic Satisfaction: No
Political stability: Yes
3rd-party threat/involvement: No
In this case, China’s political stability is still present, but the third-party threats
quadrant is the last factor to fail before deviating from its initial strategy.

Figure 39. Escapement for 2017
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